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Abstract
The most important transformation in the international economy over the last two decades
has been the rise of the BRIC economies – those of Brazil, Russia, India and China. These
countries have experienced massive economic growth, and play an increasingly critical role
in global trade in goods. More recently, BRICs – especially China – have taken on yet
another critical role as sources of loans to developing countries. While loans from wealthy
democracies to developing countries declined from $216 billion in the 1990s to $128 billion
in the 2000s, loans from BRIC governments increased from $9 billion to $85 billion. Cash-
strapped governments often find loans from BRIC lenders attractive because they come
with fewer “strings” attached. Yet what is puzzling is that despite the apparent benefits
of such loans, only a third of all developing countries have jumped at the opportunity to
abandon the United States and the IMF by borrowing from China instead. That is, most
governments have not taken advantage of loan offers by BRICs, but continue to faithfully
borrow from traditional creditors. Given the apparent availability of “easy money,” why
do some developing countries choose BRIC loans over IMF loans while others do not?
My dissertation is the first to systematically explore the response by developing countries
to loan offers by BRICs. I argue that the key determinant of loan choice is the relative
power of Labor interests versus those of Finance and Industry. Because the loans offered
by the World Bank and IMF have systematically different conditions than loan offers
from BRICs, they create different relative winners and losers among Industry, Finance
and Labor. Loans from traditional lenders tend to come with stringent conditions that
favor fiscal prudence and price stability, largely benefiting Finance and Industry, whereas
BRIC loans fund projects with few conditions of state spending, benefiting Labor through
employment generation. By analyzing which coalition dominates politically, I can explain
why some governments turn to BRICs while others turn to the IMF or private foreign
v
creditors.
I support my argument with both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Interviews
with decision makers in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia provide empirical support on a micro
level. I triangulate the insights from the field with a statistical analysis of loan data to test
whether my argument holds for a larger set of cases.
The normative implications of my findings pertain to three issues: power, economic
development and democracy. With respect to the first issue, loans to foreign countries
are thought to provide creditor countries with a degree of power over recipient countries.
Previously, this process was understood to be determined by creditors alone, such as the
US and the USSR during the Cold War. However, my dissertation points to the power of
recipient countries to affect the outcome of this confrontation. Thus, my work illuminates
how globalization actually increases small states’ room to maneuver in an increasingly
globalized world. Second, the debate regarding economic development is currently domi-
nated by two paradigms. On the one hand, there is the (neo-)liberal model promoted by
western actors. Here, citizens are enabled to be productive members in markets governed
by comparative advantages by improving the skills and abilities of individuals. On the
other hand, the industrialization paradigm draws inspiration from the East Asian Tigers
(e.g. South Korea and Taiwan). It therefore focuses on creating new comparative advan-
tages by actively promoting industrialization. My dissertation spells out which countries
follow which development path, and therefore provides insights into the prospects of lifting
millions out of poverty. Third, there is democracy. Many have argued that Chinese loans
might undermine democracy in recipient countries as the loans lack ‘good governance’ con-
ditions. I provide a different view. My dissertation is a major step towards understanding
the distirbutional consequences of different loans. If IMF loans benefit the capital owners
who are already rich, but Labor – the numerically largest actor – benefits from BRIC loans,
emerging creditors might contribute to a reduction in inequality, which has been shown to
make democracy more likely.
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Chapter 1
BRICs and Cliques
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Different countries, different loans
On October 15, 2006, none of the candidates in the first round of the Ecuadorian presiden-
tial elections were able to obtain an absolute majority. In the second round on November
26th, voters were asked to decide between A´lvaro Noboa of the right-wing party Partido
Renovador Institucional de Accin Nacional, and Rafael Correa running for the social move-
ment Alianza PAIS. Correa won the presidential election with 57% of the vote. After his
election – but a full month before being sworn into office – Correa announced on December
15, 2006 that his administration would re-negotiate Ecuador’s external debt, stating that
“La vida antes que la Deuda” – life should take priority over debt. Correa’s words were
followed by deeds as Ecuador paid off all IMF loans at once and in full on April 20, 2007,
thereby fulfilling one of his campaign promises.
A month later, in July 2007, Correa issued a decree instituting the “Comisio´n para
la Auditoria Integral del Credito Publico” [Commission to Audit the Entirety of Public
Debt], abbreviated as CAIC. Its task was to examine the legitimacy of different types of
debt (multilateral, bilateral, private and domestic debt) that Ecuador had accumulated
1
2over the years and determine whether these debts should be repaid. While these investiga-
tions were ongoing, interest payments came due on November 14, 2008 for the remaining
government bonds held by private creditors. Correa declared that he would not pay the
interest payments on the these bonds until CIAC’s findings were obtained. CAIC’s final
report was presented on November 20, in Quito, in front of a large crowd of Ecuadori-
ans, along with a televised ceremony. The commission recommended suspending the debt
repayment on many of the remaining bonds. Following the recommendation of the com-
mission, the government suspended payments on the principal of the Global12-Bonds as
well as the Global15- and Global30-Bonds, making Ecuador’s default official.
On April 24, 2009, after it had become clear that Ecuador had no intention to repay
this debt, creditors were willing to accept the conditions of a debt swap: The Global Bonds
were exchanged for new bonds worth only 30% of the original face value. Two days after
this announcement, Ecuadorians were again called to the ballots to vote in the first round
of a presidential election. However, this time the result was unexpected as, for the first
time since 1979, a second round of voting was unnecessary. Correa gained an absolute
majority with 51.9 % of all votes in the first round.
Notably, Ecuador’s behavior towards traditional western creditors differed markedly
from its behavior towards emerging creditors – in particular Brazil, Russia, India and
China, the so-called BRICs. Correa effectively stopped servicing existing debt from tra-
ditional western creditors, but continued to pay interest and principal on that debt. For
instance, in January 2007 the installment due on loans to Brazil for the San Francisco
hydropower project were paid on time. During this time, when Ecuador needed to take
out new loans, credit offers by traditional creditors were explicitly rejected. Instead, the
government obtained several loans from China, Brazil and Russia. For example, Ecuador
announced on February 20, 2009 that it would borrow $1.7 billion from China. This was
only the first of several major loans: to date, Ecuador has obtained a total of $5.4 billion
in loans from China.
3Puzzlingly, while Ecuador turned away from traditional western creditors towards BRIC
loans, neighboring Colombia did the opposite. Instead of borrowing from the Chinese,
Colombia continued to borrow from traditional creditors. This is surprising, because there
were several opportunities for Colombians to borrow from the Chinese. After all, the Chi-
nese Development Bank has maintained a permanent office in Bogota since 2007 (Guarin,
2011). Colombian public officials report that the loan proposals by the China Export-
Import bank were rejected by the government (Chaco´n Pen˜a, 2011a). The economic advisor
to the Chinese ambassador confirmed loan offers were made, but also that the Colombian
government has been hesitant to accept these offers (Quan, 2011).
The Chinese have also offered to finance several public works projects. For example,
in 2005 the Colombian government wanted to build an alternative to the Panama Canal,
a so-called Canal Seco [Dry Canal]. The government inquired whether foreign creditors –
the Chinese among them – would be interested in financing this project. The Chinese were
initially thought of highly, but they were not selected for the project (Garcia, 2011; Lei-
teritz, 2011). In addition, Colombian officials confirmed that the Chinese offered a loan to
the state-owned enterprise ColPetrol. Yet again, this loan offer was rejected (Rojas Hayes,
2011). Finally, Colombia rejected a Chinese loan offer for financing a hydropower project,
the Acueducto Metropolitano de Bucaramanga. Instead it favored borrowing from a re-
gional multilateral organization, the Andean Development Cooperation (CAF). However,
as these negotiations fell through, Columbia still did not use Chinese money but rather
borrowed from a private market actor, Bancolombia. In sum, the Colombian government
had many opportunities to obtain loans from China. Instead, it choose to explicitly reject
these loan offers and borrow from traditional lenders such as the IMF, western governments
and the private capital market.
What explains this puzzle? Why did Ecuador reject traditional lenders and turn to
BRICs? And why did Colombia, in contrast, reject Chinese loan offers and continue bor-
rowing from traditional creditors?
41.1.2 The question of this study
The most important transformation in the international economy over the last two decades
has been the rise of the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries
experienced massive economic growth, and play an increasingly critical role in global trade
in goods. As evidenced by the example of Ecuador, BRICs – especially China – have taken
on yet another critical role as sources of loans to developing countries. While loans from
wealthy democracies to developing countries declined from $216 billion in the 1990s to $128
billion in the 2000s, loans from BRIC governments increased from $9 billion to $85 billion.
Cash-strapped governments often find loans from BRIC lenders attractive because they
come with fewer “strings” attached. Yet it is puzzling that despite the apparent benefits
of such loans, only a third of all developing countries have taken advantage of the oppor-
tunity to replace the United States and the IMF by borrowing from China instead. That
is, most governments have not accepted loan offers by BRICs, but continue to faithfully
borrow from traditional creditors. Given the apparent availability of “easy money,” why do
some developing countries choose BRIC loans over IMF loans while others do not? Specif-
ically, why did Ecuador turn away from traditional lenders and borrow from China, while
Colombia rejected Chinese loan offers and continued to borrow from western creditors?
My dissertation is the first to unpack the puzzle of why some developing countries tend
to accept loan offers from BRICs while others do not. I argue that the key determinant of
loan choice is the relative power of Labor interests versus those of Finance and Industry.
Because the loans offered by the World Bank and IMF have systematically different con-
ditions than loan offers by BRICs, they create different relative winners and losers among
Industry, Finance and Labor. Loans from traditional lenders tend to come with stringent
conditions that favor fiscal prudence and price stability, largely benefiting Finance and
Industry, whereas BRIC loans fund projects with few conditions of state spending, benefit-
ing Labor through employment generation. Existing economic conditions, combined with
the structural strength of Labor, shape which actors dominate politically. The resulting
5coalitions account for whether developing countries pursue BRIC loans or traditional loans.
In short, if Labor dominates the political arena, governments will borrow from BRICs to
satisfy the demands of this societal group. For the same reason, the government will reject
loan offers from the IMF, western governments, or private creditors. In contrast, in coun-
tries dominated by Finance or Industry, governments will avoid BRIC loans and borrow
from traditional creditors instead.
1.2 The empirical puzzle
1.2.1 Actors and loan types
Sovereign loans are loans that the government of a country obtains in the name of its
population from external creditors. Governments can borrow from a variety of sources. I
distinguish between four types of creditors from which a government can choose – IFI, DAC,
BRIC and private lenders. IFI loans are granted by International Financial Institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. The disbursement of
these loans is typically tied to certain ‘good governance’ conditions that aim at issues of
transparency, anti-corruption and protection from mismanagement. More generally, these
conditions intend to remove obstacles to an efficient market system in the recipient country,
so as to improve the business environment for both domestic and foreign companies.
Secondly, a government can also borrow bilaterally from the governments of other
countries. I distinguish between bilateral loans of western countries and bilateral loans from
BRICs as the characteristics of their loans differ. Western countries are organized in the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The member countries of this formal group,
situated within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
have agreed to harmonize their lending procedures in order to promote the principles of
‘good governance.’ I therefore call this group of western government the group of DAC
creditors. DAC loans can be given by a variety of creditor institutions, such as a specific
6aid agency like USAID or the US government directly.
In contrast to DAC creditors, the lending activities in the third loan type are not
constrained by such self-imposed rules. BRIC loans feature non-traditional lending ar-
rangements such as repayment in natural resources such as oil or copper. In addition,
BRIC loans typically include the condition that funds be spent on materials or services
obtained from the lending country. The provider of such services is usually a state-owned
enterprise. For example, the governmentally owned Chinese Development Bank (CDB)
lent the Ecuadorian government $2.8 billion for the construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair
Hydroelectric Power Dam. Part of the agreement was that Ecuador would use a Chinese
firm to construct this dam. Just like DAC countries, BRICs have specific institutions
granting these types of loans. For example, the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) and
the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank make these types of arrangements in the name of the
Chinese government.
Lastly, governments of developing countries can also obtain resources from private
creditors through either bonds or syndicated loans. The former are securities issued by
a government that promise the creditor will pay interest for the duration of the bond and
repay the principal once the maturity date has arrived. Typically, bond holders are a
diverse set of both domestic and foreign institutions and private individual investors. In
contrast, syndicated loans are jointly extended by a group of foreign banks.
The loans can take a variety of forms. For example, IMF loans are released only af-
ter the recipient government satisfies conditions, such as cutting expenditure or changing
regulations. However, once the resources are transferred, the government can employ the
resources in whatever way it wants, such as balancing the budget or financing particular
government programs in education or social welfare.1 In contrast, BRIC loans are often
1 The difference between loans and aid is blurry at times. For instance, the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) classifies loans that are concessional (i.e. that have a low interest rate and long financing
terms) as aid, while loans with less favorable terms are not counted. Since the criteria for what is classified
as aid and what is not differ across lenders, my approach is to count any monetary transfers with the
condition of repayment and a positive interest rate as a loan. I therefore exclude grants as they represent
transfers without the requirement for repayment.
7earmarked for specific projects such as bridges, roads or hospitals. These projects are dif-
ferent from foreign direct investments (FDI) that are designed, financed, and implemented
by private foreign companies. In these cases, the government does not design or finance
the investment, but foreign companies nevertheless might need to obtain concessions from
the government to gain the right for a coal mine or an oil drilling project. In contrast, I
am concerned with the loans that finance projects designed and funded by the government,
while only the implementation of the project might be outsourced.
Having defined the subject of my study – sovereign loans – let me clarify what my study
will not cover. I will not analyze the determinants of humanitarian aid and assistance,
such as sending emergency food aid or doctors to developing countries. Also, foreign direct
investment (FDI) is not part of this study. While investors entering a developing country
might need to obtain a concession from the government for their project, the funding and
implementation of a FDI project is entirely in the hands of the foreign investor.
1.2.2 Volume and trends of BRIC lending
Over the past 40 years, BRIC countries have made loan commitments amounting to about
$101 billion. However, the vast majority of this amount was granted after the year 2000.
Figure 1.1 illustrates that BRICs are not ‘new’ lenders in the narrow sense. Brazil, India,
Russia and China have made loans since the 1970s, even though in very small loan amounts.
However, around 2000, things changed as the four countries began to massively expand
their loan volumes.
More specifically, of the 1,154 lender-borrower dyads in which BRICs lend to developing
countries, roughly half of the yearly commitments – 532 – were smaller than $10 million.
In fact, prior to 2000, the lending by BRICs were almost comically small. For example,
Table 1.1 shows that the loan commitment of China to the Maldives in 1995 totaled $1,560.
However, since then, BRIC lending has changed dramatically. As evidenced by Figure
1.1, the lending volume of China, Brazil, India and Russia has increased significantly since
8Figure 1.1: Trend in lending volume by China, Brazil, Russia and India
2000. For example, an interviewee revealed to me that when he was Peruvian Vice-Minister
of the Economy he was approached by representatives of the Chinese Development Bank
that inquired whether there were any projects that they might help finance. The minister
then gave the Chinese delegation a list of potential loans they might be interested in, of
which the largest project had a volume of $2 million. The change in lending practices by the
Chinese is well-captured by their response: “Don’t you have anything larger?” (Moro´n Pas-
tor, 2011). This anecdote can be complemented by aggregate data. For example, Table
1.2 displays the BRIC annual lending commitments in excess of $1billion, each of which
has been granted after 2004. For example, Angola obtained a loan of $9.8 billion in 2005.
For the purposes of this study, I will therefore only focus on BRIC loans of respectable size
9Year Recipient Creditor Commitment
1987 Zambia Russia $1,100
1995 Maldives China $1,560
1978 Ethiopia China $5,400
1987 Seychelles Russia $9,280
1977 Ethiopia China $13,500
1993 Bangladesh India $14,160
1996 Armenia Russia $17,820
2002 Sa˜o Tome´ and Principe China $21,630
1997 Ethiopia China $21,710
1999 Lesotho China $22,350
Table 1.1: The 10 smallest lending commitments in a given year BRICs, 1970-2010.
Year Recipient Creditor Commitment
2010 Bhutan India $1.0 bn
2010 Ethiopia China $1.1 bn
2007 Vietnam China $1.2 bn
2009 Sri Lanka China $1.2 bn
2010 Belarus Russia $1.4 bn
2007 Belarus Russia $1.5 bn
2009 Pakistan China $1.6 bn
2010 Pakistan China $1.8 bn
2004 Angola China $2.0 bn
2009 Angola China $2.6 bn
2010 Ecuador China $2.7 bn
2010 Angola China $3.5 bn
2009 Brazil China $7.0 bn
2005 Angola China $9.8 bn
Table 1.2: All BRIC lending commitments in a given year larger than $1bn, 1970-2010.
that are representative for the rise of BRIC lending.
The regional distribution of these loans mirrors that of DAC countries (see Figure
1.2). The vast majority of this amount was granted to governments of sub-saharan African
countries, followed by recipients in Latin America. Countries in the Middle East and
North Africa received the fewest loan commitments. Notably, the lending destinations of
each individual BRIC differ somewhat. Considering BRIC loans given over the past ten
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years, China and India have lent primarily to African countries, while Brazilian loans are
concentrated in South America. In contrast, Russian lending does not seem to follow any
clear pattern (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4 respectively).
Figure 1.2: Comparison of BRIC lending volume by region
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1.2.3 The puzzle
The data presented above provide powerful testimony to the fact that BRIC loans are on
the rise. One sign of their dramatic transformation from nobodies into major players in
the international financial markets is their expansion of loans to developing countries at
the expense of traditional lenders. While lending commitments of western governments
to developing countries declined from $216 billion in the 1990s to $128 billion by 2010,
the commitments by BRIC lenders increased from only $9 billion to $85 billion. Figure
1.5 illustrates this trend: with the rise of BRIC lending to developing countries, western
governments lost ‘market share.’ BRIC loan commitments surpassed DAC commitments
for the first time in 2009, when emerging creditors lent a total of $20 billion to developing
countries, while DAC loans only amounted to $17 billion. This reversal continued in 2010
with BRICs committing a total of $23 billion, while DACs lent only $19 billion. At the
same time, the demand for IMF loans decreased significantly.
Chinese loans come with ‘fewer strings attached,’ which explains their considerable
attraction for cash-strapped governments. Yet despite their apparent benefits – and al-
though a shortage of liquid assets characterizes nearly all developing economies – only a
third of all developing countries have taken the opportunity to shift their composition of
new borrowing in favor of Chinese loans. In contrast, other governments explicitly rejected
loan offers by BRICs, and continue to faithfully borrow from traditional creditors. Why do
some developing countries choose BRIC loans over IMF loans? And why do some countries
refuse BRIC loan offers?
Contrasts in borrowing patterns by governments in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia illus-
trate this point. These neighboring countries are located in the same geographical region,
all have ports at the Pacific Ocean, and are similarly proximate to China. Furthermore,
Ecuador, Peru and Colombia share the same historical and cultural heritage as well as a
common language. All three countries are presidential democracies with a similar institu-
tional set-up. However, the domestic coalitional dynamics between societal interest groups
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Figure 1.5: Comparison of tends in lending volume across BRICs, DACs and the IMF.
differ. I will show that this explains their divergent borrowing patterns from 2005 to 2011.
Over the years, Ecuador borrowed a total of $2.7 billion in loans from China. This
consisted of one loan for the Coco Coda Sinclaire project, valued at $1.7 billion as well as
a $1 billion untied credit. In addition, in 2011, Ecuador obtained a $0.6 billion loan for the
Sopladora Electrical project as well as another $2 billion untied loan. Interestingly, the lat-
ter is divided into two tranches, of which $1.4 billion was denominated in US dollars, while
the remaining $0.6 billion was denominated in remnibi (Minoli, 2011). At the same time,
Ecuador reduced its exposure to western creditors such as the IMF and private creditors.
In contrast to Ecuador, Colombia has explicitly rejected loan offers by China and continues
to borrow from traditional creditors. Consequently, the rise of BRIC lenders has not had
an impact on Colombia’s debt portfolio which has remained unchanged. Peru’s experience
differs from that of either Colombia or Ecuador as it exhibits variation over time. In the
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1990s, Peru obtained Chinese loans almost yearly, albeit in comparatively small amounts.
However, prior to the 1990s and since the year 2000, Peru has not borrowed a single cent
from China. This pattern again accentuates the question of why some governments borrow
from China while others do not.
1.3 Existing explanations
1.3.1 Easy answers, inadequate answers
Why do the governments of some developing countries borrow from BRICs, while others
do not? Confronted with this puzzle, researchers have offered several explanations. For
example, some scholars suggest that ideology might explain the distribution of BRIC loans
(Clapham, 2008; Yeh, 2008; Adebajo, 2008; Sachikonye, 2008). The argument is that a
quasi-communist country such as China would be more willing to lend to countries that
share a similarly leftist political view of the world. However, the facts do not square with
this hypothesis. The governments of the 50 developing countries that have borrowed large
amounts from China over the past decade have been both leftist and conservative.
Other scholars have suggested that the Chinese are primarily interested in natural re-
sources (Zhao, 2007; Yagtes, 2007; de Oliveira, 2008; Lee and Shalmon, 2008; Rotberg,
2008; Brautigam, 2009). It should, therefore, be expected that Chinese capital flows to
countries that have natural resources. Examples include iron ore for the Chinese steel
industry, or coal and oil for Chinese energy needs. However, this hypothesis does not ex-
plain why China would be engaged in financial relations with resource-poor countries such
as Ethiopia. Further, Chinese loans are financing projects such as hydroelectric dams in
Ecuador. As these projects produce output that cannot simply be shipped off to China,
this hypothesis cannot explain the lending patterns either. Also, both the ideology hypoth-
esis and the natural resource hypothesis are supply-side arguments. The driving force of
lending is assumed in these hypotheses to be the creditors and their interests in developing
16
countries. However, during my fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia I learned that
the Chinese have representatives in all three countries and have made loan offers to all of
them. Yet, not all of these countries accepted such offers. It therefore appears that the
determinants for which countries obtain capital from China are not driven by the Chinese
supply, but rather by the characteristics of the (potential) recipient country.
In examining reasons a country would accept loans from BRIC countries while others
do not, a third suggestion points towards the country’s history with the IMF. Some schol-
ars argue that the IMF has in the past attached macroeconomic conditions to their loans
that have proven to be harmful to developing countries (Pastor, 1987; Garuda, 2000; Prze-
worski and Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2002; Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006). For example,
so-called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) require recipient countries to implement
austerity measures in order to balance their budget. It is suggested that recipient countries
despise these conditions and are therefore looking for alternatives to the IMF – such as
BRIC loans. However, this argument should apply to any developing country that previ-
ously received a loan from the IMF. However, not all clients of the IMF are turning away
from this multilateral institution in order to instead borrow from BRICs. In addition, this
hypothesis ignores the fact that Chinese loans also come with conditions. For instance,
Chinese project loans require the recipients to use the resources to purchase materials and
services from China.
1.3.2 Why previous explanations have fallen short
When searching for an explanation to a particular puzzle, it is insufficient to simply dismiss
existing arguments as soon as contradicting evidence is presented. Instead, I will analyze
the underlying reasons why existing work is unable to provide an acceptable answer to the
puzzle. I argue that existing work undertheorizes the nature of borrowing decisions and
ignores the domestic political dynamics in a recipient country.
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The dependent variable
I argue that the outcome to be explained is misspecified. Existing literature focuses on why
countries borrow from a single creditor. This is the case for the existing literature on the
determinants of borrowing from the IMF (Copelovitch, 2010b; Vreeland, 2003b; Thacker,
1999), from western bilateral creditors and from private creditors (Tomz, 2007). Similarly,
the emerging literature on BRIC loans to developing countries focuses only
I argue that analysis of a single creditor in isolation from other creditors is unable
to produce convincing explanations of borrowing patterns. This is because an isolated
analysis cannot capture the borrower’s decision-making process as it chooses between the
different sources of credit. Thus, the borrower’s decision-making process should be at the
center of the analysis for two reasons.
First, analyzing the determinants of borrowing from a single source instead of a set of
creditors is unable to capture the strategic nature of the borrower’s choice. Just as with
private individuals, sovereign borrowers cannot obtain an unlimited amount of loans. This
constraint of a maximum debt ceiling has important implications. It introduces an inter-
dependency, as a borrower’s decision for one creditor is also a decision against another.
The choice between creditors, under the constraint of a maximum debt ceiling, involves
opportunity costs for the borrower. Any analysis of borrowing patterns must therefore
take into consideration the strategic element that arises from the presence of opportunity
costs. It is therefore essential that explanations of borrowing decisions do not focus on
the determinants of borrowing from a single creditor. Instead, this interdependency re-
quires successful theories to explain the choice between different creditors. While similar
approaches have a long tradition in the field of firm financing (Modigliani and Miller, 1958),
the same comprehensive approach has not been applied to sovereign borrowing.
Second, loan agreements are the result of negotiations between the debtor and creditor
(Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006). A central determinant of power in bargaining situations
is the presence of alternative options that an actor has available. The fewer options an actor
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has, the more desperate she is to reach an agreement regardless of the costs. Conversely, if
an actor does have alternatives besides reaching an agreement with the current negotiation
partner, her negotiation position is more powerful. Loan negotiations between a developing
country and a single creditor are governed by the same principles. Analyzing the relations
between developing countries and only single creditors in isolation, while ignoring that
countries have alternative borrowing options, will result in biased findings as the negotiation
power of countries will be underestimated. To understand why countries borrow from
particular creditors, we need to examine the full range of options. Thus, the outcome to
be analyzed should be the decision-making process by which a developing country chooses
between the borrowing options available.
The independent variable
In addition to misspecifying the outcome to be explained, existing explanations for coun-
tries’ borrowing decisions have ignored the variation of domestic political factors within
recipient countries. Scholars have argued a developing country may want to obtain IMF
loans because of the conditions attached to such a loan. The conditions of IMF loans
typically involve a series of fiscal and macroeconomic adjustments that aim to make the
domestic business environment more attractive, particularly to foreign investors. An IMF
program is therefore a “seal of approval” and thus a signal to potential foreign investors
(Stone, 2002) and creditors (Aggarwal, 1996). In addition, conditions of an IMF loan pro-
vide the recipient government with leverage to implement unpopular economic reforms –
such as devaluations or austerity measures – against domestic resistance (Remmer, 1986;
Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Vreeland, 2003b). As Putnam (1988, p.457) noted, “Interna-
tional negotiations sometimes enable government leaders to do what they privately wish to
do, but are powerless to do domestically. [...] This pattern characterizes many stabilization
programs that are (misleadingly) said to be ‘imposed’ by the IMF.”
However, these approaches cannot explain why governments’ borrowing strategies differ.
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If IMF loans are a public good, why do some governments reject such loans? I argue that
the inability to answer this question is the treatment of sovereign borrowers as a single
unified actor. While researchers acknowledge divergent domestic interests, their analyses
do not factor those interests as influences. Rather, the central government is assumed to
be the only relevant actor on the part of the borrowers. Divergent domestic preferences are
treated in these situations as a nuisance that must be dealt with by the benevolent central
government, and using the IMF as an external force to silence domestic interest groups is
one way of doing so. Thus, in these hypotheses, the causal arrow points from the central
government to the societal interests, but not the other way around.
I argue that this assumption is misplaced and the causal arrow should point from the
societal interests to the central government. In this case, domestic interests would deter-
mine how a government acts in loan negotiations. This approach has gained prominence
with respect to trade policy (Rogowski, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001; Hiscox, 2002; Baker, 2003) but it has not been applied to sovereign loans.
My study is the first to systematically explore the politics of sovereign borrowing.
Requirements for a satisfactory explanation
In sum, a satisfactory explanation of countries’ borrowing decisions needs to take two
considerations into account. First, because the interdependency between the decision to
borrow from one creditor versus another exists, it is insufficient to examine only the de-
terminants of borrowing from a single creditor. A satisfactory analysis must explain the
composition of new borrowing that results from the series of decisions between competing
loan offers by various creditors in a given year. Second, such an analysis must incorporate
the preferences of the domestic actors to which the government responds. I argue that
the political dynamics of competing domestic interest groups explains the governments’
decisions regarding their choices of creditors.
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1.4 My argument
This study is the first to systematically explore the response by developing countries to
loan offers by BRICs. While the analytics of this argument are established in Chapter 2,
a preview shall be presented here. In short, my explanation is based on conflict between
economic groups over the following borrowing options: whether to borrow from western
governments, from the IMF or World Bank, from private foreign banks, or from emerging
lenders. Because the conditions attached to each type of loan differ, each tends to create
a different set of relative winners and losers. By analyzing which coalition dominates
politically, I can explain why some governments turn to BRICs, while others turn to the
IMF or private foreign creditors.
To derive which type of domestic political coalitions will result in BRIC loans, I begin
with analyzing the individual preferences of three domestic interest groups – Finance,
Industry, and Labor – among the borrowing options. Finance is interested in policies
that promote a stable business environment and prevent financial crisis. Considering the
characteristics of the loan options available to a government, it is likely that Finance would
be in favor of IMF loans, seeing that conditions attached to these loans are designed to
prevent banking crises and ensure an efficient market system. In contrast to Finance, Labor
is interested in higher wages and employment opportunities. Based on existing scholarship,
IMF loans are unlikely to serve these interests. In contrast, BRIC loans are typically tied
to specific investment projects and therefore employment opportunities. I continue this
exercise of comparing the interest of the three actors of Finance, Industry and Labor to
the characteristics of the four borrowing options. This allows me to derive a preference
profile for the actors across the different types of creditors (see Table 1.3).
However, whose preferences will be implemented by the government? I assume that
when making the borrowing decision a government will be motivated by maintaining in-
cumbency. If want to politicians want to remain in office, it is in their interest to maximize
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Multilateral creditors DAC creditors BRIC creditors Private creditors
Finance + + – +
Industry o – + +
Labor – + + –
Table 1.3: Summary of expected distributional consequences by actor.
votes while minimizing the expenses to secure those votes. In order to maximize the num-
ber of votes politicians can get, they have the incentive to choose policies that satisfy the
demands of multiple interest groups simultaneously. I suggest that politicians therefore
observe the overall economic and political environment to determine whether or not the
interests of two actors are congruent. For example, if employment in Industry is high,
Labor can be expected to have similar interests to Industry due to its dependence on that
sector. In contrast, under conditions of high inflation, Labor’s interests are likely to be
congruent with those of Finance. While inflation devalues the capital owned by Finance, it
also lowers the real wages of Labor. In sum, depending on the overall state of the economy,
the interests of Labor are either congruent with those of Finance or those of Industry.
I suggest that politicians perform this exercise for both Finance and Industry in order
to determine under which conditions the respective groups’ interests are congruent. By
combining the information on the groups that share interests, politicians arrive at three
distinct informal coalitions whose demands can be met simultaneously with a single policy:
 Corporatist coalition: Industry + Labor vs. Finance
 Capital coalition: Finance + Industry vs. Labor
 Consumer coalition: Finance + Labor vs. Industry
However, note that these are not formal coalitions. There are no written agreements
between, say, Labor and Finance that they will lobby the government to borrow from the
IMF as opposed to the emerging lenders. Rather, I assume that the causal mechanism of
preference aggregation begins with the office-motivated politicians in government.
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IFI creditors DAC creditors BRIC creditors Private creditors
Capital coalition + o o ++
Corporatist coalition – o ++ o
Consumer coalition o ++ o o
Table 1.4: Summary of expected distributional consequences by coalition.
To determine which policies would be optimal for politicians to pursue given a particular
type of coalition, I aggregate the preferences of each actor across loan options (see Table 1.3)
to arrive at the loans demanded by the possible actor–coalitions. If both actors individually
prefer a particular creditor, their joint preference will reflect this agreement and exhibit a
strong preference for this creditor. If, however, the two coalition partners have divergent
preferences with respect to a particular borrowing option, the aggregate joint preference
will be weak with respect to this creditor. Table 2.3 presents the joint preferences that
result from this process.
After deriving the individual level preferences, the process of coalition formation, and
the joint preference profile, I have identified the conditions under which governments have
the incentive to choose BRIC loans over loans from traditional lenders. In short, I expect
that BRIC loans are signed if a country is dominated by a Corporatist coalition (between
Labor and Industry). In contrast, if a country is characterized by a Capital coalition (of
Finance and Industry), its government will borrow from either the private market or the
IMF. Lastly, DAC loans from western governments are obtained if a country is dominated
by a Consumer coalition (between Finance and Labor).
1.5 Empirical strategy
A theory combining preferences and coalition formation is best tested using an empirical
approach that combines the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods.
For this reason, I undertook several months of fieldwork to speak with key decision
makers. However, most existing fieldwork, with respect to issues of sovereign debt, focuses
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on interviewing IMF officials or other creditor representatives. In contrast, I interviewed
domestic elites in three debtor countries: Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. The case se-
lection was guided by theoretical considerations derived from my conceptual framework.
While they share characteristics such as political system, natural resource endowment, and
distance from China, these countries differ markedly in their coalitional dynamics. By
conducting more than 100 elite interviews, I found that it is because of these political
differences that only one country – Ecuador – has accepted loan offers from the Chinese.
I interviewed domestic representatives of the public sector (Prime Ministers, Finance
Ministers, Senators, and representatives from Public Debt departments) to verify whether
governmental decision-makers are taking domestic interest groups into account when de-
ciding between creditors. I subsequently interviewed a broad range of actors in the do-
mestic private sector (domestic banks and businesses, business associations). Through
these conversations, I substantiated the theoretical expectation regarding which type of
actor – Finance, Industry or Labor – hopes to benefit from which type of loan. Finally,
I spoke with international actors such as officials of multilateral institutions and western
development agencies. I was also able to interview Chinese officials, both from the public
sector (Chinese Development Bank, Chinese embassies) as well as the private sector (Chi-
nese banks, Chinese mining companies). The interviews with these actors confirmed that
domestic considerations of recipient countries are an overlooked driver of lending patterns.
I complement the qualitative evidence with statistical analysis to test whether my
argument applies to a larger set of countries than those where I undertook fieldwork. A
quantitative analysis required two steps. First, I needed a measure that classified countries
by the type of coalition present. While my fieldwork allowed me to identify which coalitions
were present in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, obtaining this information for all developing
countries presented a challenge for two reasons. On the one hand, the outcome (i.e. choice
of borrower) cannot be aligned along a one-dimensional left-right scale as would be the case
with trade liberalization. On the other hand, there are no formal agreements between the
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Finance, Industry and Labor to lobby the government with respect to a particular creditor.
However, my conversations with politicians clearly indicated that they understood whose
interests were aligned.
In the fact of this conceptual challenge, recall that I suggested above the central goal
of each politician is to win or maintain office. Such office-seeking politicians hence have
the incentive to cater to multiple constituencies simultaneously in order to maximize the
prospect of maintaining incumbency. In such a situation it is advantageous to politicians
if their policies can satisfy the preferences of multiple interest groups simultaneously. I
argue that politicians carefully observe the structural conditions of the domestic economy
to infer which actors are likely to have similar interests. Once they have analyzed which
two of the three domestic actors have congruent interests, politicians have the incentive to
implement policies – i.e. borrowing from the jointly preferred creditor – that satisfy the
preferences of both actors at once. I modeled this decision-making process using a Latent
Class Analysis. With this analysis I estimated whether each actor’s interests are more
congruent with one or the other remaining actor. Aggregating this information allowed
me to create a categorical measure capturing the type of coalition that characterizes a
particular country.
In the second step, I used the newly-created categorical variable of the coalition type
to predict the type of loan that the government is likely to obtain. For this purpose, I
present a new dyadic-panel dataset on government borrowing for 129 countries. It uses a
novel approach to obtain data on BRIC lending, which has so far not been available to
researchers, as China, in particular, treats its lending activities as state secrets. In short, I
did not follow the existing attempts of estimating the capital outflows from emerging lenders
(see Brautigam, 2009). Instead, I worked with the World Bank to obtain their internal
data based on information provided by developing countries on the sources of their capital
inflows. With the dataset assembled using this approach I advance the current literature
by roviding systematic information on loan volume and lending conditions disaggregated
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by recipient country.
To analyze the data I applied a novel estimator, a Differentiated Product Model. This
model represents a major contribution to the current literature on sovereign debt. By
implementing a Differentiated Product Model I go beyond what is possible with linear
panel data methods or multinomial logit models. The latter lack the ability to estimate
the demand for the four creditors simultaneously and instead require four separate re-
gressions. In contrast to multinomial logit models, my empirical approach makes full use
of all available data on borrowing patterns across countries and makes more appropriate
assumptions about the data generating process. In addition, the Differentiated Product
Model explicitly incorporates the ‘room to borrow’ that a country has available. Unlike
other estimators, my model can therefore elegantly account for interdependency among
creditors. As derived from my theory, a maximum amount of debt implies that a country’s
decision for one creditor is simultaneously a decision against another.
Most importantly, the estimator allows for the calculation of the degree to which coun-
tries utilize particular creditors. In other words, it provides a consistent and efficient way
to predict the composition of the total amount of loans obtained per year conditional on
country characteristics. In contrast, existing scholarship on sovereign borrowing has only
focused on explaining the choice for or against a single creditor while disregarding simulta-
neous borrowing from other sources. The estimation method proposed here thus represents
a significant methodological contribution to the study of sovereign debt as it focuses on
the composition of the loan portfolio acquired.
The empirical analysis provides strong support for the argument that social coalitions
explain government’s borrowing decisions. For example, figure 1.6 displays the predicted
share of loans obtained by the four creditors across the three coalitions. Countries charac-
terized by a Corporatist coalition acquire 44% of the total loan amount obtained in a year
from BRICs. In contrast, government agencies in countries with either Capital coalitions or
Consumer coalitions utilize BRIC creditors to a much lesser extent, borrowing only 11% or
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Figure 1.6: Predicted loan shares by coalition based on Differentiated Product Model.
16% on average but rely more heavily on IFIs and private creditors. Instead, these govern-
ments obtain more than half of their annual borrowing amount from IFIs (55% and 56%,
respectively). While Corporatist coalitions are predicted to still obtain a sizable amount
from IFIs, with 39% of the overall borrowing amount its share is about 30% smaller than
that of the other coalitions. Lastly, Corporatist coalitions utilize private creditors to a
minimal degree as only 9
While the comparison of the absolute shares of loans obtained from the four creditors
across coalitions is indicative, the comparison of each type of coalition to a hypothetical
‘average’ country further illuminates the stark variation of borrowing behavior. As shown
in Figure 1.7, Corporatist coalitions obtain a much larger share of the total volume of
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Figure 1.7: The difference in predicted loan share for each coalition in comparison to loan
share obtained by average country.
loans acquired annually from BRICs, while Capital and Consumer coalitions underutilize
this creditor. The differences across coalitions are remarkable. In contrast, there do not
appear to be significant differences in the degree to which the three coalitions utilize DAC
creditors. While Corporatist coalitions rely heavily on BRIC creditors, the opposite is true
with respect to both IFIs and private creditors. In comparison to an average country, the
predicted loan share of IFIs and private creditors is about 11% below average, while both
Capital and Corporatist coalitions utilize these creditors to a higher degree than an average
country.
In sum, both the qualitative evidence from my fieldwork and the quantitative analysis
using a new dataset and an innovative estimation procedure confirm that governments in
countries dominated by Corporatist coalitions are more likely to borrow from BRICs than
traditional lenders.
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1.6 Significance
1.6.1 Academic contribution
My research expands the boundaries of the literature on sovereign debt, which currently
only explains whether or not governments borrow from a single type of lender. Thus, we
know when developing countries borrow from the IMF (Copelovitch, 2010b; Vreeland, 2007)
or the private market (Tomz, 2007). However, given the constraint that countries cannot
borrow an unlimited amount, the decision to borrow from one creditor is also a decision to
not borrow from another. My theory therefore provides a (Rogowski, 1989)-style unifying
framework that explains how developing countries choose between several borrowing op-
tions. By illuminating the domestic political dynamics my research provides insights into
why the sovereignty costs of governments vary across countries. Similarly, past work has
been unable to explain credit rationing with economic variables only. Incorporating the
domestic politics in recipient countries helps to explain why specific creditors want to offer
credit to governments that have the incentive to avoid their type of loans.
My argument has broader implications in addition to the immediate explanatory value
of its theoretical framework. First, my theory reconciles two contradictory findings. On the
one hand, IMF programs have repeatedly been cited as the cause for popular protests. For
example, Vreeland (2003b) describes instances where political leaders stand firm despite
large public protests against the intention to sign an IMF agreement. Yet, scholars find
that political leaders are not punished for signing IMF agreements. In particular, Sidell
(1988) and Killick (1995) argue that IMF programs helped existing governments to main-
tain office. My theoretical framework reconciles these observations. While the minority
actor – say Labor – may be in the streets protesting, I provide an explanation for why a
government catering to a Capital coalition has the incentive to implement the preferred
policy of Finance and Industry over Labor.
Second, scholars have been puzzled by the empirical fact that a country which has
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received IMF loans in the past is more likely to receive an IMF loan again than a country
that has never had dealings with the IMF. This so-called recidivism cannot be explained by
economic factors alone as the differences in probabilities persist even when controlling for
economic measures. Political scientists have therefore suggested that the domestic audience
costs of obtaining IMF loans with their macroeconomic conditions differ systematically
across these two sets of countries. In particular, participating in IMF programs incurs
so-called ‘sovereignty costs’ as the public is expected to accuse the government of ‘selling
out’ to the international institution. However, sovereignty costs decrease over time if the
current government can point to previous leaders that have turned to the IMF in the past.
With lower sovereignty costs, the likelihood of turning to the IMF again and again is higher
than in countries that still would incur high sovereignty costs if they were to enter an IMF
agreement for the first time (Vreeland, 2003a).
While this hypothesis can explain the dynamics of a country after it has signed its first
IMF agreement, it does not explain why it would ever sign an agreement in the first place.
After all, initially, both sets of countries were identical as neither had received an IMF
loan. In contrast, my theoretical framework can explain the heterogeneity in sovereignty
costs across countries without reference to some exogenous shock while also explaining
recidivism. The focus on the political dynamics of domestic interest groups can therefore
explain what type of countries are more likely to enter into an agreement with the IMF
in the first place, as well as why they are more likely to return to the IMF over and over
again.
1.6.2 Political significance
Why should we care who borrows from BRICs? The normative implications of my findings
pertain to three issues: power, economic development and democracy.
With respect to the first issue, loans to foreign countries are thought to provide creditor
countries with a degree of power over recipient countries (Waltz, 1979). Previously, this
30
process was understood to be determined by creditors alone, such as the US and, during
the Cold War, the USSR. However, my research points to the power of recipient countries
to affect the outcome of this confrontation. Thus, if the power of creditors depends on the
decisions made by recipients – and not only on the decisions by the creditors – my work
illuminates how globalization actually increases the room for small states to maneuver in
an increasingly globalized world.
Second, there are currently two dominant paradigms regarding which development path
countries should follow to arrive at economic development. On the one hand, there is
the (neo-)liberal model promoted by western actors. Here, citizens are enabled to be
productive members in markets governed by comparative advantages by improving the
skills and abilities of individuals. On the other hand, the industrialization paradigm draws
inspiration from the East Asian Tigers. It therefore focuses on creating new comparative
advantages by actively promoting industrialization. Clearly, IMF and DAC loans advance
the liberal paradigm by emphasizing education and health, while BRIC loans are associated
with promoting industrialization by addressing infrastructure bottlenecks. According to
Foster et al. (2008, p.23), loans by BRICs therefore address the annual infrastructure
gap in African countries of $10 billion per annum, which has been estimated to reduce
Africa’s GDP growth by about 1% (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; Calderon and Serve´n,
2004). Chinese loans might therefore help resolve a crucial bottleneck preventing growth
in sectors dependent on existing infrastructure. My research spells out which countries
follow which development path, and therefore provides insights into the prospects of lifting
millions out of poverty.
Third, many have argued that Chinese loans might undermine democracy in recipient
countries as they lack ‘good governance’ conditions. I provide a different view. My findings
provide a major step towards understanding the distributional consequences of different
loans. If IMF loans benefit the capital owners who are already rich, but Labor – the
numerically largest actor – benefits from BRIC loans, emerging creditors might contribute
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to a reduction in inequality. Following Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006),
reducing inequality makes democracy more likely. Chinese loans might therefore have an
indirect pro-democratic effect in spite of Chinese intent.
1.7 Plan of the study
The reminder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical
framework that motivates my argument regarding how to explain the variation in borrowing
patterns. There, I derive several hypotheses that I test in the subsequent chapters. Chapter
3 verifies whether the fundamental assumptions upon which my theoretical framework
rests correspond to reality. I then conduct a statistical analysis of borrowing behavior
that proceeds in two steps. In Chapter 4, I present a measurement model that allows me
to estimate which country is characterized by which type of coalition. The subsequent
Chapter 5 utilizes this classification to test whether the borrowing patterns of developing
countries follow the hypotheses derived from my theory. The statistical analysis provides
strong evidence that social coalitions explain the borrowing behavior of the 129 countries
included in my dataset. To show that these findings are not simply artifacts of the data,
Chapter 6 presents qualitative evidence from my fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia.
There, I document how the political dynamics between social coalitions and governmental
decision-makers, along the lines of my theory, explain the borrowing behavior of these three
countries. Chapter 7 concludes the study by examining whether BRIC loans are ‘good’ for
economic development or democracy.
Chapter 2
A Theory of Sovereign Borrowing
2.1 Introduction
The existing arguments explaining the distribution of BRIC loans are not satisfactory. For
example, one popular theory suggests that the Chinese lend money in order to obtain access
to natural resources. However, if this were the case, China would not have lent to both
resource-rich countries such as Angola and resource-poor countries like Ethiopia. Further,
countries that have natural resources exhibit different financial relations with China. For
instance, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador all have natural resources. Yet, their borrowing
patterns differ widely: Ecuador had not borrowed from the Chinese until 2010, then did
so massively. Ecuador also took out additional loans from China in 2011 and 2012. In
contrast, Peru borrowed from the Chinese throughout the 1990s, but abruptly stopped
this practice after the year 2000. Lastly, Colombia has explicitly rejected loan offers that
were extended by the Chinese. In short, it appears that creditors such as the BRIC lend
indiscriminately while the recipient’s choices vary both across countries and across time. I
therefore propose a demand-side explanation for why loan agreements exist between BRICs
and some developing countries but not others.
My study is the first to systematically explore the response by developing countries
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to loan offers by BRICs. My explanation is based on conflict between economic groups
over the following borrowing options: whether to borrow from western governments, from
the IMF or World Bank, from private foreign banks, or from emerging lenders. Because
the conditions attached to each type of loan differ, each tends to create a different set
of relative winners and losers. For example, I show that Finance and Industry tend to
profit from IMF loans while Labor loses. In contrast, BRIC loans benefit both Labor and
Industry, while Finance loses. By analyzing which coalition dominates politically, and who
the government will listen to, I can explain why some governments turn to BRICs while
others turn to the IMF or private foreign creditors. In explaining why some governments
choose one creditor over another, I propose a theoretical framework that builds on the work
by Rogowski (1989) and Frieden (1991).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing
literature of government borrowing in general and with respect to emerging lenders in
particular. My analysis will substantiate the need for an alternative theory and derive the
criteria for a satisfactory alternative explanation that is subsequently developed. In section
2.3, I introduce the foundations of my theory by defining the domestic actors Finance,
Industry and Labor and elaborating on their general interests. I also analyze the four
borrowing options – IFI, DAC, BRIC and private loans – and investigate their respective
characteristics. Following this, I combine the information on the actors’ interests and
the loan characteristics in a common framework and analyze the respective distributional
consequences to obtain insights into which actor would prefer which type of loan. Following
these definitions, Section 2.4 sketches the process of coalition formation and examines what
type of loan a particular coalition would prefer. The resulting hypotheses of this theory
are summarized in section 2.5.
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2.2 Existing work, and my contribution
Why have previous attempts to explain government borrowing from BRICs been unsuc-
cessful? The following discussion of existing literature will focus on the underlying reasons
in order to inform my own theory. To do so most effectively, I will analyze existing work
first with respect to the outcome to be explained, and then with respect to the explanations
put forward to explain the outcome.
2.2.1 The outcome to be explained
One characteristic of developing countries is the lack of sufficient capital and the subse-
quent need to import it. To obtain capital, the governments of developing countries can
choose from several different sources of credit. However, existing literature only focuses
on the determinants that explain why governments borrow from a specific creditor in iso-
lation. Thus, we know when developing countries borrow from the IMF (Vreeland, 2007;
Copelovitch, 2010b) or the private market (Tomz, 2007). However, these works ignore the
fact that developing countries have to choose between several creditors: Multilateral or-
ganizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, bilateral loans from western countries,
bilateral loans from BRIC countries, and private creditors.
What is interesting, though, is that the total amount of debt they can obtain is limited.
Just as is the case for private individuals in search for financing to purchase a house, a
reverse budget constraint exists for governments: creditors will not extend loans if the
country’s sustainable level of debt has been reached. That is, once the amount of debt
is larger than the capacity of debtor to ‘carry’ this debt (as measured by their economic
strength), no creditor will extend additional loans, as they fear that this debt will either not
be serviced or will be defaulted on. Given such a limit of the total amount of debt that can
be obtained, a government’s decision for one creditor is also a decision against another.
From a borrower’s perspective, a maximum debt ceiling introduces an interdependency
between the various sources of credit. It is therefore essential to explain the choice between
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creditors instead of only analyzing the determinants of whether a government will borrow
from a specific creditor or not.
I therefore argue that political economists should focus on the choice between sources
of credit instead of analyzing the determinants of borrowing from a specific creditor in
isolation. Such an approach is necessary to explain why some countries borrow from BRICs
instead of the IMF and vice versa – or why some countries decide to borrow a bit from
both creditors.
The borrower’s choice of lender manifests itself in the resulting debt composition.
Economists have pursued the analysis of debt composition both in the private and the
public realm. For example, starting with the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller
(1958), a vibrant literature studies the determinants of private firms’ debt portfolios.
However, with respect to sovereign debt, the literature is limited. Differences in the
aggregated value of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency have been found
to be a cause for variation of countries’ vulnerability to financial crisis (Eichengreen, Haus-
mann and Panizza, 2003). Subsequent research on the reasons for the inability of countries
to issue bonds denominated in their own local currency gained significant attention. The
so-called ‘original sin’ increases the risk of financial crises, as a real exchange rate depreci-
ation would make it more difficult to service debt if it is denominated in foreign currency
(Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2004; Melecky, 2012). Scholars working on the issue
of ‘debt intolerance,’ in turn, have attributed this inability to borrow in local currency to
weak institutions and bad policies in emerging economies (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano,
2003)1 .
However, these approaches have only looked at the composition of sovereign bond port-
folios. Bonds represent only a subset of financing options, the others being syndicated loans
as well as multilateral and bilateral loans. Consequently, the interdependencies between
1 A parallel body of work has examined differences in maturity structures of debt portfolios as shorter
maturities require more frequent rollover of debt, and therefore result in higher volatility (Chamon et al.,
2005)
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multilateral and bilateral loans as well as bonds are not taken into account. In addition,
the portfolios have been analyzed with respect to currency denomination and maturities
of the bonds, but not to the identity of the creditor. In other words, Chinese money is
considered to be identical to American money, as long as it is denominated in the same
currency. However, existing scholarship (for example Woo, 1991, p.158) finds that the
identity of the creditor matters even if the financing terms are identical.
In sum, the existing literature on sovereign debt misspecifies the outcome that is to be
explained. To address this, I will focus on the choice between creditors instead of explaining
the choice for a specific creditor.
2.2.2 The explanations proposed
What explains the distribution of loans between sovereign creditors and debtors? The
existing literature focuses primarily on the decision calculus of the creditors to explain the
flows of sovereign credit.
For example, scholars analyzing which countries receive IMF loans primarily focus
on the supply side. Thacker (1999) and Stone (2004) contend that the IMF is merely
an instrument of the US, and lending behavior consequently mirrors the interests of its
largest shareholder. More refined analyses have taken private interest groups within the
industrialized countries into account. For example, Copelovitch (2010a,b) argues that IMF
lending follows the interests of the domestic financial sector in the United States, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. The IMF lends more money to developing
countries to which private banks of G5 countries are highly exposed, as this reduces the
risk of a default. In this view, the IMF loans provide a bailout to the private sector actors
of its major shareholders. In sum, therefore, IMF lending is explained from a creditors’
perspective.
The analysis of which governments obtain debt from private creditors is similarly one-
sided. In his influential book, Tomz (2007) argues sovereign debtors are at the mercy
37
of international private creditors. As only the creditors judge the developing countries’
credit worthiness, they alone determine who obtains private capital. Tomz conceptualizes
the recipient countries as sovereigns with only one desire: implement policies that please
private creditors so as to regain or maintain their creditworthiness.
The examples of existing literature cited above suffer from the fact that they explain
the presence of loan agreements solely with the actions of creditors. Debtor countries are
typically viewed as a reactionary partner that merely needs resources, regardless of the
source. Developing countries are therefore conceptualized as actors without agency.
There are some exceptions that utilize a debtor perspective to explain borrowing deci-
sions. For example, scholars have argued that a government might obtain IMF loans not
for the monetary resources. Considering that the conditions attached to IMF loans are
costly, governments hope that an IMF program is a “seal of approval” as a signal to po-
tential investors (Aggarwal, 1996; Marchesi, 2003). However, while the recipient has been
conceptualized as an active player, these analyses understood debtors only as a single, ho-
mogenous entity. For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p.350) state that “throughout
our analysis, we will treat each sovereign borrower as a single unified entity, ‘the country.”’
When explaining IMF lending from a borrower’s perspective, other scholars suggest that
the IMF conditions provide the recipient government with leverage to implement unpopular
economic reforms – such as devaluations or austerity measures – against domestic resistance
(Remmer, 1986; Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Vreeland, 2003b). For example, Putnam
(1988, p.457) states that “international negotiations sometimes enable government leaders
to do what they privately wish to do, but are powerless to do domestically ... this pattern
characterizes many stabilization programs that are (misleadingly) said to be ‘imposed’
by the IMF.” However, while this line of work acknowledges that there may be domestic
interests that are against borrowing from the IMF, these actors are not explicitly analyzed.
We do not know who they are, why they oppose the conditions attached to IMF loans,
nor what they want instead. We only know of the presence of ‘domestic resistance’ that
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provides incentives to the government to seek an external ally.2
However, extensive literature on a related topic makes a strong case that this assump-
tion is outdated. Works on the political economy of trade (see Rogowski (1989); Grossman
and Helpman (1994); Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Hiscox (2002); Baker (2003)) incorpo-
rate insights by the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems that suggest various
actors are affected differently by international flows of trade: some benefit from increased
trade because of their position in the domestic economy, while others lose out. Consider-
ing these distributional consequences these domestic interest groups have an incentive to
lobby their governments. Disaggregating the analysis to examine the effect of domestic
interest groups therefore helps to explain government policy decisions. I argue that the
political dynamics between domestic interest groups within developing countries are the
key to explaining why a government obtains a loan from one source versus another.
2.2.3 Requirements for satisfactory explanation
The analysis presented above reveals gaps in the existing literature that are responsible
for the inability to explain the observed patterns of sovereign borrowing. A satisfactory
explanation must therefore address three issues: First, the outcome to be explained must
be the choice between creditors as opposed to the choice whether or not to borrow from a
single creditor. After all, developing countries have several sources of credit available and
yet are constrained by an upper limit of total debt that can be obtained, which introduces
2 Analysis of the effect of competing domestic interest groups has been used to explain questions related
to the IMF. For example, Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) argue that domestic interest groups matter for
the distributional consequences of IMF agreements. If the IMF demands spending cuts, it initially does
not specify which part of the budget should be reduced. As the eventual budget cuts are a result of
negotiations between the IMF and the government, Nooruddin and Simmons argue that there is space for
domestic interest groups to influence where the cuts are to be made. They show that in democracies it is the
poor that are typically the losers as they are usually not as organized. As they consequently lack political
voice they are harder hit by spending cuts (See also Woo (2010) and Conway (2006)). However, these
approaches assume that an IMF agreement has already been reached, and domestic politics only factors
into the secondary decision regarding how to subsequently distribute the consequences amongst domestic
constituencies. I argue that this makes the second step before the first, as no consideration is given to how
the same domestic coalitions might affect the decision to seek out an IMF agreement in the first place.
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an interdependency between obtaining debt from one source versus another. Second, under
these conditions, an explanation of borrowing patterns cannot be provided from a creditor
perspective. Instead, the decision calculus of the recipient country must be at the center
stage. It is therefore necessary to examine the incentives faced by the recipient government.
In particular, a satisfactory theory must incorporate the preferences of domestic actors to
which the government responds. The political dynamics of competing domestic interest
groups might drive the government’s borrowing strategy. Third, if the government’s choice
between creditors is to be explained with the preferences of various domestic actors, an
approach must start by analyzing the distributional consequences for each actor across
each type of loan.
Following the considerations laid out above, I begin by defining the domestic actors
Finance, Industry, and Labor. I then introduce the various borrowing options available to
the central government and analyze the distributional consequences that each type of loan
would have on the three domestic actors. The subsequent analysis of coalitional dynamics
results in an explanation regarding when a government has the incentive to borrow from
emerging lenders as opposed to traditional lenders.
2.3 Actors, interests, and preferences
2.3.1 Defining actors
The starting point of my theoretical framework is to define the domestic actors to which the
government responds. I assume the relevant groups to be Finance, Industry and Labor.
In doing so, I follow the work by leading scholars in political economy. For example.
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005, p.23) suggest a framework that differentiates between owners,
managers, and workers while Rogowski (1989, p.6) divides society into capital, land, and
labor. Frieden (1991, p.34), in turn, proposes a framework based on divergent class interests
between capital and labor as well as sectoral divisions. Most recently, Pepinsky (2008,
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p.439) distinguishes between mobile capital, fixed capital, and labor to explain government
policy.
In my theoretical framework, Finance is defined as all domestic actors that own mobile
capital goods. These are intangible assets such as stocks or bonds. This comprises banks
and domestic investment companies. As such, their income is generated by providing
financial services to their clients and from interest on capital investments. However, I
understand Finance’s capital to be mobile in the domestic sense only. The local financial
sector typically does not have the opportunity to leave the country, despite the intangible
nature of its assets. After all, its business is typically dependent on a domestic clientele
such as individual savers or domestic investors. Further, the local financial sector of many
developing countries are characterized by a lack of subsidiaries abroad to which liquid
assets could be transferred.
In contrast to Finance, Industry comprises all actors that own immobile capital goods
such as manufacturing equipment and other capital necessary to produce tangible products.
Hence, factory owners such as manufacturing companies or infrastructure firms represent
the vast majority of Industry. I also conceptualize land ownership as a form of immobile
capital. Note that in contrast to the United States, the number of firms listed on a stock
market in developing countries is small, and the set of domestic investors that are able to
purchase these stocks is similarly small. It is therefore generally not the case that employees
are also owners of their companies.
Lastly, Labor encompasses all actors who do not own capital and therefore need to sell
their labor. The income of this group is therefore entirely comprised of wages3 .
I follow Frieden (1991) in assuming that the role of the government is to aggregate
the preferences of domestic actors weighted by their relative power, and, subsequently,
implement the dominant policy demands. I assume that the government’s main objective
3 At this point, in the interest of parsimony, I assume that Labor is a homogenous unit and do not
differentiate between formal and informal work, or skilled and unskilled labor. However, I will relax these
assumptions later on.
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is to maintain incumbency. It does not have interests of its own regarding the source of
credit but merely responds to societal pressures. This implies that my argument does
not only apply to democracies, but also to autocrats who are dependent on the continued
support of a selectorate.
To conceptualize the government as an ‘area for contestation,’ as opposed to an actor
in itself, might appear at odds with the existing literature on “Bringing the State Back
In” (Skocpol, Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Schmidt, 2009) that explicitly allows for the
state to have its own interests. While I acknowledge that this concept holds appeal, I argue
that its applicability in the context of developing countries is limited for two reasons. First,
it is not clear whether bureaucracies would have strong preferences with regard to which
creditor to choose, and if so, in which direction this interest would point. After all, different
ministries might have opposing interests. For example, the Foreign ministry might want
BRIC loans in order to avoid conditions attached to multilateral loans thereby increasing
its room to maneuver in the international arena. In contrast, the Procurement Ministry
might want multilateral loans for the technical expertise that comes with World Bank
loans. Second, while bureaucracy is the foundation of the strong states that characterize
the East Asian Tigers, the large majority of developing countries can best be described
as weak states. Considering the low degree of state capacity, it is unwarranted to assume
that states themselves will have interests. Instead, the assumption that states primarily
respond to societal interests is reasonable, particularly in the context of recipient developing
countries4 .
2.3.2 Defining interests
The next step is to determine what these actors want. I therefore examine the political
and economic characteristics of each actor to analytically derive both their interests and
their preferences. This is an important distinction: Interests are the broad long-term goals
4 See chapter 3 for empirical evidence supporting this assumption.
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that actors hope to accomplish with particular political actions. In contrast, preferences
identify the preferred choice among a specific set of options. For example, it may be in
my interest to lose weight - but my preference for accomplishing this goal is to play more
sports rather than eat less. In other words, preferences across options mark the preferred
means to an end, while the interests define the end itself.
The interests of the actors are defined as follows: I assume that Finance is primarily
interested in the stability of the domestic banking system in order to ensure its continued
existence. In addition, as inflation would devalue their capital, low inflation is in their
interest to ensure stable and continued profits. Lastly, the presence of potential clients
to which they can offer their financial services is essential to the interests of Finance. In
contrast, Industry is primarily interested in the sufficient supply of production inputs as
well as adequate demand for their outputs. In addition, they are concerned with the level
of investment as this is their main source of maintaining their sources of income. Finally,
Labor’s interests amount to an increase in real wages as well as sufficient employment
opportunities. In addition, social transfers and anti-poverty programs by external actors
would also be in their interest.
2.3.3 Defining preferences
Above, I introduced the actors’ respective interests. However, what are the preferences
of the actors’ across the various borrowing options? The following section combines the
information of actors interests with the characteristics of the four borrowing options –
multilateral creditors, two types of bilateral creditors, or private sources – to derive the
actors’ specific preferences. For this reason, I analyze the distributional consequences that
each type of loan would have on the respective domestic actor.
Here I assume that domestic actors have expectations regarding the distributional con-
sequences of each loan type: each actor will compare their interests with the characteristics
43
IFI creditors DAC creditors BRIC creditors Private creditors
Finance + + – +
Industry o – + +
Labor – + + –
Table 2.1: Distributional consequences by actor.
of each borrowing option. For example, IMF loans come with certain macroeconomic condi-
tions that might benefit some actors more than others. Even though the central government
obtains the loans, there are distributional consequences for domestic actors that depend
on the characteristics of the creditor. In the process of deciding between loan offers, gov-
ernments have the political incentive to choose the borrowing strategy that is optimal for
their desired winning coalition in order to ensure re-election.
In what follows, I will refer to the relevant literature to identify the distributional
consequences of each borrowing option on each domestic actor. Two caveats, though: first,
note that I am referring to the average tendency of an actor to prefer or dislike a particular
loan option. It is therefore possible to find particular circumstances where an actor might
have different preferences than indicated here. Second, I consider short-term distributional
consequences only and am abstracting from long term effects. After all, an increase in
social expenditure – from which Labor directly benefits – might also benefit Finance in the
long run by increasing human capital. However, these benefits are not immediate and are
highly uncertain. I therefore assume that Finance would disapprove of social expenditure
as it does not have direct material benefits in the short term.
The resulting distribution of preferences of the three domestic actors across the bor-
rowing options of the government are represented by Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Preferences with respect to multilateral creditors
Multilateral loans are obtained from multilateral institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. These loans are typically inexpensive as their
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interest rates are low and maturities long. However, they are characterized by specific con-
ditions and a particular sectoral focus. The conditions attached to multilateral loans follow
the prescriptions of the liberal Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2000). They include
structural adjustment requirements that aim at improving the Balance of Payment deficit,
cutting the budget deficit with austerity measures, and reducing inflation in order to pre-
serve the purchasing power of capital. In addition, so-called ‘good governance’ conditions
require the recipient country to increase its standards with respect to transparency and
accountability. Due to the mission of multilateral institutions, multilateral loans typically
emphasize social purposes such as education, housing or health.
Finance’s preferences with regard to multilateral loans are positive. There are several
reasons for this. First, Copelovitch (2010b) argues that an IMF loan can limit the risk of
financial crises in the recipient country. As such, IMF loans are not only a bailout to banks
from industrialized countries that are exposed in developing countries, but also benefit the
domestic financial sector. Domestic banks are therefore able to engage in profit-seeking
activities that otherwise would not be available. Further, as IMF loans are considered
effective in addressing balance of payment problems, the government is less likely to default
(Pastor, 1987; Conway, 1994). Such defaults would not be in the interest of Finance, as
it would seriously limit its ability to engage with international actors and, for example,
to obtain interbank loans. In addition, scholars have argued that some governments will
seek out an IMF program in order to implement economic reforms that are unpopular
with Labor or Industry. Presumably, though, reforms pertaining to the removal of capital
controls, restrictions on exchange rates, and curbing inflation are in the interest of Finance.
The preferences of Industry are likely to be ambivalent with regard to the government
obtaining a multilateral loan. On the one hand, austerity measures imposed by the IMF
are likely to lower public investment, and therefore reduce work for domestic companies
(Conway, 1994). In addition, scholars have found that output and growth tends to contract
after signing an IMF agreement, which would indicate that Industry is likely to suffer
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(Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2003a; Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006).
However, under conditions of high inflation, the profits of Industry are just as much at risk
as those of Finance. It therefore might welcome IMF conditions that curb inflation under
these conditions. Thus, while there are some directional effects, the preference intensity of
Industry for or against multilateral loans is low.
Labor has negative preferences with respect to the government obtaining an IMF loan.
Existing research shows that IMF programs are associated with an increase in inequality
(Pastor, 1987; Garuda, 2000), usually as a consequence of a reduction in the income share of
labor (Vreeland, 2002). In addition, scholars have noted that welfare spending on the poor
is likely to deteriorate under the auspice of an IMF program. For example, Nooruddin and
Simmons (2006) show that IMF programs have a negative effect on health and education
expenditures in democracies.
2.3.5 Preferences in regards to DAC creditors
With respect to bilateral loans, I distinguish between loans from traditional western lenders
and loans from emerging creditors, as their characteristics differ fundamentally. Western
bilateral creditors are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) within
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). DAC members
have agreed on how bilateral sovereign-to-sovereign capital flows should look. For example,
they should be untied transfers to concessional terms with a focus on social expenditure.
Nevertheless, it is expected that bilateral loans from DAC countries are rewarding recip-
ients that exhibit ‘good governance,’ which include rule of law, transparency, and other
investor-friendly policies. For example, Dollar (2006) and Collier and Dollar (2002) find
that donors are increasingly selective with respect to recipient policy. With respect to the
bilateral loans from one DAC member, Stone (2004, p.580) writes that “Britain promotes
the Commonwealth of Nations, a loose regime that has gradually evolved into a good gov-
ernance club. For example, South Africa was readmitted to the Commonwealth after the
46
end of Apartheid, and Zimbabwe was recently expelled after coming under severe criticism
for confiscating land holdings.” Also, it is expected that DAC loans are given only if certain
‘good governance’ criteria are met. This has led to an emphasis on loans for the health
and education sector.
Considering the good governance requirements, Finance is likely to view DAC loans
favorably. After all, it expects that bilateral loans from traditional creditors will compel the
government to pursue orthodox economic policies that would benefit Finance. As bilateral
funds from traditional creditors tend to be correlated with IMF loans (Rowlands, 2001,
see), the policy preferences of the IMF and DAC donors can be assumed to be similar. In
addition, Copelovitch (2010b) shows that the banking sector in industrialized countries has
the ability to direct multilateral lenders to stabilize financial sectors in developing countries.
Consequently, it can be expected that these banks are also able to direct bilateral capital
flows from DAC countries for the same reason. Finance in the recipient countries should
therefore expect similar positive payoffs from bilateral loans as with IMF loans.
The strong association of policy preferences between IMF and bilateral lending suggests
that Industry dislikes DAC loans, as it does IMF loans. The emphasis on good governance
will make it impossible for governments to pursue an industrial policy akin to that of
the East Asian Tigers in the 1980s, aimed at creating comparative advantages for domestic
firms (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989). In addition to the good governance requirements, DAC
countries also place heavy emphasis on social expenditures, such as education and health.
While this may benefit the economy as a whole in the long run, it does not provide specific
nor immediate benefits to Industry.
In contrast, Labor’s preferences with respect to DAC loans are likely to be favorable,
as it will directly benefit from increases in education and social expenditures.
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2.3.6 Preferences regarding BRIC creditors
In contrast to DAC member countries, the BRIC lenders are not constrained with respect to
their lending conditions. They are therefore not bound by the norms codified in the DAC.
This implies that the lending conditions of BRIC loans differ with respect of their terms
and repayment options. For instance, BRIC loans have been found to be more expensive
than DAC loans (Foster et al., 2008). Also, while DAC countries do not require collateral
to secure repayment, the Chinese have required oil as collateral for loans (Mapstone, 2009;
Sudan Tribune, 2012). In addition to differences in financing terms, BRICs appear to have
a different emphasis on the purpose of the loans, suggesting that there has been an over-
emphasis on “social projects” at the expense of building productive capacity (Mwase and
Yang, 2012). Further, BRIC loans are not associated with ‘good governance’ requirements,
and therefore give the recipient country greater leeway regarding the use of the incoming
resources. Also, their sectoral focus appears to be towards infrastructure rather than social
projects.
Considering these differences, Finance would prefer if its government would not obtain
BRIC loans. As there are no good governance conditions attached, Finance cannot expect
the government to move towards their preferred economic policy that emphasizes liberal
markets and capital mobility. In addition, the sectoral focus on infrastructure projects
would boost public investment, which in turn crowds out private investment - and therefore
undermines the clientele of Finance.
In contrast, Industry is likely to be in favor of BRIC loans. As there are no good
governance conditions attached to these loans, the government retains room to maneuver
to implement industrial policy, which would directly benefit Industry. Their sectoral focus
on financing infrastructure projects further suggests that Industry could benefit as domestic
firms can expect business via subcontracting.
Labor also has favorable preferences with respect to BRIC loans. If budget loans
from BRICs are indeed conducive to an increase in public investment in infrastructure,
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positive employment effects are likely. Some observers have raised the concern that the
Chinese bring their own labor to build infrastructure projects. However, Mwase and Yang
(2012) state that this is not universally the case. Some Chinese construction companies in
countries like Tanzania report about 80 percent of employment going to local communities.
For example, a recent Chinese investment was reported to have created 3,000 jobs for local
workers (Changfa, 2012; Sayila, 2012). However, observers in post-conflict countries (e.g.,
Angola and Sierra Leone) report lower levels due to the lack of available skilled workers.
2.3.7 Preferences concerning private creditors
Lastly, capital transfers from private sources can take a variety of forms. First, loans can be
extended by international private banks in developed economies, most often in the form of
syndicated loans. Syndicated loans are extended by a group of commercial private banks (a
syndicate) that jointly lend to a single government. Issuing government bonds is a second
option for developing countries to obtain capital from private lenders. Bonds are formal
contracts between the government and a multitude of individual investors who may be
private institutions or even individuals. Private creditors are typically rather expensive for
developing countries because of the risk premium required by private creditors. However,
they do not carry any conditions and the government is therefore unconstrained regarding
the use to which these borrowed resources are put.
Finance is likely to be in favor of its government borrowing from private creditors. For
instance, if the government issues bonds, Finance benefits in two ways. First, they are the
only domestic group that has the financial resources to purchase these securities. If the
domestic financial sector is holding bonds issued by its government, the interest payments
of the government on these bonds amount to a transfer of resources collected via taxes
from the general population to Finance. In addition, sovereign issuances further expand
the already existing bond market for firms, and therefore provide additional opportunities
to Finance to offer financial services.
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As Industry is comprised of private companies, they, as well, are in favor of the govern-
ment obtaining debt from private sources. In particular, because the successful placement
of bonds is a signal to investors that the business climate and outlook are favorable, Indus-
try itself will benefit from easier access to foreign loans to finance their own operations.
Lastly, Labor will likely have negative preferences with respect to private debt. Workers
in developing countries typically do not have the financial resources to purchase bonds
themselves. Bonds therefore constitute a transfer of resources away from Labor to both
the domestic and foreign financial sector as the interest paid on bonds must be financed
with tax revenue.
2.4 The politics of loan choice
2.4.1 Process of preference aggregation
So far, I have derived the preferences of Finance, Industry and Labor across the four
borrowing options available to the government. What is left to explain are the demand
side as well as the supply side of the process that results in a government’s borrowing
decision. The former suggests the mechanism by which the preferences of the societal
actors are aggregated, while the latter indicates the process by which politicians decide to
whose preferences to listen.
Johnson and Salop (1980, p.12) state that “the choice of policy instruments will be
influenced by the political power of various [...] groups.” However, conceptualizing a
mechanism of preference aggregation with respect to the topic of this study is a challenge
for two reasons. First, the issue is characterized by an unordered set of actors, as well as an
unordered set of policy choices. It is therefore not possible to align Finance, Industry and
Labor in a one-dimensional space according to their ordered preferences. In this respect,
the issue of sovereign debt is fundamentally different from the subject of international
trade as the actors can very well be aligned along a single spatial dimension of ‘more trade
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liberalization’ versus ‘more trade protection’. In addition, the preference aggregation of the
three actors is characterized by a lack of formality similar to what Bearce (2003) has already
noted with respect to monetary policy: there are no formal coalition agreements between
actors that have similar preferences. In addition, even if preferences of two actors are known
to be aligned, we observe surprisingly little active lobbying by the groups that are affected.
Any theoretical mechanism of preference aggregation with respect to sovereign borrowing
has to take these considerations into account. Faced with this conceptual challenge, I draw
inspiration from Downs (1957) who argues that the central goal of each politician is to
win or maintain office. Such office-seeking politicians hence have the incentive to cater to
multiple constituencies simultaneously in order to maximize the prospect of maintaining
incumbency. In such a situation it is advantageous to politicians if their policies can satisfy
the preferences of multiple interest groups simultaneously. Drawing on Shepsle (1979), I
argue that politicians carefully observe the structural conditions of the domestic economy
to infer which actors are likely to have similar interests. Once they have analyzed which
two of the three domestic actors have congruent interests, politicians have the incentive to
implement policies – i.e. borrowing from the jointly preferred creditor – that satisfy the
preferences of two actors at once.
I suggest that politicians observe the overall economic and political environment to
determine whether the interests of two actors are congruent. For example, if unemployment
is high, Labor can be expected to have similar interests to Industry. After all, just like
Industry, Labor would be in favor of increasing investment in order to create employment
opportunities. In contrast, under conditions of high inflation, Labor’s interests are likely
to be congruent with those of Finance. While inflation devalues the capital owned by
Finance, it also lowers the real wages of Labor. In sum, depending on the overall state of
the economy, the interests of Labor are either congruent with those of Finance or those of
Industry.
A similar reasoning applies to the interests of Industry. If the structure of domestic
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industry is focused on producing goods for export, the interests of Industry are likely to
be congruent with the interests of Finance. As most industries in developing countries are
competing in world markets based on price and not quality, it is essential to keep labor
costs low. Labor will therefore not be part of the coalition, as was the case in South Korea
(Kay, 2002). In contrast, if the structure of the domestic industry is primarily focused on
satisfying the demands of the domestic population, Industry’s preferences are likely to be
congruent with Labor’s. After all, Industry has an interest in ensuring that its customers
have sufficient purchasing power to buy the products it produces.
Lastly, the congruence of Finance’s interests with those of either Labor or Industry also
depend on the structure of the economy. For example, if there is a high level of domestic
credit to Industry and investments are primarily financed by domestic rather than foreign
sources, Finance’s interests will be congruent with those of Industry. In contrast, if the
domestic financial sector is catering to the general population as customers, it is likely that
Finance’s interests are similar to those of Labor.
In short, I argue that politicians do the preference aggregation for the various actors.
They have the incentive to think in terms of informal coalitions between actors with con-
gruent interests and they can identify the respective coalition present by observing the
structural conditions of the domestic political economy. This mechanism of preference ag-
gregation would therefore be consistent with the empirical lack of formal coalitions and yet
explain the behavior of politicians implementing policies generally thought to be favored
by the dominant actors.
2.4.2 Resulting joint preferences by coalition
Since I assume three actors – Finance, Industry, and Labor – there are three distinctive
coalitional possibilities (see Table 2.2). First, Industry and Labor might have congruent
interests, leaving Finance to be the single actor. In the spirit of the Varieties of Capital-
ism literature, I name this possibility the Corporatist coalition. In contrast, the Capital
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Coalition Partners Single Actor Coalition
Industry and Labor Finance Corporatist coalition
Industry and Finance Labor Capital coalition
Finance and Labor Industry Consumer coalition
Table 2.2: Coalitional possibilities.
IFI creditors DAC creditors BRIC creditors Private creditors
Capital coalition (Finance + Industry) + o o ++
Corporatist coalition (Labor + Industry) – o ++ o
Consumer coalition (Finance + Labor) o ++ o o
Table 2.3: Distributional consequences by coalition.
coalition is present if the interests of the capital owners – Finance with mobile capital, and
Industry with fixed capital – are congruent. Lastly, I call the coalition between Finance
and Labor the Consumer coalition.
Each of the three possible coalitions has a different joint-preference ordering with re-
spect to the borrowing options available to the government. These joint preferences are
a function of the individual actors’ preferences (see Table 1.3). If both actors agree in
their assessment of whether the government should or should not borrow from a particular
source, the joint preference will reflect this. However, if the preferences of the individual
actors are contradictory, the joint preference of the coalition will be undecided with respect
to this borrowing option. The resulting joint preferences of the respective coalitions are
represented in Table 2.3.
In turn, Table 2.4 illustrates the pattern of joint preference ordering across the three
possible coalitions between Finance, Industry, and Labor. The Capital coalition between
Finance and Industry has a strong joint preference for loans from the private market as
both actors prefer this option individually. Multilateral loans are preferred over bilateral
loans from DAC or BRIC countries, but not as strongly favored as private creditors. In
contrast, the Corporatist coalition exhibits a strong joint preference for BRIC loans as
both Labor and Industry favor this creditor individually. At the same time, this coalition
has a strong preference against multilateral loans. DAC loans and private loans are jointly
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Coalition Single actor Joint preference ordering Country
of dominant coalition example
Capital coalition (Finance + Industry) Labor Private > IFI > (DAC, BRIC) Colombia
Corporatist coalition (Labor + Industry) Finance BRIC > (DAC, Private) > IFI Ecuador
Consumer coalition (Finance + Labor) Industry DAC > (IFI, BRIC, Private) Peru
Table 2.4: Illustration of joint preference ordering by coalition.
neither liked nor disliked as the individual preferences are not shared by the coalition
partner. Lastly, the Consumer coalition shows a strong joint preference for DAC loans,
while they are indifferent between multilateral, BRIC and private creditors.
2.5 Resulting hypotheses
The theoretical framework above introduces preferences of the three actors and suggests a
process of coalition formation. In this way, a profile of the joint preferences summarized
in Table 2.3 was obtained. The variation of the coalitions’ preferences across creditors can
be utilized to derive specific hypotheses.
I argue that the composition of new loans a country acquires in a particular year can
be explained by the type of social coalition that is present in that country. I do not suggest
that a country characterized by a particular coalition will always use the preferred creditor.
Rather, I argue that, on average, the government will tend to favor borrowing from the
creditor preferred by the dominant coalition when making the series of borrowing decisions
in a given year. The resulting composition of total new borrowing should therefore reflect
the tendency to over-utilize one creditor to the detriment of the others. With respect to
the specific coalitions identified, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis A1: Corporatist coalition Governments in countries characterized by a
Corporatist coalition between Labor and Industry are expected to prefer borrowing from
BRICs more than will governments in countries characterized by other coalitions. At the
same time, when making borrowing decisions, these governments will be more likely to
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dismiss loan offers by traditional creditors, in particular the IFIs.
Hypothesis A2: Capital coalition If a country is characterized by an informal coali-
tion between Finance and Industry, it is classified as a Capital coalition. Governments of
these types of countries are expected to prefer borrowing from traditional creditors and
exhibit an aversion with respect to BRIC creditors when deciding among competing loan
offers. In particular, this type of country is hypothesized to favor private creditors as well
as IFIs.
Hypothesis A3: Consumer coalition An informal coalition between Finance and
Labor represents a Consumer coalition. Politicians in countries characterized by this type
of coalition are also expected to prefer borrowing from traditional versus emerging creditors.
In particular, these countries are expected to exhibit a preference for DAC loans.
2.6 Summary
In sum, I explain why some developing countries tend to borrow from BRICs, while others
do not. To do so, I propose a theoretical framework that explains how developing coun-
tries choose between loan offers. My theory addresses three shortcomings of the existing
literature on sovereign borrowing. First, I focus on explaining the choice between several
creditors as opposed to examining whether or not a government borrows from a specific
creditor. Second, I reject the assumption that borrowing countries are homogenous entities.
Instead I disaggregate the state to analyze the preferences of domestic interest groups and
how they might determine government policy. Lastly, because of the focus on the choice
between creditors as well as the role of domestic political actors, I am able to introduce
the analysis of distributional consequence into the explanation of governments’ borrowing
strategies.
My theory incorporates an analysis of the differences in distributional consequences
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of the various borrowing options across several domestic interest groups. I suggest that
these distributional consequences determine the preferences of the actors. I then outline a
process of preference aggregation that results in an informal coalition between two of the
three actors, isolating the single remaining actor. I argue that the government will tend
to borrow from the creditor that is preferred by the dominant social coalition in order to
gain the political support needed for maintaining incumbency. This approach allows me
to predict under which conditions a government of a developing country can be expected
to favor borrowing from emerging creditors as opposed to traditional lenders.
Chapter 3
Empirical Support for the
Theoretical Framework
3.1 Verifying fundamental assumptions
The previous chapter outlined a theory that explains why some governments of developing
countries tend to choose loans from Brazil, India, Russia and China while other govern-
ments are more likely to reject their loan proposals. In the process of developing this
theory, I have made a series of assumptions. Before proceeding with the tests of the hy-
potheses that follow from my theory, I need to verify that these fundamental assumptions
are appropriate.
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate evidence related to the basic
tenets of my theoretical framework as a precursor to investigation of several hypotheses
derived from my framework. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First,
Section 3.2 investigates whether the process of lending is best explained with a demand-
side theory or if loans are driven by the preferences of creditors instead. I will argue that
the supply of loans can reasonably be assumed to be constant and therefore variation in
borrowing patterns must stem from differences in demand. Section 3.3 examines the process
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of borrowing more closely. In it, I conclude that politics have ample opportunity to shape
the process of borrowing, the outcome of which, therefore, does not reflect a technocratic
decision but a political process. Sections 3.5 and 3.5 debunk the notion that politicians
care about the cost of loans or the type of project when choosing among competing loan
offers. Instead, I show in Section 3.7 that the preferences of domestic interest groups vary
and that politicians respond to these preferences by selecting the loan with distributional
characteristics that match the preferences of the dominant interest groups.
To provide an empirical foundation to the discussions in this chapter, I draw on a variety
of sources. First, I will present statistical evidence from a newly collected dataset about
developing countries’ borrowing behavior that will be introduced in more detail later (see
Section 5.1). Similarly, I will draw on the insights obtained from about 120 interviews with
high-level decision-makers which I conducted in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. Specifics
about the case selection and interview method can be found elsewhere (see Section 6.1
while details regarding the questions asked and interviewees can be found in the Appendix
A.
3.2 Demand-side vs. supply-side
It might be argued that successful loan agreements are driven by the ‘producer’ (i.e the
creditor) and not the ’consumer’ (the debtor). In this case, creditors’ willingness to lend
to one country, but not another, would explain why some governments obtain loans from
a particular creditor while others do not. The debtors’ preferences would therefore not
be of important as the recipient government would be glad to receive whichever loan it
could obtain. In other words, in that hypothesis the process of lending might be driven
by the supply side. If this were the case, an explanation based on the demand side –
such as the one put forward in Chapter 2 – would be inappropriate as the preferences of
domestic interest groups or the government of recipient countries would not matter. In
such a case, the ‘choice’ of developing countries between creditors might not actually be
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a choice. Rather, developing countries would be passive recipients of loans that creditors
decide to allocate.
In contrast to the supply-side hypothesis, I argue that the demand side is crucial for
explaining the lending/borrowing patterns observed. Confronted with the supply-side hy-
pothesis it is therefore necessary to provide empirical support for one of my theory’s funda-
mental assumptions: the supply of loans can be assumed constant while debtors’ preferences
vary, which, in turn, explains variations in the observed choice of creditor. The purpose
of this section is therefore to provide evidence for the assumption that the supply side is
not the driving force behind the distribution of loans but that – contrary to conventional
wisdom – the supply of loans can be taken as largely constant.
3.2.1 The supply of BRIC loans
With respect to the supply of bilateral loans by Brazil, Russia, India and China, I base my
observations on the interviews with both debtor and creditor representatives I conducted in
Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. These countries are similar in many respects, particularly in
their distance from China, colonial histories, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, and po-
litical systems. However, only one of these countries, Ecuador, has borrowed large amounts
from the BRICs. Yet, my interviews with public debt officials made clear that not only
Ecuador, but also Peru and Colombia had received loan offers from the Chinese. In part,
this is because one of the most important Chinese policy banks, the Chinese Development
Bank (CDB), maintains offices in the capitals of each of these three countries. For exam-
ple, the CDB had opened its office in Bogota, Colombia, already in 2007 (Guarin, 2011).
Others confirm that the CDB’s Peruvian office in Lima is staffed by four permanent em-
ployees(Alzamora, 2011; Su, 2011; Ming, 2011). In other words, the physical representation
of the Chinese in these three countries is constant.
However, despite their physical presence in these countries, BRICs willingness to lend
might still vary. Interviewees representing the debtors suggested that the Chinese strategy
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towards the three countries is the same (Paredes, 2011). However, I triangulated this
information by conducting interviews with Chinese creditor representatives, such as those
from the CDB, in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Their answers were consistent across
the three countries, confirming that Chinese lending institutions are generally willing to
lend. After all, they represent a policy bank with the purpose of lending. I was told
that the CDB is, in principle, interested in lending if approached by a government with a
project that is in the ‘national interest’ of the recipient. Upon further questioning regarding
what constituted a project in the ‘national interest,’ the officials stated that they would
be willing to grant loans for undertakings that would increase people’s welfare or make
important economic sectors more competitive. In essence, the CDB “is willing to lend to
anybody with a good proposal, because we are a development organization, just like the
World Bank or IADB” (Ming, 2011).
3.2.2 DAC creditors and the difference between foreign aid and loans
The traditional discourse concerning foreign aid by western bilateral lenders suggests that
these lenders have the ability to direct to whom their resources are given. In particular, it
appears as if transfers from DACs to developing countries are primarily motivated by the
political and strategic considerations of the donors as opposed to the requirements of, or
demands from, recipients.
I agree with this assessment – but only with respect to foreign aid. For the purposes
of the investigation into sovereign lending, it is important to differentiate between foreign
aid and loans. The literature with respect to aid has firmly established that its provision is
strongly correlated with the receipt of political favors within international organizations. In
other words, foreign aid buys votes. For example, developing countries that became mem-
bers of the UN Security Council began to receive 56% more aid from western developed
countries than those not represented (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Dreher, Nunnenkamp
and Thiele (2008) show that this relationship particularly describes the behavior of the
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United States. Most recently, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) find that the proba-
bility of obtaining foreign aid from the United States increases sharply after a country is
elected to the Security Council. Despite the official rhetoric of human rights and develop-
ment, autocracies are very likely to begin receiving US aid after joining the Council even
if they have never been a recipient previously. In addition, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2010) show that the recipients of US foreign aid favor US policies during their tenure on
the Security Council.
While there is robust evidence for the argument that foreign aid buys votes, I argue
that this relationship is different in the context of loans. Foreign aid constitutes a monetary
transfer where no monetary repayment is expected. Instead, as shown above, ‘repayment’
is obtained in political terms. In contrast to foreign aid, bilateral loans do contain the
provision of repayment in monetary terms (i.e. principal with interest). Thus, in the case
of bilateral loans, repayment in votes is not required because a monetary repayment is
already expected. Due to this difference in the type of ‘repayment,’ it is not reasonable
to expect that the distribution of bilateral loans is strongly shaped by donors’ political
interests. Loans are a commercial product that are granted to anyone who can reasonably
be expected to repay both principal and interest.
My conversations with French, German and US creditor representatives in Ecuador,
Peru and Colombia confirmed that creditors viewed loans as a rather apolitical instrument.
In particular, my interviews revealed that the agencies’ missions are to get as much business
with governments of developing countries as possible. The French representatives were
most explicit in stating that “whenever the host country would invite loan proposals we
[the Agence Francaise de Developpement] would make an offer on terms that they deemed
competitive in light of the expected offers by other creditors” (Richy and Gazon, 2011).
Following this statement, the interviewees listed the interest rates and maturities that
their competitors such as the GIZ (Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit, the
German Development Agency) or USAID as well as multilateral institutions such as the
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IADB would typically offer.
In sum, it is important to differentiate between loans and foreign aid. While the latter
might very well be driven by supply-side considerations, the commercial nature of bilateral
loans in a competitive market indicates that demand considerations are more decisive.
3.2.3 IFI membership and borrowing rights
I argue that the supply of loans by the third type of creditor, International Financial
Institutions, can also be viewed as constant. For example, the IMF – arguably the most
important creditor to developing countries among the IFIs – is a membership organization
with financial resources that are provided by its members via quota subscription. Upon
joining, each member country therefore contributes a certain amount of hard currency to
the IMF that is largely proportional to the country’s GDP. Currently, the US is the country
contributing the largest quota to the IMF (about $64 billion) while Tuvalu is the smallest
contributing member with a quota of $1.8 million.
These quotas play a key role with respect to the countries’ access to IMF financing.
To quote the IMF itself, “the amount of financing a member can obtain from the IMF
(its access limit) is based on its quota. For example, under Stand-By and Extended Ar-
rangements, a member can borrow up to 200 percent of its quota annually and 600 percent
cumulatively. However, access may be higher in exceptional circumstances” (IMF, 2013a).
If a country is a member of the IMF it has the right to borrow from the IMF. For IMF
member countries, therefore, the supply of loans can be assumed constant.
It is important to understand the country coverage to which this constant IMF supply
applies. My dataset contains a total of 129 developing countries over the period of seven
years (2003-2010). Of these 903 country-year observations, only 8 country-years were
without IMF membership: Kosovo joined the IMF only after its independence on June 29,
2009 and Montenegro only on January 18, 2007 after its separation from Serbia. Apart from
these five years that Kosovo was not IMF members and the three years that Montenegro
62
missed out, all other developing countries were an IMF member during the entire period
of my dataset.
When examining IMF membership over a longer time period, the picture remains re-
markably similar. When analyzing IMF membership for the same set of 129 countries
from 1970 through 2010, in only 667 of a total 5289 country-years were the respective
countries not IMF members. This is even more striking considering that 330 of the 667
non-membership country-years can be attributed to the 15 countries emerging from the
former Soviet Union (such as Kazakhstan or the Ukraine). After all, they did not have the
opportunity to become members until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
In sum, the supply of IMF loans can be viewed as constant, as IMF membership is
almost universal and IMF members have the right to borrow up to 600% of their quota.
However, even though the supply of loans is constant, actual borrowing from the IMF ex-
hibits variation which has received attention from academic scholars. Existing scholarship
has attempted to explain this variation in utilizing IMF loans primarily with supply-side
arguments. For example, Copelovitch (2010b) shows that in the aforementioned ‘excep-
tional circumstances’ some countries might get larger loans than others. In particular,
governments of developing countries, in which private banks from G5 countries are heavily
exposed, typically obtain larger loans in times of crisis in order to avert financial crises
which would hurt these private financial interests.
I argue, in contrast, that this variation of utilizing the IMF primarily depends on
demand-side considerations. Some countries simply do not want to borrow from the IMF,
while others do. Considering that the supply of IMF loans is constant, the heterogeneity
of debtor preferences also results in variation of observed borrowing behavior. In this case,
it is reasonable to assume that the supply of loans by the IMF is constant, which in turn
implies that the presence or absence of an IMF loan is largely determined by the demand
(or lack thereof) from the potential recipient.
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3.2.4 Private creditors and the non-discrimination of borrowers
Private creditors might be considered most fickle in comparison to the other three creditors.
After all, the BRICs, DACs and IFIs are public creditors and, as such, can be assumed
to respond more slowly to changing market conditions either for bureaucratic or political
reasons. In contrast, conventional wisdom considers private creditors to be extremely risk
averse, hesitant to extend loans to risky clients, and likely to ‘punish’ bad customers by
refusing to do business with them again in the future.
If this assessment of private creditors is correct, we would expect that their lending
behaviors exhibit the following characteristics. From a cross-sectional perspective, private
creditors would disproportionately favor lending to countries that are in low risk of default
and therefore very likely to repay the loan with interest. At the same time, countries
with high risk of default should receive very few resources from private creditors. In
addition to the cross-sectional perspective examining the decision of private creditors to
allocate their resources at a specific point in time, the temporal dimension should also
exhibit discriminating behavior by private creditors. Conventional wisdom would claim
that private creditors exhibit substantial hesitation when it comes to lending to countries
that previously defaulted on their loans. In this paradigm, countries that fail to repay loans
would develop ‘bad’ reputations that would prevent them from borrowing from private
creditors in the future. I will investigate the accuracy of both perspectives in turn.
The main question implicit in the cross-sectional perspective is the following: do cred-
itors consider the riskiness of countries when making lending decisions? Conventional
wisdom suggests that private creditors, in particular, should lend disproportionately to
countries with high creditworthiness. At the same time, countries classified as bad risks
and, consequently, at high probability of default, whould receive comparatively fewer re-
sources. Investor Rating Agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and the Fitch
Group provide information on the perceived riskiness of countries. This information is
typically summarized in the form of Sovereign Debt Ratings that range from AAA (best)
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to D (worst).1 Conventional wisdom suggests we should expect the ratio of the number
of loans to low-risk countries relative to the number of countries in this category to be high.
In contrast, countries with low sovereign debt ratings would receive disproportionately few
loans.
However, the data do not appear to support this expectation. Figure 3.1 displays the
distribution of number of loans by private creditors across the sovereign debt rating of the
recipient in the year the loan was received. The graph also displays the absolute number of
country-years in the respective risk categories. The figure shows that the number of loans
given to countries in any particular type of risk category is proportional to the overall
number of countries in this category. If private creditors would favor lending to low-risk
governments and discriminate against high-risk countries, the distribution should be such
that for highly rated countries the line representing the distribution of loans would be
significantly above the bars. Similarly, we would expect that for low ranked countries the
line depicting the loan distribution would be lower than the bars. However, this is not
the case. In fact, private creditors appear to be lending significant amounts to countries
classified as ‘non-investment grade speculative’ (BB range) and even to countries deemed
‘highly speculative’ (B range). Considering this evidence, it can be concluded that with
respect to the cross-sectional dimension, the distribution of loans by private creditors does
not appear to be discriminating against high-risk countries and favoring low-risk clients.
From the cross-section perspective it can therefore be argued that the supply of private
loans to developing countries is constant.
I attribute the inadequacy of the conventional wisdom to the lack of attention paid to
the flip-side of risk – the reward received in exchange for the risk. In a competitive lending
market, higher risk should be rewarded with higher potential returns signified by a higher
average interest rate. Considering this proportional relationship between risk and reward
1 Different rating agencies use the same scale. However, their labels for the respective categories differ.
For example, while the top rated category is labeled Aaa by Fitch, Standard & Poor assigns the label AAA
to the same category. In the following, I will utilize the classification by Standard & Poor’s.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of private loans of any size conditional on countries’ sovereign
debt rating. The histogram represents the number of countries that received the respective
sovereign debt rating.
it appears reasonable to expect that even lower-ranked countries would receive resources
from private creditors. In fact, if the loan market were perfectly efficient and interest rates
fully compensated for risk, there is every reason to expect that private creditors would be
indifferent between granting loans to high or low risk countries. The ratio of countries per
classification and number of loans to countries in a given classification should consequently
be constant, which is exactly what we observe.
Having analyzed the cross-sectional dimension of lending by private creditors, I now
examine how the lending profiles of the other creditors look with respect to the recipients’
sovereign debt rating. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 display this information for DACs, IFIs and
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BRICs respectively. It is telling that neither DAC or IFI creditors appear to be sensitive
to the debt rating of their borrowers, for their loan distribution closely matches the distri-
bution of countries across the various sovereign debt ratings. Interestingly, BRICs deviate
from the pattern exhibited by traditional creditors. They lend a slightly disproportionate
number of loans to countries that are deemed higher-risk.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Private loans of any size conditional on countries’ sovereign
debt rating. The histogram represents the number of countries that received the respective
sovereign debt rating.
Now I will turn to the inter-temporal dimension of loan allocation. In particular, I will
examine whether there is a reputational effect that prevents governments from borrowing
from private creditors if they have defaulted on loans in the past. If conventional wisdom
is correct, private creditors are likely to punish countries for defaulting. A reputational
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Private loans of any size conditional on countries’ sovereign
debt rating. The histogram represents the number of countries that received the respective
sovereign debt rating.
effect would therefore deny these countries access to private capital for years to come.
This point of view is prominent in the work on sovereign debt. The canonical formal
model by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assumes that a country’s decision to default will cut
them off from the private debt market permanently. Empirical work has lent additional
support for this claim. For example, English (1996) notes that among US states in the
1800s, debt repudiation did result in exclusion from private capital markets. More recently,
Tomz (2007) argues that Argentina repaid its debt in the 1930s, not in order to avoid a
trade embargo from the UK but rather to strengthen its reputation as a good debtor2 .
2 For a contrary account, see (Diaz Alejandro, 1983)
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Private loans of any size conditional on countries’ sovereign
debt rating. The histogram represents the number of countries that received the respective
sovereign debt rating.
However, “whatever were the reasons that led Argentina [...] to repay their debts, there
is by now agreement on the fact that default does not lead to a permanent exclusion from
the international capital market. In fact, the evidence suggests that, while countries lose
access during default, once the restructuring process is fully concluded, financial markets do
not discriminate, in terms of access, between defaulters and non-defaulters” (Borensztein
and Panizza, 2008, p.13 ). A significant body of both empirical (Lindert and Morton, 1989;
Richmond and Dias, 2009) as well as theoretical (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer,
2009) work shows that private creditors have “often preferred to repeat the past rather
than study it” (Lindert and Morton, 1989, p.39). The most recent econometric study on
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the subject concludes that they were “unable to detect strong punishment of defaulting
countries by credit markets. The median number of years it took countries to tap the
markets after default fell from four years in the 1980s to zero in the 1990s” (Gelos, Sahay
and Sandleris, 2011, p.20). They add that “these statistics, together with the results from
our panel estimations seem to contradict a common perception that defaults result in very
prolonged loss of market access” (Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris, 2011, p.20).
My own data is fully in line with the aforementioned evidence against a repudiational
theory that has private creditors punish defaulting countries. In extending data provided
by Laeven and Valencia (2008), there were a total of 53 sovereign debt defaults between
1970 and 2010. Figure 3.5 examines how many years after a default the offending country
obtained the first loan from private creditors again. The results are striking: in 46 of
53 cases of default, the defaulting country obtained a new loan from private creditors
within one year after the default. Note that this analysis only considers debtors obtaining
new loans but excludes instances of old loans being rolled over during the process of re-
negotiation after default.
The results are comparable for the other traditional creditors. In the overwhelming
number of cases both DAC creditors (see Figure 3.6) and IFIs (see Figure 3.7) are willing
to lend again to a defaulting country only one year after default. The situation is slightly
different for BRICs, as they have not been creditors for a long period of time. Nevertheless,
Figure 3.8 indicates that BRICs track record of renewed lending after default exhibits a
similar tendency to forgive defaulting debtors quickly.
In sum, default appears to restrict the ability to borrow only in the very shortest of
terms. Creditors – regardless of their identity – do not hold a grudge against default-
ers. Contrary to the reputational hypothesis, creditors are apparently willing to forgive a
defaulting country quickly.
While it is only speculation at this point, I assume that this apparent falseness of the
conventional wisdom is, in part, due to a moral hazard problem. If a country reduces
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Figure 3.5: Number of years it takes after a country’s default until it borrows again from
private creditors, conditional on the amount borrowed.
its overall debt by defaulting on its loans, future creditors might perceive it as less risky
post-default precisely because the debt level is again at a sustainable level. In other words,
a default might make a country more attractive for creditors because the risk of a renewed
default due to an unsustainable debt burden is lowered.
In conclusion, this section has presented evidence in favor of the assumption that the
supply of loans can reasonably be expected to be constant. Interviews with BRIC lenders
have revealed their desire to lend to “anybody”; the discussion of DAC creditors revealed
that loans are viewed as commercial products unlike foreign aid; IFI membership was
shown to be almost universal, which together with the right to borrow up to six times its
quota implies that access to IMF loans is a given; and, private creditors were shown to
not discriminate against countries with low sovereign debt ratings or previous defaults. In
short, there are convincing reasons to assume that developing countries do have access to
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Figure 3.6: Number of years it takes after a country’s default until it borrows again from
DACs, conditional on the amount borrowed.
any of the four types of creditors if they so desire.
While a demand-side theory explaining the choice of creditor is therefore entirely ap-
propriate, it does not say that there are no supply-side effects. I argue, however, that the
supply side assumes a secondary role by influencing the terms on which loans are extended,
once the decision for a specific creditor has been made. This would be in line with the
existing scholarship. For example, with respect to the IMF, Copelovitch (2010b) and Gould
(2003) show that the number and type of conditions attached to IMF loans varies with the
stakes that private banks from western countries have in developing countries. Similarly,
Dreher and Jensen (2009), Barro and Lee (2005) and Thacker (1999) show that the degree
of conditionality is inversely related to the recipient country’s relations with the US. I will
consequently control for these factors in the statistical analysis of borrowing choices in
Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.7: Number of years it takes after a country’s default until it borrows again from
International Financial Institutions, conditional on the amount borrowed.
3.3 The process of choosing among loan offers
While the previous section established that creditors typically offer loans if debtors wish to
obtain them, this section triangulates these findings from the debtor perspective. It shows
that debtors typically have several loan offers from which they can choose. If governments
would not have the opportunity to choose between creditors, a theory focused on explaining
the choice between competing loan offers would not be acceptable. In addition, my theory
suggests that the borrowing process is shaped by political considerations. This section
provides evidence in favor of this assumption by demonstrating the opportunities for politics
to impact the decision-making process.
To provide evidence for my assumptions, I will draw on my fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru
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Figure 3.8: Number of years it takes after a country’s default until it borrows again from
BRICs, conditional on the amount borrowed.
and Colombia. While there, I interviewed public officials working in the Public Debt de-
partments of the respective countries with the intention of understanding the process by
which sovereign debt is contracted. By doing so, I was able to learn whether govern-
ments have a choice between loan offers and whether politics has opportunities to shape
the decision-making process. I will present the evidence collected in Ecuador, Peru and
Colombia in turn.
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3.3.1 Contracting loans in Ecuador
In Ecuador3 , the first step in the process of obtaining sovereign loans is identifying the pur-
pose for borrowing. For example, it may be necessary to borrow for the general budget or to
finance a particular project. With respect to the latter, the National Secretary of Planning
and Development [Secretaria Nacional de Planificacion y Desarrollo (SENPLADES)] cre-
ates a National Investment Plan [Plan Anual de Inversion (PAI)] that includes all projects
the government wants to undertake. SENPLADES decides which projects to include based
on the viability of the respective projects. Following this step, the Public Debt Office [Sub-
secretario de Credito Publico] within the Finance Ministry solicits offers from a variety of
creditors, such as multilateral institutions, “gobiernos amigos” as well as private credi-
tors. The public debt officials I spoke with stated that Ecuador typically receives several
competing credit offers which typically total about 85% of the amount requested.
In order to decide between the offers, the Finance Ministry next evaluates the loan
offers received. Interestingly, the financial terms of the offer do not appear to be a major
factor in this process. Rather, my interviewees noted that it often is not a question of how
expensive these loans are, but whether or not Ecuador can use the loans in a way they
would like. Officials do not seem to have formal criteria in place by which to judge the
relative benefit of each loan offer. Rather, when I asked why Ecuador suddenly began to
accept loan offers by the Chinese, the Ecuadorian debt officer responded that “it was a
political decision,” while pointing his index finger upwards.
Once the decision amongst the loan offers has been made, the actual loan contract is
negotiated between the Public Debt Office within the Ministry of Finance and the creditor.
I was told that Ecuador cannot usually negotiate the terms of the agreement as it is too
small of a player to make demands. Once the loan contract has been written, the creditor
has to approve and sign it. Following the creditor’s signature, Ecuador has another three
3 The information of this section is based on interviews with the following governmental officials:
Pen˜a Villarruel (2011), Anonymous (2011a), Villalbo Andrade (2011), and Minoli (2011). Also, Mancero de
Viterio (2011).
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months to sign the contract on their part.
Within that time frame, the debt contract is evaluated by a variety of political offices
within the Ecuadorian government. First, it is presented to the State Attorney [Procurador
del Estado] in order to verify that the legal aspects of the contract meet Ecuadorian law.
In particular, this focuses on the arbitration clause [cla´usula arbitraje] of the contract and
assesses whether it allows foreign companies to sue the Ecuadorian government in foreign
courts as this would be unconstitutional. If approved and the loan proposal is for $35
million or less, the Ministry of Finance is authorized to sign the loan right away. However,
if the loan amount is larger than $35 million, the proposal must be presented to a Debt
Committee [Comite del Deuda]. This committee has the final say on whether or not the
Finance Ministry is to sign the loan. However, the committee is a political body, as its
chair is the President of the Republic, even though it is said that he usually delegates this
power to the Minister of the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Policy. In addition to
the President, the Debt Committee consists of the Minister of Finance, a representative
from SENPLADES, a representative of the undersecretary for Public Credit, as well as
a secretary from the Debt Committee itself. This relatively small committee of political
figures officially only examines whether the loan is consistent with the constitutionally
required upper debt limit which requires the overall debt stock of Ecuador to remain below
40% of its GDP. However, it is understood that there are primarily political considerations
that play into the Committee’s final decision. Once the Ecuadorian actors have approved
the loan, the Ministry of Finance is authorized to sign the loan on behalf of the government.
To summarize, the Ecuadorian process of contracting loans provides several opportuni-
ties for politicians to intervene. In particular, the Debt Committee [Comite del Deuda] is
essentially a political body as its members include Ecuador’s President and the Minster of
Finance. The quote provided above that “it was a political decision” (Anonymous, 2011a)
to begin borrowing from BRICs as opposed to traditional creditors speaks to this fact.
Considering the process of contracting loans, it should not come as a surprise that the
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borrowing outcome would be shaped by political considerations.
3.3.2 Colombia’s process of obtaining loans
The Colombian process of signing debt agreements is similar to the Ecuadorian.4 The
procedure begins with the National Planning Department [Departamento Nacional de
Planeacio´n (DNP)], in conjunction with the government, identifying the purposes for which
external resources should be obtained. This could be either for general budget purposes or
to finance a particular project.
In the case of the latter, the project must be presented to the Economic and Social Policy
Council [El Consejo Nacional de Pol´ıtica Econo´mica y Social (CONPES)]. This body is
Colombia’s senior planning council and is composed of the Vice President, all Ministers, the
Director of the Office of the President of the Republic, the Director of National Planning
and the Director of Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation.
CONPES reviews the viability of the project before the Council for Fiscal Policy [Consejo
Superior de Pol´ıtica Fiscal (CONFIS)] then determines how the undertakings should be
financed. CONFIS is composed of the Minister of Finance, the Director of Administrative
Department of National Planning, Economic Advisor to the President of the Republic, the
Deputy Ministers of Finance, the Director of the National Treasury and the Director of
Public Credit.
In the next step, the authorization of the Council of Ministers (“El Compes”) is required
to go proceed with the plans. The council needs to approve the project’s alignment with
the intentions of the National Development Plan [Plan National de Desarrollo].
Once the approval of the Council of Ministers is obtained, reports of both CONPES
and CONFIS are forwarded to the Inter-parliamentary Public Debt Commission [Comision
Interparlamentaria de Credito Publico (CICP)]. This Commission consists of six members,
4 The information of this section is based on interviews with the governmental officials Rojas Hayes
(2011), Benetti (2011), as well as representatives of foreign creditors, Richy and Gazon (2011) and Leo´n
(2011).
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three from the House of Representatives and three from the Senate. The CICP checks the
loans for viability of the financing. Due to the political character of this committee, “it is a
complex process. For [multilateral and bilateral debt] we actually have to present it twice
to the committee. First to get approval to negotiate for a loan, and once the negotiations
are finished we need an authorization to actually hire the debt.” (Rojas Hayes, 2011) It
should be noted that the CICP has the right to veto any external sovereign loan proposal.
After the CICP has given the government’s request for a loan initial approval, the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit [Ministerio de Hacienda y Cre´dito Pu´blico (MHCP)]
is authorized to solicit loan offers. In this regard, public officials repeatedly stated that
“we have lots of sources of funding” (Rojas Hayes, 2011).
Once the various creditors have made loan offers, MHCP takes all offers back to the
CICP for a ‘final opinion.’ In particular, the committee must ensure that the loan agree-
ment to be signed does not increase the Colombian debt burden to an unsustainable level.
Once the commission has concluded that the loan offer conforms to Colombian law and
policy guidelines, it authorizes the MHCP to sign the loan agreement. If the undertak-
ing was a budget loan, the process stops here. If, however, it is a project that is to be
financed, the next step is the organization of a bidding process for the construction of the
project. Unlike Peru and Ecuador, Colombia separates the processes of obtaining funding
for projects and contracting the construction of the project. This institutional separation
of financing and construction of the project implies that so-called ‘tied loans’ are nearly
impossible to extend, as they require the debtor to use the loan for the purchase of services
or materials from the creditor country. This puts emerging lenders at a disadvantage as
they prefer to grant tied loans.
Politics has several opportunities to influence the process of contracting loans in Colom-
bia. This is apparent when considering the membership of the committees whose approval
is required: CONPES includes the Vice President and the government Ministers while
CONFIS includes the Minister of Finance, the Economic Advisor to the President of the
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Republic, and the Deputy Ministers of Finance. In addition, the Council of Ministers’
approval is required. The influence of politics on the process of contracting loans is most
obvious in the case of the Inter-Parliamentary Public Finance Commission [Comision In-
terparlamentaria de Credito Publico (CICP)]. As mentioned above, the Commission is
composed not of experts in public finance, but of three members of the House of Represen-
tatives and another three from the Senate. The interviewees consistently pointed out that
this is an essentially political body. As it has the right to veto loan proposals, its ability to
shape the borrowing decisions cannot be understated. In sum, as in the case of Ecuador,
it is reasonable to expect that borrowing decisions in Colombia are politically motivated.
3.3.3 Borrowing procedures in Peru
The borrowing procedure in Peru is, in principle, similar to those in Ecuador and Colom-
bia.5 The process starts with the respective ministry preparing a proposal. For example,
the Finance Ministry might outline the need for a budget loan, while a sectoral ministry
might propose financing a particular project with external resources. These proposals are
then evaluated by the Ministry of Economics and Finance [Ministerio de Economia y Fi-
nanzas (MEF)] for viability. If a suggested project is deemed worthwhile, the MEF begins
to solicit loan offers. I was told that this process typically results in loan offers from cred-
itors such as multilateral institutions (IADB, IMF), bilateral creditors (in particular, the
KfW, JICA, CDF) and private creditors (Felix, 2011).
Once the creditors have reviewed the Peruvian requirements and indicated that they
would be willing to extend a loan, the MEF decides with whom it wants to work. Then,
the actual loan negotiations begin. These cover the financial terms of the agreement, such
as the loan amount, grace period, interest rate and commission, as well as the obligations
of the executing agency (i.e. the responsible Ministry). Once this has been accomplished,
the Council of Ministers [Consejo de Ministros] – none of whom are bureaucrats of one the
5 The information of this section is based on interviews with the following governmental officials: Felix
(2011), and Carbajal Vela (2011).
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Ministries – signs the loan (Ara´oz, 2011).
In contrast to the process of contracting loans in Ecuador and Colombia, the Peruvian
process is comparatively straightforward. Once the technical studies are done, the MEF
is in charge - and no other ministry is involved (Salhuana, 2011). All necessary functions
are centralized. As one official put it, “we have the power. Only the MEF negotiates the
actual loan” (Carbajal Vela, 2011). In fact, when asked about the differences between the
Colombian and Peruvian borrowing procedures, a Colombian debt officer stated that:
“I have actually spoken with the Director of Public Credit of Peru about the
Peruvian debt contracting process. She said ’You know what we do, we try to
convince the government that the Minister of Finance can sign everything’ –
and thus [...] they can deal with all of the paperwork inside [the Ministry of
Finance] and that makes it easier.” (Rojas Hayes, 2011)
.
However, while the bureaucratic processes are centralized in Peru, the borrowing process
is nevertheless shaped by politics. Similar to Ecuador’s Debt Committee and Colombia’s
Inter-Parliamentary Public Finance Commission, the Peruvian process of signing a loan
agreement is characterized by an explicitly political body that has the right to veto loan
proposals. However, while the Colombian CICP is involved throughout the process of con-
tracting loans, the Peruvian political veto player enters at the very end of the process. The
loan is signed by the Council of Ministers [Consejo de Ministros] directly, not a ministry.
This implies that the bureaucratic process has to be forward-looking to take the preferences
of the Council of Ministers into account. Considering the backward induction necessary,
it comes as no surprise that preemptive obedience is common. Just as in Ecuador and
Colombia, Peruvian borrowing decisions are therefore also deeply shaped by politics.
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3.4 The choice for one creditor as a choice against another
My argument suggests that the decision for one creditor is simultaneously a decision against
another. The purpose of this section is to substantiate the assumption that an interdepen-
dency exists between choosing among various loan offers.
The most obvious starting point is to analyze whether debtor governments themselves
consider an overall debt limit when making borrowing decisions. After all, if governments
self-impose a maximum amount of debt it follows that they cannot accept all loan offers
they receive. Such a debt limit would therefore introduce an interdependency where the
decision for one creditor is also a decision against others.
My fieldwork uncovered evidence of such self-imposed debt limits. For example, when
investigating the process of borrowing in Colombia6 the importance of the Inter-Parliamentary
Public Debt Commission [Comision Interparlamentaria de Credito Publico (CICP)] became
apparent. I also learned that one of the official tasks performed by the CICP is to examine
whether the debt to be contracted will increase Colombia’s overall debt stock to an unsus-
tainable level. While such a level is not clearly defined, it does suggest that the process of
borrowing considers an overall debt limit.
Matters are more evident in Ecuador. Under the influence of past debt crises, Ecuador’s
current constitution requires that the overall debt stock not exceed a specific threshold.
More particularly, the total external debt stock may not exceed 40% of Ecuador’s gross
domestic product (GDP). Public debt officials in the Ecuadorian Ministry of Finance were
aware of this, as the answer to my question regarding where Ecuador currently stands was
given without any hesitation: “ Our current external debt is at 29% of GDP, as we have a
debt stock of $ 17 million and a GDP of $70 million” (Anonymous, 2011a).
A further observable implication of the claim that governments choose amongst cred-
itors is instances of rejected loan proposals. While we can observe which loans a country
6 See Section 3.3
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obtains, quantitative data on rejections is typically not available. In fact, obtaining any in-
formation on events that were not realized is a challenge. Nevertheless, during my fieldwork
I was able to uncover some evidence of instances of governments rejecting loan offers.
For example, Colombia had several opportunities to borrow from the Chinese. For
one, the Chinese have been readily available for negotiations as the Chinese Development
Bank has maintained a permanent office in Bogota since 2007 (Guarin, 2011). In addition,
I was told by several interviewees that loan offers have been extended to the Colombian
government. Public officials told me of loan proposals by the China Export-Import bank
that were rejected by the government (Chaco´n Pen˜a, 2011a). This was validated by an
interviewee who worked for the Ministry of Foreign relations (Garcia, 2011). The economic
and commercial counselor to the Chinese ambassador also confirmed that loan offers had
been made, but noted that the Colombian government has been hesitant to accept these
offers (Quan, 2011).
More specifically, it is known that the Chinese offered to finance several public works
projects in Colombia. For example, already in 2005, Colombia wanted to build an alterna-
tive to the Panama Canal, a so-called Canal Seco [Dry Canal]. The government solicited
foreign creditors – among them, the Chinese – interest in financing this project. The Chi-
nese were initially thought of highly, but they were not selected for the project (Garcia,
2011; Leiteritz, 2011). In addition, government officials confirmed that the Chinese offered
a loan to the State-Owned Enterprise ColPetrol. Yet again, this loan offer was rejected
(Rojas Hayes, 2011). Thus, the Colombian government had several opportunities to obtain
loans from China. Instead, it chose to reject these loan offers and borrow from traditional
lenders such as the IMF, western governments and the private capital market.
A corollary of rejected loan offers on the part of the recipient government is the presence
of competition amongst creditors. My interviews with representatives of lending institu-
tions in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia confirmed that such competition is real and fierce.
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For example, a representative of the German development agency stated that there is com-
petition between them and the Chinese with respect to whose loan offer is accepted by the
Ecuadorian government. In particular, there were instances where the Germans wanted to
finance particular projects in Ecuador, but lost out to the competing Chinese offer (Rast,
2011). The reverse was the case in Colombia, where a Chinese official implied that their
loan proposal had been defeated by a western loan offer (Quan, 2011). This coincides with
the information that the Colombian Inter-Parliamentary Commission of Public Debt has
in the past rejected loan proposals (Rojas Hayes, 2011).7
With respect to multinational lenders, interviewees were undecided whether BRIC loans
were crowding out loans from the World Bank or IMF. Some observers stated that there
is no competition, as the sectoral focus of projects financed by the World Bank and China
differs (Escobar Arango, 2011). However, while a former World Bank representative agreed
that the sectoral overlap is minimal, that is beside the point. With limited borrowing
capacities, the decision is between creditors, not between sectors (Perry, 2011). Similarly,
a former employee of the IMF stated that multilateral organizations are directly competing
with the Chinese (Steiner, 2011), an assessment that was shared by Colombian officials in
particular (Martinez, 2011).
Bilateral lenders are also aware of the competition. When interviewing representatives
of the French Development Agency [Agence Francaise de D/’eveloppement, AFD] I asked
whether they felt it necessary to compete with other creditors. In their view, this was
indeed the case. In fact, the conversation then turned into a comparison between the loan
offers the AFD typically makes to governments of developing countries and those of its
competitors. For this purpose, the interviewees were explicit about the information they
had about their competitors. With respect to the interest rate, for example, the AFD
charges LIBOR plus 120 basis points, which is the same rate as demanded by the CAF
[Corporation Andina de Formento]. Larger institutions such as the World Bank or the
7 However, it was not possible to obtain further details on the loans that the Commission rejected as
their records are not public
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IADB charge LIBOR plus 100 basis points and 90 basis points, respectively, but – as was
pointed out repeatedly – attach somewhat more stringent conditions than the AFD. The
knowledge of their competition was impressive.
In sum, there appears to be much evidence that an overall debt limit that would in-
troduce interdependency amongst creditors. The debt limits institutionalized in countries
borrowing processes, instances of governments rejecting loan proposals and creditors being
aware of the competition amongst themselves all point to the conclusion that a govern-
ment’s decision for one creditor is simultaneously a decision against another.
3.5 The cost of loans and loan choices
The purpose of the previous sections was to verify the assumption that a demand-side
theory is the appropriate approach to explain the presence or absence of loans from various
creditors. I have shown that the credit supply can be assumed constant and that debtors
have a choice between loan offers. However, how do debtors decide among competing loan
offers? My theory suggests that decision-makers will utilize political criteria, namely the
distributional consequences of a loan with respect to the politically dominant coalition.
However, it might reasonably be argued that countries faced with competing loan offers
simply choose the cheapest option. In this case, politics would not explain which loan is
chosen but rather mere economic considerations would determine borrowing choices. If
this alternative explanation were to be verified, the data on existing borrowing patterns
should indicate that debtors, by and large, choose the cheapest loan available.
The task of verifying whether this is the case, though, is a challenge. The reason is that
we can observe only loan amounts and conditions of loan agreements that were realized,
while the conditions of the competing loan offers that were not chosen remain unobserved.
Ideally, one would gather systematic data on the loan conditions of all loan offers on the
table for all countries at any point in time when a borrowing decision is made. However,
such individual country-year data is not available, and it is therefore difficult to make direct
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inferences on whether or not the cheapest loan offer was chosen.
In absence of such data, a second-best approach would compare the loan conditions
of the loans realized across all borrowing instances. If a competitive market of borrowing
exists, we should observe that most loans obtained exhibit similar loan conditions due
to the price competition among creditors. In fact, it would be irrational for countries to
borrow at the more expensive terms than otherwise available. We would therefore not
observe that loans were obtained to significantly more disadvantageous conditions.
However, the data on the actual loans realized does not square neatly with these expec-
tations. One criteria that measures the cost of loans is the grace period. The grace period
is a time frame typically starting immediately after the loan is signed. During this period,
no interest is charged. More importantly, the grace period indicates the time interval to
the first repayment of capital: it signifies a certain breathing space in which the loan can
be put towards productive undertakings whose earnings are then used to repay the loan.
The longer the grace period, the more advantageous to the debtor. Figure 3.9 displays the
grace periods of loans obtained from BRICs, DACs, IFIs and private creditors. It appears
that the average grace periods on loans obtained from BRICs, DACs and IFIs do not differ
much. However, countries also chose to borrow extensively from private creditors, even
though their loans are comparatively more expensive as measured by the grace period.
A related measure of the cost of a loan is its maturity, which refers to the time the bor-
rower has to repay the loan. Longer maturities therefore imply a longer time period until
the final repayment installment for the loan. In this sense, a loan is more expensive if its
maturities is shorter than comparable offers. Figure 3.10 displays the maturity of loans con-
tracted from the four types of creditors under consideration. Traditional creditors appear
to grant loans to particularly favorable maturities, with BRIC creditors falling somewhat
behind but still offering loans with comparatively long maturities. However, if countries
borrowed from private creditors, the maturities granted were particularly unfavorable.
The cost of a loan can also be measured by the interest rate charged. Being the
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Figure 3.9: Average grace period by creditor. Note longer grace periods are favorable to
the debtor.
most straightforward measure of borrowing costs, higher interest rates imply a higher cost
of borrowing to the debtor. Figure 3.11 again displays that the interest rates on loans
obtained from BRICs, DACs and IFIs do not differ much. While the contrast is not as
stark as with grace periods and maturities, private creditors nevertheless demand higher
interest rates on average than official creditors.
The various measures of the cost introduced above are summarized by the grant element
of a particular loan. It measures the ‘softness’ of the loan by translating grace period,
maturity and interest rate into a measure of the concessionality of a loan. More specifically,
it is calculated as “the difference between the face value of a loan and the discounted present
value of the service payments the borrower will make over the lifetime of the loan, expressed
as a percentage of the face value” (OECD, 2010)[see also (IMF et al., 2003, p.250)]. Figure
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Figure 3.10: Average maturity by creditor. Note: longer maturities are favorable to the
debtor.
3.12 displays the grant element implicit in the loan conditions from the four types of
creditors. It is again apparent that the grant element of BRICs, DACs and IFIs do not
differ much, while the degree of concessionality of private loans is significantly lower.
Therefore, the average cost of loans obtained does not support the hypothesis that
debtors always choose the cheapest creditor. If this were the case, private creditors would
represent a particularly unappealing choice for debtors, which stands in stark contrast to
the observed borrowing from private creditors.
One might argue that comparison of loans granted on separate occasions is not appro-
priate to judge the relative cost of loan offers available when a single borrowing decision
is to be made. Due to the lack of data on the loans that were not chosen, I resort to a
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Figure 3.11: Average interest rate by creditor.
second-best approach. In order to approximate the conditions of loans that were not cho-
sen, I calculate counterfactual loan offers for each actual loan agreement made. I used the
following procedure to obtain such counterfactual estimates: Assume that country A whose
creditworthiness is rated with BB+ by the rating agencies in a particular year obtained a
DAC loan in that year. To obtain a counterfactual for the DAC loan actually obtained, I
calculate the mean interest rate of loans granted by BRICs to all countries that are also
classified as BB+, except country A. I repeat this procedure for IFIs and private creditors,
and for each measure of loan conditions available (i.e. interest rate, grace period, maturity,
and grant element). I reiterate this procedure for each loan that any country in my dataset
obtained at any point in time.
The counterfactual loan conditions obtained this way represent the average market
conditions for countries that chose one type of loan when faced with alternative loans,
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Figure 3.12: Average grant element by creditor. Note: higher grant elements implies a
‘cheaper’ loan.
conditional on their creditworthiness. These counterfactuals, as imperfect as they may be,
allow me to approximate the conditions of loan offers that countries faced when they made
their borrowing decision.
Figure 3.13 compares the grace period of a particular chosen
This impression is further confirmed when considering the differences between an actual
loan and counterfactual loans with respect to their maturities (Figure 3.14), interest rates
(Figure 3.15) and grant element (Figure 3.16). Official creditors offer more advantageous
terms, in particular the IFIs, while private creditors appear to be the most expensive
option.
The Figures 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 present aggregate evidence against the hypothesis
that countries always choose the cheapest loan. In addition, the counterfactual analysis
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allows me to look at individual borrowing decisions. Table 3.1 provides a summary of
borrowing decisions with respect to the relative costs of loans. It displays the absolute and
relative frequency with which countries have chosen a particular creditor, despite the fact
that the creditor chosen offered the most expensive terms in comparison to the counter-
factual offers by the remaining creditors. For example, in 28 instances countries decided
to obtain their largest loan from BRICs even though the grant element implicit in the
counterfactual loan offers by DACs, IFIs and private creditors were higher. Similarly, in
24 instances countries chose to borrow from the IMF even though in comparison to the
counterfactual loan offers from BRICs, DACs, or private creditors, it was the most ex-
pensive option. The figures are even more staggering with respect to private creditors.
Using the grant element as the measure of loan costs, in 157 instances countries chose to
borrow from private creditors even though they represented the most expensive choice in
comparison to BRICs, DACs or IFI loans. To provide further insight, these instances of
countries borrowing from the most expensive (as measured by the grant element) creditor
are listed in Table 3.2.
Frequency Percent
Most expensive defined by grant element
BRIC largest loan 28 12.96
DAC largest loan 7 3.24
IFI largest loan 24 11.11
PRI largest loan 157 72.69
Most expensive defined by interest rate
BRIC largest loan 9 10.98
DAC largest loan 3 3.66
IFI largest loan 2 2.44
PRI largest loan 68 82.93
Most expensive defined by grace period
BRIC largest loan 37 23.12
DAC largest loan 9 5.62
IFI largest loan 32 20
PRI largest loan 82 51.25
Most expensive defined by maturity
BRIC largest loan 26 13.13
DAC largest loan 6 3.03
IFI largest loan 29 14.65
PRI largest loan 137 69.19
Table 3.1: Number of countries that chose the respective loan even though it was the most
expensive relative to their counterfactual loan offers.
Figure 3.13: Comparison of grace period of loans obtained vs. the counterfactual loan
conditions of the alternative borrowing options. Note: longer grace periods are favorable
to the debtor.
Figure 3.14: Comparison of maturities of loans obtained vs. the counterfactual loan con-
ditions of the alternative borrowing options. Note: longer maturities are favorable to the
debtor.
Figure 3.15: Comparison of interest rate of loans obtained vs. the counterfactual loan
conditions of the alternative borrowing options.
Figure 3.16: Comparison of grant element of loans obtained vs. the counterfactual loan
conditions of the alternative borrowing options. Note: higher grant elements implies a
‘cheaper’ loan.
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In sum, the hypothesis that countries always choose the cheapest creditor can confi-
dently be rejected. When deciding among competing loan offers countries obviously do
not only take economic considerations into account: Countries do not always choose the
cheapest loan offer. It is therefore reasonable to expect that political considerations trump
economic factors when governments decide between competing loan offers.
3.6 Borrowing decisions and the type of project
Besides the cost of the project, the type of project to be financed might affect the choice of
creditor. If a country has a particular economic profile and subsequent supply bottlenecks
in relation to their endowments, its government would want to borrow from a particular
creditor. For example, when a country would want to bolster its budget, it might turn to
private creditors whereas it might solicit loans from the Chinese if it intended to finance
an infrastructure project.
I argue that this rationale is not applicable, for two reasons. First, only a fraction of
the sovereign loans a government receives from external creditors are tied to a particular
project. In addition, governments also obtain budget loans. In other words, loans are not
generally earmarked for particular projects.
I also argue that even for the fraction of loans that are tied to a particular project,
governments typically receive loan offers from several creditors. Faced with the requirement
to choose among loan offers, I argue that politics affects the decision-making in the manner
suggested by my theory.
However, even more important for the question of whether the type of project deter-
mines the choice of creditor is the issue of fungibility. Epstein and Gang (2009, p.17)
remark that “the empirical literature has not been able to provide a robust measure of
the degree of aid fungibility. Nevertheless for many years, at least since the introduction
of structural adjustment aid in the 1980s, aid policy has assumed near 100% fungibility.”
The heart of the problem is appropriately summarized by Dollar and Pritchett (1998):
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One way to ensure additionality is for donors to finance only items or projects
that governments are not financing. Common sense tells us, however, that this
reasoning is flawed. It would mean that donors finance only what countries
and governments do not want to do. And government would have little or no
commitment to implementing or, much less, maintaining projects once donors
depart. Some governments (purposely or by default) have given donors free
rein to do what ever they feel like. Money for such projects would almost cer-
tainly be ‘additional,’ but with equal certainty the projects themselves would
be pointless, except in those rare cases that the project itself creates commit-
ment. Far better that both recipients and donors be strongly committed to the
sustainability of projects. But this is precisely when money will be fungible.
(Dollar and Pritchett, 1998, p.79)
In a review of the empirical literature Jones (2005) confirms that external resources pro-
vided to sovereign governments are generally fungible. Several econometric studies provide
robust evidence for the phenomenon that governments reduce their own budgets for par-
ticular sectors if they received aid tied to projects in the respective sector (Pettersson,
2007; Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu, 1998). Analyses examining the development of indi-
vidual countries’ budgets over time came to similar conclusions. In the case of Uganda,
Dollar (2006) states “that it is possible that all of the successful donor-financed projects
in Uganda would have been undertaken by the private sector or by the government itself
if aid resources had not been available.” Similarly, Pack and Pack (1993, p.258) conclude
that their findings with respect to “the fungibility of foreign aid in the Dominican Republic
are consistent with the most negative views on this question contained in the literature.”
Considering this evidence for the fungibility of aid, scholars have concluded that “targeting
assistance to specific projects is essentially a futile exercise” (Svensson, 2000, p.72).
There appears to be no difference between loans and aid as – at least with respect
to the issue of fungibility – both are merely transfers of external resources to a sovereign
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recipient. The issue would be different if one were to consider loans to individual companies
for a particular project. In this case, the recipient company would be a comparatively
small entity with a typically narrow focus. The re-allocation of internal resources towards
alternative operations is unlikely and in many cases impossible. However, a sovereign
borrower running a country would have many opportunities for re-allocation. The empirical
literature confirms this view. For example, with respect to the IMF (Dreher, 2009, p.246)
states that fungibility of money implies that the IMFs control over its loans is limited.
Rodrik (1995, p.26) points out that since external resources are fungible, governments
might use IMF loans to repay private loans without the IMF being able to veto such
reallocation of resources. It therefore appears that even with loans, the dated quote by
Finch (1983, p. 77) still holds: “The Fund has to accept that the authorities of a country
are the sole judges of its social and political priorities.”
In conclusion, “donors should take it for granted that their financing is fungible because
that is reality”(Dollar and Pritchett, 1998, p.91). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
the type of project financed does not necessarily pre-determine the choice of creditor. In
fact, even without fungibility of external resources and ignoring budget loans, recipient
governments would still be faced with a choice among competing loan offers for particular
projects.
3.7 Distributional consequences and actors’ preferences
In Section 3.5, I have shown that recipient governments do not choose creditors based on
the cost of the loans. Section 3.6 adds that the type of project to be financed does not
predetermine the choice of creditor either. What criteria, then, do governments use in
order to chose among competing loan offers?
As suggested in Chapter 2 I argue that the government’s decision between loan offers is
determined by the preferences of domestic interest groups relevant for the maintenance of
incumbency. More specifically, Section 2.3 combines the actors’ general interests with the
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characteristics of the four borrowing options – multilateral creditors, bilateral loans from
DAC and BRIC countries, or private sources. I analyze the distributional consequences
that each type of loan would have on the respective domestic actor in order to derive the
actors’ preferences with respect to these four types of creditors (see Table 2.1).
The purpose of this section is to provide qualitative evidence for the assumption that
Finance, Industry and Labor have preferences across their government’s borrowing options,
and, in fact, that these preferences differ across interest groups. I will therefore draw on the
interviews I conducted in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia with representatives from Finance,
Industry and Labor.
As to the observable implications from my theory, I expect that Finance exhibits a
strong preference against BRIC loans but in favor of multilateral and DAC creditors.
Industry, in turn, is assumed to be partial to BRIC loans and private creditors. Labor
is expected to have strong preference for BRIC and DAC loans, while it would refuse
multilateral loans. The final observable implication would be that the divergent preferences
of Finance, Industry and Labor across loan offers will be constant across the three countries.
3.7.1 Loan preferences of Finance
According to my theory, domestic Finance would strongly favor traditional lenders – the
IMF, DAC creditors, and private lenders – over BRICs. My interviews with representatives
of the financial sectors in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia confirmed these expectations.
BRICs When asking about DACs versus BRICs, Finance’s preferences were distinctly
in favor of the former. For example, a high-level executive of an Ecuadorian investment
bank stated that “[the Chinese] grab you by the balls and take advantage of you” (Checa,
2011). Other financial actors agree that these loans are the first step to further withdrawal
of western actors. A former financial manager of an Ecuadorian bank voiced that he is
“angry” because of the kinds of conditions that the Chinese impose. In his view, the Chinese
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are taking advantage of the situation where the government exhibits a strong preference
for their loans over western creditors (Rodas Espinel, 2011). Knowing this, it appears to
the former finance minister as if “[the Chinese] can demand whatever they want” (Salgado,
2011). “After all,” added the director of a conservative think tank, “where else can you
get 7% interest rate at no risk?” (Albornoz, 2011).
Chinese loans also are viewed as a way to secure investment concessions and contracts
for public works. For example, managers have the impression that these loans were the
reason subsequent oil concessions and contracts for hydropower projects were given to
Chinese companies (Checa, 2011; Salgado, 2011; Albornoz, 2011). From their perspective,
there is reason to worry that these loans will not benefit Ecuador. One interviewee told me
that he visited Chinese projects in Africa around 2005, “and was appalled.” He initially
had been given the impression that the Chinese were making a positive impact on the local
economy, but that was not the case in his experience (Steiner, 2011).
The negative attitudes by Finance towards emerging creditors also manifests itself in
the behavior of these actors towards the Chinese. For example, the Colombian financial
sector has been unwilling to work with Chinese actors. If the Chinese want to open an
account, there is only one commercial bank in Colombia that is willing to work with them.
According to a representative of this bank, the underlying reasons are illustrated by the
experiences of Huawei, a Chinese electronics and communications giant that wanted to
establish a presence in Colombia (Guarin, 2011). Huawei arrived in 2001 with exactly two
representatives. However, they were unable to open an account in Colombia as not a single
bank wanted to work with them – not even the Colombian branch of Citibank, despite their
strong representation in China. For example, the Chinese used their apartment as their
office, which is frowned upon by Colombian actors in the finance sector as it is perceived
as unprofessional. Instead, the Colombians deem the “Americans [as] the maximum level
of everything” in terms of their living style, professional work environment, and clothing.
In contrast, to the Colombians, the Chinese representatives were dressed plainly. One
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anonymous interviewee noted that “they are peasants [...] and the Colombians think that
the Chinese stink like onions.” In addition, the Chinese are said to print legal documents in
order to then scribble annotations on everything. Colombians despise this practice as they
prefer clean and unaltered originals. In contrast to the majority of Colombian banks, my
contact who was willing to work with the Chinese did develop trust, which subsequently
turned into a business relationship. Three years later, representatives of the Colombian
Citibank asked my contact “How can you support these Chinese, these dirty people?” In
addition, the financial elite typically send their children to the best and most expensive
private schools in Bogota. However, my contact’s children were sent to travel in China to
have new experiences, to which the other parents exclaimed “Are you crazy to send your
children to China?”
I realize that this anecdote contains many instances of prejudice that appear too cliche´
to be true. However, the sentiment of the narrative appears to be representative as Chinese
private actors report having received such behavior. For example, a representative of the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) told me of the difficulties establishing
offices and business relationships in Colombia and Ecuador, while they have been able
– after considerable effort – to open a small office in Peru. The careful wording of this
representative referred to the argument that the Chinese entering the Peruvian market
would mean more competition, to which the interviewee responded that “the other foreign
companies are allowed to enter Peru as well, so why shouldn’t the Chinese? Further, the
other companies are welcomed in China as well, thus it is only fair that the Chinese go to
Peru as well. Also, the pie is so big that you have to be able to profit somehow. If you
don’t profit from doing business with the Chinese, then this is your problem, not mine”
(Xiaohe, 2011).
DACs While Finance exhibits a strong preference against BRIC loans, their positive
attitude towards DAC creditors is wholehearted. “Prefiero malo conocide que bueno por
conocer [I prefer the evil that I know over the unknown]” is a saying that I encountered
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frequently during my interviews with financial actors. An Ecuadorian business representa-
tive stated that “I love the Chinese, but I fear them because I saw what they are capable
of – see Tibet. It is scary if you are in the hands of China. If I would have to choose hands,
I would probably choose the US because I know them” (Rodas, 2011).
These sentiments are present in the financial sector of Colombia and Peru as well.
A Colombian business lawyer states that “we simply don’t know about China” (Ibarra,
Moreno Henao and Mendoza de Galofre, 2011), while a Colombian professor of international
business adds that “We see a big monster – we don’t know what they [the Chinese] want”
(Garcia, 2011). A Colombian interviewee that requested to remain anonymous stated that
“With the US, Colombia isn’t quite sure what their political agenda is. However, whatever
it is, we can live with it.” Similarly, in Peru, an investment manager told me that ”The
Chinese are not a good business to have. [...] We are going to miss the Americans. They
may be as corrupt as anyone else, but their values of how to do business are not shared by
the Chinese” (Anonymous, 2011f).
IFIs The representatives of Finance also confirmed my theoretical expectations with
respect to how they view multilateral lenders. An Ecuadorian business representative
stated that “it is better to sign with the IMF even if you disagree instead of shouting
‘Imperialism’. Having more unemployment in your country because of your 5 minutes of
pride is not worth it” (Rodas, 2011). A former director of Colombia’s leading economic
think tank, who is also former Finance Minister, noted that in his experience Chinese
loans are typically obscure and associated with a lot of corruption. He would therefore
prefer IMF loans over Chinese loans, despite the conditions attached to the former (Perry,
2011). Ecuadorian financial experts agreed, voicing their frustrations with Ecuador paying
off its IMF loans early. After all, if a government wants to reduce its debt burden, it
should use resources to repay the most expensive loans first in terms of interest rates.
Ecuador therefore should have held on to IMF loans as they are characterized by relatively
low interest rates (Albornoz, 2011; Oleas M, 2011). Also, an investment banker remarked
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that he missed the IMF’s conditions that limit the government’s room to maneuver as “in
Ecuador, companies are kicked out and investors are treated like shit” (Checa, 2011).
Private Creditors Private debt is viewed in a positive light by representatives of Fi-
nance. For example, even though Ecuador’s GlobalBonds required a higher interest rate
than other debt, financial experts condemned the decision to default on these bonds. The
representatives I talked with agreed that there was no economic necessity for default, as
Ecuador’s debt stock was relatively moderate. At the time, the ratio of external debt to
GDP was about 30% and the annual debt service obligations amounted to about 1.5% of
GDP which is generally considered to be acceptable. One representative remarked, “from
a financial point of view there was no reason to default. This was only done to satisfy an
ideological dream. They [the Ecuadorian government] defaulted because they believe that
debt is something evil that keeps developing countries underdeveloped” (Albornoz, 2011).
In sum, my interviews with representatives of Finance confirm the theoretical expecta-
tions. Finance exhibits a strong preference for the IMF, DAC lenders and private creditors,
while they forcefully condemn BRIC loans.
3.7.2 Industry’s preferences regarding creditors
The analytical considerations in Section 2.3 suggest that Industry prefers BRIC loans
and private creditors over DAC loans, and that it is undecided with respect to multilateral
loans. The evidence from interviews with Industry representatives confirm these observable
implications.
BRICs Because the Ecuadorian government has already signed loan agreements with
the Chinese, I asked each interviewee from the Ecuadorian industrial sector if they dislike
Chinese loans. After all, these loans are often tied to the condition that the resources lent
must be spent on the services of big Chinese companies which puts Ecuadorian companies
at a disadvantage. For example, Ecuador borrowed $1.7 billion from China to construct
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Coca Codo-Sinclair hydropower dam. The loan was tied to the condition that a Chinese
company would be contracted to construct the dam. In fact, Sinohydro, a Chinese state
owned company, did get the contract for the construction of the dam.
However, virtually all interviewees disagreed with this leading question. Their argu-
ment is that Ecuadorian firms do not lose out due to this practice, because there are no
Ecuadorian firms that have the capacity for such massive projects. In fact, the smaller
Ecuadorian firms are glad that the big Chinese companies come in, as they expect business
through subcontracting that would not have been available otherwise (Checa, 2011; Perez,
2011; Ja´come Estrella, 2011; Albornoz, 2011). If there is any crowding out, then it is the
interests of western companies and investors that are displaced by the Chinese (Paredes,
2011). A representative of an Ecuadorian bank that usually finances investment undertak-
ings by domestic industry stated that companies are actually quite happy with the Chinese.
Because of the tied loans, the prices are not ‘right’ (i.e. set by market standards) as there
is no competitive bidding process in the first place. Thus, “Ecuadorian subcontracters are
actually paid quite generously by the Chinese” (Anonymous, 2011c).
Naturally, the situation in Colombia differs from the one in Ecuador as there have
not yet been any Chinese loans to the government. However, speaking with Industry
representatives in Colombia, clearly indicated that domestic Industry in this country is also
in favor of increased relations with China. For example, the largest business association
in Colombia, Asociacio´n Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) has created a
new office within their organization with the sole purpose of intensifying relations with
China (Salamanca, 2011). Besides attracting Chinese loans and investment, they also
work towards more immediate goals, such as streamlining the process by which Chinese
businesspersons could obtain a Colombian work visa.
Moreover, Colombian businesses themselves are not afraid to be ‘invaded’ by the Chi-
nese. Instead, they want foreign technology and knowledge as they “recognize that we
[domestic industry] can learn a lot from foreigners. I wouldn’t be concerned at all [about
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the Chinese]” (Pen˜a, 2011). I once was even openly laughed at when asking whether there
would be any resistance against Chinese investments that might follow Chinese loans – this
is apparently perceived to be a ridiculous thought to begin with (R´ıncon, 2011). In addition,
one businessman told me that he is on the board of an agrobusiness company, whose equity
is currently bought by a Chinese investor “and nobody cares” (Steiner, 2011). The Chinese
confirm this perspective. A representative of the Chinese embassy to Colombia confirmed
that they “haven’t received any complaints from local businesses. The Colombians have a
welcoming attitude” (Quan, 2011).
Nevertheless, my fieldwork did not necessarily reveal a perfectly clear picture. The
messiness of the reality I confronted during my time in the field revealed that not every
company is happy about increased Chinese business activities.
For example, the majority of the Peruvian Industry representatives appeared to be in
favor of intensified relations with China. However, individual companies that fear losing
from such a development have been reported to organize singular actions. One example is
the textile industry in Peru. While there is no direct competition of Peruvian firms with
Chinese investments in general, the government recently banned the import of Indian yarn
– even though Peru needs to import cotton as it does not produce it sufficiently. However
“Somebody with interests” must have taken political action (Kuczynski, 2011).
The situation in Colombia might differ in the sense that there exists a stock of en-
trepreneurs associated with comparatively strong local companies. Consequently, there is
a sense of how to face competition and therefore “Colombians are not sitting there and wait-
ing for FDI to happen” (Thiell, 2011). Instead, individual companies are taking political
action to defend their position. For example, the native car manufacturer felt threatened
by the potential of a Korean manufacturer coming to Colombia. Thus, one commentator
recalls an issue of the main Colombian newspaper ‘El Tiempo’ that – in the same day –
featured a full-page advertisement for an investment treaty with Korea as well as another
full page ad arguing against such a treaty (Garcia, 2011).
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In spite of these situations, Industry generally appears to be in favor of intensified
financial and business relations with China. While “it is very hard to get a win-win
situation. There are always losers” (Herrera, 2011), it appears that only a minority of
industries opposes the Chinese. One lawyer even suggested that “The smaller an enterprise,
the more resistance there is against the Chinese, while larger companies are ok with [the
Chinese coming to Colombia]” (Ibarra, Moreno Henao and Mendoza de Galofre, 2011).
DACs I hypothesized that Industry has negative preferences with regard to DAC loans.
As these loans are likely to go hand-in-hand with demands for ‘good governance’ con-
ditions, DAC loans might reward countries that lower barriers to investment and trade
with western companies. This perspective was confirmed in interviews as the challenge
from Chinese firms was viewed as minor in comparison to the competition imposed by
established western multinational companies. For example, one business representative
complained that import taxes are not used sufficiently to protect certain industries (Ro-
das, 2011). Others agreed that Ecuador renouncing the investment treaties with western
governments that “overprotected foreign investors” was the right action to take. After all,
allowing these companies to sue the Ecuadorian government or firms in foreign courts is
improper (Piedra Vivar, 2011). In contrast, Chinese companies were cited as being in favor
of fewer legal restrictions.
Conventional wisdom also suggests that Chinese companies are less welcomed as they
are assumed to bring their own labor. This would reduce the spillover of business con-
ducted by Chinese companies into the local economy. However, the opinion of Industry
representatives did not view Chinese firms as different from western companies in this
regard. A Colombian business representative stated that in his opinion, “if Siemens [a
western company] would open a plant in Colombia, they would bring their own engineers
and consequently there would be no spillovers. In contrast, if China opens a plant, they use
it as a production hub for the region. Simply because of their language they are required
to hire more local staff, and thus there will be spillovers ” (Gaviria ’Angel, 2011).
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Lastly, Industry was quite outspoken against good governance requirements that would
prohibit their government from implementing industrial policy. For example, Colombian
Industry representatives support the government’s program aimed at boosting productiv-
ity in specific sectors (Salamanca, 2011; Duarte, 2011). President Uribe instigated the
“Productive Transformation Program,” and most Industry representatives are glad that
President Santos is continuing this program, albeit under a different name (‘Locomotivas’).
In sum, my impression is that Industry would disapprove of DAC loans with conditions
that would undermine the government’s ability to pursue an industrial policy8 .
IFIs and private creditors Lastly, the theoretical framework suggests that Industry
is undecided with respect to its preference for or against multilateral loans. Admittedly,
I obtained little evidence that can support – or disprove – this analytical claim. The
interviewees seem to believe that multilateral loans are not significantly relevant for them.
Some mentioned that IMF conditions might improve the business climate in their countries,
while others thought that austerity measures would lead to a reduction in investments and
thus loss of income on the part of Industry. Nevertheless, these opinions were not defended
vigorously. I obtained the same impression with respect to private creditors.
In sum, the interviews provide powerful evidence for the main analytical predictions
that Industry views BRIC loans favorably and DAC creditors are seen with a more critical
attitude.
3.7.3 Borrowing preferences of Labor
Labor represents all domestic actors that own neither mobile or immobile capital, unlike
Finance or Industry. Instead, Labor subsumes all citizens who have to sell their labor
on the market in order to earn a livelihood. Combining these characteristics with the
information on the various borrowing options, my theory suggests that Labor is in favor
8 For further discussion on the preferences of domestic industry with respect to its government’s ability
to implement industrial policy see Chang (2002)
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of BRIC loans for their potential to create employment opportunities, and DAC loans for
their focus on educational and social expenditure. In contrast, Labor would disapprove
of multilateral loans due to the austerity measures attached. Similarly, private creditors
would be viewed critically. The interviews with Labor representatives confirmed these
theoretical expectations.
BRICs BRIC loans are generally viewed in a positive light. Most civil society and labor
representatives knew of the characteristics of Chinese loans, namely high interest rates
and the condition to spend the money on Chinese goods and services. Nevertheless, the
same representatives were not opposed to big Chinese companies obtaining the contracts
for large infrastructure projects that were financed with Chinese loans. After all, these do
translate into employment opportunities, which is the main priority for Labor represen-
tatives (Cooper, 2011; Posada, 2011; Steiner, 2011). In fact, as other creditors might not
be interested in financing huge hydroelectric dams due to the immense start up capital
required, Chinese loans provide added benefits to the recipient countries.
Several Labor representatives further mentioned that they like the fact that the gov-
ernment is now more independent of the multilateral creditors (Mancero de Viterio, 2011;
Ja´come Estrella, 2011). This stands in stark contrast to the opinion of Finance, where a
banker voiced his outrage concerning the fact that the general population does not view
the Chinese conditions critically: “I am angry because of the kinds of conditions that the
Chinese impose, and that the government is willing to accept. I am angry that my people
don’t realize this” (Rodas Espinel, 2011). Along these lines, the general population is also
in favor of intensifying relations with China in other areas, such as trade. For example,
a former prime minister of Peru noted that there was general support for establishing a
Free Trade Agreement with China. While the local textile industry lamented the expected
negative effect on the domestic clothing production, the population was in favor of lower
prices – which propelled the government to sign the FTA agreement (Kuczynski, 2011).
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IFIs Labor exhibits strong distaste for multilateral loans. Several interviewees empha-
sized how the IMF had previously demanded conditions that undermined the produc-
tive capacity of their country, which in turn made repayment of debt even more difficult
(Mancero de Viterio, 2011). A Jubilee activist recalled how the IMF policies in response
to the Ecuadorian debt crisis in 1999 resulted in the bankruptcy of 3 million businesses,
much capital flight, and the emigration of about 20% of the productive population. It
was therefore no surprise that social movements sprung up against multilateral creditors,
demanding a re-ordering of priorities (Salgado, 2011). The government subsequently ex-
ploited these sentiments for electoral gains. Correa wanted to secure the loyalty of the
large social movement that is critical of multilateral creditors. He therefore organized a
Commission to Audit the Entirety of Public Debt [Comisio´n para la Auditoria Integral
del Credito Publico] “in order to secure an ideological mandate for governance from this
movement” (Kaiser, 2012).
Private Creditors Similarly, Labor’s opinion of private creditors is negative. Intervie-
wees mentioned how private creditors have contributed to Ecuador’s economic problems by
demanding high interest rates (Salgado, 2011). In addition, bonds in particular are viewed
critically, as Labor assumes that domestic elites were able to purchase these bonds as well
– which constitutes a redistribution of taxes from the general population to the elites who
earn interest from these bonds.
3.7.4 The variation of borrowing preferences
In conclusion, the interviews I conducted with representatives of Finance, Industry and
Labor largely confirm the empirical implications of my theory. I present powerful evidence
that Finance has strong negative preferences with respect to Chinese loans. Considering the
negative distributional consequences they can expect from these loans, it is not surprising
that the Finance representatives offered strong (and starkly worded) statements. They
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strongly prefer traditional creditors over emerging lenders. In contrast, interviews with
Industry revealed that they are in favor of Chinese loans as they expect opportunities
for business via subcontracting. Lastly, Labor exhibits strong opinions with respect to
both Chinese and multilateral loans. While the former are viewed with extreme optimism,
the negative effects of past IMF loans manifest themselves in a strong opposition towards
multilateral creditors.
I also show that the preferences of the respective actors are constant across countries.
Given the constant preferences of Labor, Industry and Finance across the different coun-
tries, why do some governments accept BRIC loan offers while others reject them? My
theory suggests that the role of incumbent politicians is key in the process of preference ag-
gregation and policy implementation. I hypothesize that politicians observe the structural
conditions of the political economy in order to deduce whose interests are congruent. As
politicians have the incentive to maximize electoral support, they will implement policies
that satisfy the demands of the minimum winning coalition. I present evidence for how
this process can play out in the following chapters.
3.8 Summary
The evidence presented in this chapter provides strong prima facie support for the theory
proposed in Chapter 2. First, I show that a demand-side theory is entirely appropriate to
explain variation in borrowing patterns as the supply of loans can be taken as constant. In
addition, examining the processes of borrowing decisions in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia
reveals that governments typically have the option to choose between different creditors.
This implies that an approach explaining a government’s decision between creditors is more
appropriate than examining the conditions under which a government would borrow from
one single creditor. Evidence is also provided in support of the claim that a government’s
decision for one creditor is simultaneously a decision against another.
Having made a prima facie case that governments need to choose among loan offers,
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this chapter examined several possible criteria that might be utilized in this process. It
appears, however, that neither the cost of loans nor the types of projects matter for the
choice of creditor. Instead, I show that the preferences of Finance, Industry and Labor
vary across the four types of creditors in accordance with the theoretical expectations.
In sum, therefore, there appears to be strong support for the fundamental assumptions
on which my theory rests. However, to show that the theory’s assumptions are consistent
with empirical observations is only the first step. In the following chapters, I therefore make
the next step of the analysis by examining the theory’s abilities to explain the outcome of
the phenomenon of interest. In other words, I will test if my theoretical framework does
indeed explain the variation in borrowing patterns observed in the empirical reality.
Chapter 4
Estimating Coalitions – A
Measurement Model
4.1 Informal coalitions
In Chapter 2, I presented a theory that explains how the interests of three distinct types
of informal coalitions vary across the four types of creditors available to governments. Ev-
idence that supports the basic assumptions of my theory were presented in Chapter 3. I
am now in a position to examine whether the borrowing decisions of governments in all
developing countries follow my theoretical predictions. For this purpose, I will conduct ex-
tensive statistical analyses of 129 developing countries to test whether the type of coalition
present in a particular country explains the borrowing decisions made by its government.
The quantitative results will be presented in chapters 4 and 5. I complement the statistical
analysis with qualitative evidence from my fieldwork in South America. The findings for
Ecuador, Colombia and Peru will be presented in Chapter 6.
My theory suggests that developing countries are dominated by one of three types of
informal coalitions. A Corporatist coalition is present if Labor and Industry are dominating
the political arena. If the interests of Finance and Industry are aligned, a Capital coalition
112
113
is present. Lastly, a coalition between Labor and Finance is termed Consumer coalition.
In order to test whether informal domestic interest group coalitions explain borrowing
decisions I first need a measure that indicates the type of coalition.
The main challenge for creating such a measure is the fact that these coalitions are infor-
mal and therefore not directly observable. For instance, there are no formal arrangements
between Finance and Industry to lobby the government regarding their preferred choice
of creditor. Yet, my interviews with politicians clearly indicated that they understood
whose interests were aligned. In Chapter 2, I therefore argued that politicians observe
the conditions of the domestic economy in order to derive whose interests are aligned and
consequently can be accommodated simultaneously. In other words, politicians aggregate
societal interests as they have an incentive to think in terms of informal coalitions in order
to maximize their chances for reelection.
In this chapter, I implement this conceptual framework. I propose a quantitative anal-
ysis that models the process by which politicians observe the structural conditions of the
domestic political economy to make inferences about the relative positions of Labor, In-
dustry and Finance. I estimate the latent probability with which the interests of Labor
are aligned with those of Industry versus Finance. I then repeat this exercise for Industry
and Finance. Once the positions of Labor, Industry and Finance are known, two of these
interests must overlap. Politicians then have the incentive to assume an informal coalition
between these two actors in order to implement a policy that satisfies the demands of both
actors simultaneously.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I will first examine the existing
scholarship on understanding coalitional arrangements between domestic actors. Section
4.3 introduces a theory of informal coalition formation that addresses the gaps in the
existing scholarship. Section 4.4 implements this theory using factor analyses to estimate
the latent indicators for each actor. As the use of factor analysis is appropriate but not
ideal, Section 4.5 presents the results of a latent profile analysis. This allows me to create
114
a measure that indicates the type of coalition present in a particular country in each year.
4.2 Identifying coalitions
4.2.1 Empirical approaches
Identifying informal coalitions is a challenging task. One way of empirically identifying
coalitions is to find measures of an actor’s strength and include interaction terms of these
variables in the regressions. If the interaction terms have a statistically significant effect
on the dependent variable while its component terms do not, it could be argued that a
coalition is present.
However, this approach makes the implicit assumption that the strongest actors will
form an alliance. This might not necessarily be the case as it is entirely reasonable to assume
that two smaller actors will cooperate to overpower the strongest actor. In addition, this
approach gives no consideration to the interests of the individual actors. It assumes that
actors cooperate to gain power, but not in order to implement policies that they jointly
prefer. Further, this approach requires indicators that adequately measure the strength of
the actors. For example, in the case of Labor, one could use indicators such as the size of the
Labor sector or union density. However, these indicators are likely to be characterized by
missing data or questionable empirical validity, in particular when considering developing
countries. Lastly, this approach assumes that economic size can be equated with the
political power of the respective agents. This is questionable as Labor’s power might
be primarily derived from its numbers and subsequently its importance in elections as it
provides the largest block of potential votes. In contrast, Finance is numerically small and
is likely to influence politicians by other means, such as campaign contributions. While
initially appealing, the approach to use interactions is not ideal.
Alternatively, scholars have suggested analyzing the revealed interests of actors. In this
approach, the presence of coalitions would be deduced from the observed behavior of the
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actors. For example, if one were to observe lobbying behavior of Finance, Industry and
Labor, one could identify the actors who are lobbying for the same cause. The advantage
of this approach lies in the fact that it does not require strong assumptions as it is solely
based on observed behavior.
However, Bearce (2003) notes that we can observe actors revealing their interests only
under certain circumstances. For example, there is little lobby activity when politicians
appear to be acting in the interests of the dominant coalition already. Conventional wisdom
therefore exaggerates lobby activities, as it ignores that lobbying is only necessary when
governments diverge from the preferred policy. In addition to the need to lobby, the
interest groups only engage in lobbying if they perceive the chances of lobbying as likely to
be successful. In sum, if interest groups do not have the incentive to lobby (because their
preferred policy is already being implemented) and/or do not have the capacity to affect
current policy even if they disagree with it, we would not observe any lobby activities.
The attempt to induce interests from observed behavior also risks confounding interests
with their effects. As argued by Frieden (1999), interests must be distinguished from the
strategic setting. Instead, interests should be specified through deduction based on prior
theory.
In short, relying on observable behavior by actors and deducing informal coalitions
from it is likely to result in biased estimates of the type of coalition present.
4.2.2 Conceptualizing coalitions
A natural starting point for conceptualizing which actors will form a coalition is the spatial
voting model. The distance between actors’ ideal points on a two-dimensional scale has
been used to explain a range of phenomena, such as voting decisions (Downs, 1957), party
competition (Stokes, 1963), and party activism (Aldrich, 1983). In each of these models,
it is hypothesized that the actors will choose the alternative closest to them. With respect
to coalition formation, one could design a model where Finance, Labor and Industry are
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aligned on a single left-to-right scale. In this case it could be argued that the actors whose
positions are closest to each other will form a coalition.
However, this assumes the existence of a single dimension along which Finance, Industry
and Labor can be compared. Considering the heterogeneity of the actors’ interests (see
Section 2.3), one would be hard pressed to make an argument for a single scale that
accurately captures each actors’ position.
Even if one were to find such a scale it would be challenging to derive all possible
coalition combinations. For example, assume that Finance is on the right and Labor is
on the left while Industry is somewhere in between. In this situation it is straightforward
to show how either a Capital coalition between Finance and Industry or a Corporatist
coalition between Industry and Labor is possible, depending on the position of Industry.
However, modeling the third combinatoric possibility – a coalition between Finance and
Labor, the Consumer coalition – would require Labor and Industry or Industry and Finance
‘switching’ positions on the unidimensional scale. It is questionable how realistic such an
assumption would be.
Considering the challenge of finding a single scale to represent the actors’ positions
as well as the procedural necessity for actors to switch relative positions, I argue that
modeling coalition formation with a spatial model on a single scale is imprudent. Instead,
I will propose an alternative spatial model that aggregates the information derived from a
separate spatial scale for each actor instead of forcing the comparison of the actors on a
single scale.
4.3 A theory of informal coalitions
I begin with the assumption that each politician’s main goal is to win or maintain office.
Office-seeking politicians have the incentive to cater to multiple constituencies simultane-
ously in order to maximize the prospect of maintaining incumbency. In such a situation, it
is advantageous for politicians’ policies to satisfy the interests of multiple societal groups
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simultaneously. I therefore argue that politicians carefully observe the conditions of the
domestic economy to infer which actors are likely to have similar interests. Once they have
analyzed which two of the three domestic actors have congruent interests, politicians have
the incentive to implement policies – i.e. borrowing from the jointly preferred creditor –
that satisfy the interests of both actors at once.
Politicians therefore observe the overall economic and political environment to deter-
mine whether the interests of two actors are congruent. If the majority of Labor is employed
in Industry, Labor’s interests can be expected to be similar to those of Industry, due to
its dependency upon it. For example, Labor would be in favor of increasing investment in
order to create employment opportunities which happen to be in the interest of Industry
as well. In contrast, under conditions of high inflation, Labor’s interests are likely to be
congruent with those of Finance. While inflation devalues the capital owned by Finance,
it also lowers the real wages of Labor. Depending on the overall state of the economy, the
interests of Labor are either congruent with those of Finance or those of Industry.
A similar reasoning applies to the interests of Industry. If the structure of the domestic
industry is primarily focused on importing goods from abroad, a healthy domestic con-
sumer base is key. Industry’s interests are therefore likely to be congruent with Labor’s.
In contrast, if Industry is focused instead on selling goods for exports, it will pay close
attention to its capacity to export. This will be in part determined by structural factors
such as a favorable exchange rate as well as low Labor costs. Historical examples such as
the South Korean experience Kay (2002)[see] indicate that to accomplish both Industry
allied itself with Finance to the detriment of Labor.
Lastly, the position of Finance with respect to either Labor or Industry also depends on
the structure of the economy. For example, if Finance is the primary provider of funding
for investment projects by domestic Industry, Finance’s interests will be close to those of its
primary customers. In contrast, if domestic Finance faces stiff competition from external
investors that are willing to provide Industry with the resources needed, Finance’s interests
118
are less likely to be congruent with those of Industry. In such a situation, as evidenced
by the fieldwork undertaken in Peru (see Section 6.4), Finance is likely to abandon the
intention to fund large infrastructure projects and instead focus on providing basic financial
services to the general population.
Industry
Labor
Finance Labor
Industry Finance
inflation employment in industry
providing finance
foreign competition
ability to export
import oriented
Figure 4.1: Illustration of Decision Model
Figure 4.1 schematically summarizes the considerations developed above. I therefore
propose a model with three actors that each have two possible coalition partners and the
condition that only two of the three actors form a coalition. This implies that there are
23 possible coalitional arrangements between the three actors. However, as is apparent in
Table 4.1, these eight possible permutations actually represent only four distinct outcomes
asA+B is substantively equivalent toB+A. If Industry’s interests are congruent with those
of Labor (and vice versa), a Corporatist coalition results. A Capital coalition indicates
congruent interests of Finance and Industry, while the Consumer coalition is characterized
by a affinity between Finance and Labor. Note that two of the eight possible arrangements
of actor’s relative position result in an intransitive ordering of interests. If Finance wants
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Preferred coalition Partner Congruent Interests Resulting coalition
of Labor of Industry of Finance
Industry Labor Labor Labor and Industry Corporatist coalition
Industry Labor Industry Labor and Industry Corporatist coalition
Industry Finance Labor intransitive (none)
Industry Finance Industry Industry and Finance Capital coalition
Finance Labor Labor Labor and Finance Consumer coalition
Finance Labor Industry intransitive (none)
Finance Finance Labor Labor and Finance Consumer coalition
Finance Finance Industry Industry and Finance Capital coalition
Table 4.1: Possible combinations of congruent interests, and resulting coalitions.
Industry, but Industry wants Labor while Labor, in turn, wants Finance, no stable coalition
results.
Conceptualizing each actors’ position as the latent probability of overlapping interests
has a crucial advantage. It allows for estimating the type of coalition present with conven-
tional statistical methods. Latent variable approaches can combine the relevant observable
indicators of the domestic political economy into a common indicator measuring the la-
tent position of each actor with respect to the other two. I can subsequently combine the
information on each actors’ position to show which actor’s positions are congruent. This
way I arrive at estimations of the coalition that is present in a country at a given time.
The following sections will present two approaches that implement this theory of informal
coalition formation.
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4.4 Estimating actor position using factor analysis
4.4.1 The model
Latent concepts are ubiquitous in political science. Abstract ideas such as democracy,
political-economic risk or ethnic identity are typically understood as latent concepts for
which no direct measure exists. In such situations, researchers typically resort to the use
of proxy variables that, within reason, can be expected to capture the concept of interest.
As an alternative to the use of proxies, several methods have been developed to esti-
mate latent concept directly. Each of these latent variable methods attempts to infer the
underlying latent variable from observable indicators. Following the classical framework
by Lazarsfeld (1950), the four existing approaches to estimating latent concepts can be
classified by their respective assumptions about the observable and unobservable variables
(see Figure 4.2): Factor analysis is used if the observable indicators are continuous and
the latent variable is assumed to be continuous as well. In contrast, latent profile analysis
involves a categorical latent variable that is estimated from continuous variables (see Gib-
son, 1959). Item response theory makes use of categorical observed variables to estimate a
continuous underlying latent variable (see ?). Lastly, latent class analysis is used if both
the observed variables as well as the assumed latent variable are categorical.
Observed variable type Assumed latent variable type Required Analysis
continuous continuous Factor Analysis
continuous categorical Latent Profile Analysis
categorical continuous Item Response Theory
categorical categorical Latent Class Analysis
Table 4.2: Lazarsfeld framework of latent variable approaches.
Of these approaches, factor analysis has been used most frequently in political science to
estimate latent concepts. In American Politics, researchers have employed factor analysis
to estimate the ideal points of US Senators (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) or judges
serving on the Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn, 2002). In Comparative Politics, Treier
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and Jackman (2008) conceptualize Democracy as a latent variable and estimated the latent
democracy score of various countries. Hausermann (2011) uses factor analysis to estimate
the position of parties, unions and employer organizations with respect to their support
or opposition for employment protection policies. To create a measure of asset specificity,
Rehm (2010) implements a factor analysis to construct a variable measuring the importance
of routine tasks within an occupation.
Following these examples, I conduct a factor analysis to estimate the latent position of
each actor with respect to the other two actors. I implement a confirmatory factor analysis,
as the theory introduced in Section 4.3 dictates how many factors are to be expected. To
estimate the patterns of association between the observed variables in X and the latent
X∗, I use a bayesian factor analysis model for mixed ordinal and continuous responses
proposed by Quinn (2004). Formally, this model is defined by
x∗i = Λφi + i (4.1)
where x∗i is the J vector of latent responses specific to observation i, Λ stands for the J ∗K
matrix of factor loadings, φi represents the K vector of factor scores specific to observation
i, i is the J vector of disturbances. The factor scores are assumed to be independent
standard normal prior distributions:
φi iid N (0, I) (4.2)
To achieve identification, Ψ is assumed to be diagonal:
i iid N (0,Ψ) (4.3)
To fit the model, Quinn re-writes it in terms of X∗ and subsequently treats X∗ as latent
data in order to work with the following posterior density:
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p(X∗, γ,Λ, φ,Ψ|X) ∝ p(X|X∗,γ)p(X∗|Λ, φ,Ψ)p(γ)p(Λ)p(Φ)p(Ψ)
∝
{
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
{
||(xij = x∗ij)||(Xj continuous)
+
Cj∑
c=1
||(xij = c)||(x∗ij ∈ (γj(c−1), γjc)||(Xj ordinal)
}
× pN (x∗i |Λφi,Ψ)
}
p(Λ)p(Φ)p(Ψ)
(4.4)
where ||(a) is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 if a is true and 0 otherwise.
pN (z|µ,
∑
) is a multivariate normal density with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix∑
evaluated at z, and p(Λ), p(Φ), and p(Ψ) are the prior densities for Λ, Φ, and Ψ,
respectively. The prior for γ drops because it is constant for all values of γ. It is then
possible to derive the full conditional distributions for the model parameters from this
posterior density. This allows for a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to be
used for model fitting which samples from the full conditional distributions of X∗, Λ, Φ,
and Ψ and uses a Metropolis-Hastings step to sample γ. When applying Quinn’s estimator
to my data I will run 100,000 iterations while discarding the first 10,000 as burn-in and
subsequently storing every 100th scan.
4.4.2 Estimating Labor
In Section 4.3, I argued that Labor’s position with respect to Finance and Industry is
determined by its concern about inflation and employment. Ideally, I would require vari-
ables that are tightly related to the actor’s interests. For example, when inferring Labor’s
interests I would prefer to use data concerning whether wage increases are tied to inflation.
If Labor would have insisted on such a precaution when negotiating wage contracts, it
would be strong evidence that Labor is highly sensitive to inflation. This would be strong
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support for the assumption that Labor would likely have similar interests to Finance. Un-
fortunately, such data is unavailable and I will therefore resort to the second-best measures.
Specifically, I will combine the information of four variables to estimate the position
of Labor with respect to Finance and Industry. First, the employment in industry as a
percentage of total employment is used to capture how dependent Labor is on Industry
in terms of employment opportunities. I will assume that the higher the percentage of
workers employed in Industry, the more likely that Labor’s interests are aligned with those
of Industry. Further, inflation, as measured by the annual percentage of consumer price
increases, is used to represent Labor’s concern with respect to inflation. I assume that
Labor is sensitive to high inflation as it negatively affects real wages. High inflation will
therefore induce Labor’s interests to be congruent with those of Finance which is also
concerned about inflation due to the nature of its assets. Third, I include gross fixed
capital formation in the domestic private sector as a percentage of GDP. This captures the
extent of domestic investment within a country. Labor will benefit from such investment
as it is likely to create employment opportunities. I therefore assume that higher domestic
investment will align Labor’s interests with those of Industry. Lastly, I include the net
inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. It is assumed to capture the
degree to which Labor is dependent on domestic Industry. After all, if foreign resources
are used to finance investment in a country, Labor will be less dependent on domestic
Industry to undertake such investments. Low FDI should therefore align Labor’s interests
with those of Industry, and vice versa.
All data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). Prior
to estimating the bayesian factor analysis with these variables I reverse the polarity of
the inflation variable by multiplying each observation with (-1) to harmonize the values
of the four variables included with the assumed implications. With this transformation,
high values imply Labor’s position being closer to Industry, while low values represent a
position closer to Finance. I then proceed to estimate a separate factor analysis for each
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year between 1990 and 2010.
The results of the factor analysis models are summarized in Table 4.3. The column
labeled λ provides information of what can be thought of as the factor loadings or item
discrimination parameters for each variable-year. The column ψjj provides information
on the error variances. As can be seen by the standard deviations, the model performs
reasonably well.
Year Inflation Employment in industry Domestic investment FDI
λ SD ψjj SD λ SD ψjj SD λ SD ψjj SD λ SD ψjj SD
1990 0.33 (0.10) 0.90 (0.12) 0.04 (0.10) 1.01 (0.13) 0.68 (0.15) 0.54 (0.20) 0.88 (0.15) 0.25 (0.23)
1991 0.73 (0.10) 0.50 (0.11) 0.10 (0.10) 1.01 (0.13) 0.60 (0.10) 0.66 (0.11) 0.88 (0.11) 0.26 (0.14)
1992 0.39 (0.11) 0.86 (0.12) 0.14 (0.11) 0.99 (0.13) 0.55 (0.13) 0.70 (0.15) 0.87 (0.16) 0.27 (0.23)
1993 -0.28 (0.11) 0.93 (0.13) -0.17 (0.11) 0.99 (0.13) -0.34 (0.12) 0.89 (0.14) -0.90 (0.17) 0.19 (0.24)
1994 -0.03 (0.13) 1.00 (0.13) -0.09 (0.29) 0.93 (0.20) -0.16 (0.32) 0.90 (0.19) -0.40 (0.70) 0.38 (0.36)
1995 -0.40 (0.19) 0.82 (0.23) -0.26 (0.12) 0.95 (0.13) -0.29 (0.13) 0.92 (0.13) -0.81 (0.23) 0.32 (0.31)
1996 -0.31 (0.10) 0.91 (0.12) -0.25 (0.10) 0.95 (0.12) -0.43 (0.10) 0.83 (0.12) -0.92 (0.14) 0.16 (0.19)
1997 -0.39 (0.10) 0.85 (0.12) -0.16 (0.10) 0.99 (0.13) -0.43 (0.10) 0.82 (0.12) -0.93 (0.13) 0.15 (0.19)
1998 -0.36 (0.12) 0.87 (0.13) -0.19 (0.12) 0.98 (0.13) -0.45 (0.13) 0.80 (0.15) -0.84 (0.18) 0.29 (0.26)
1999 -0.35 (0.11) 0.89 (0.13) -0.24 (0.10) 0.96 (0.12) -0.44 (0.11) 0.82 (0.13) -0.90 (0.15) 0.20 (0.22)
2000 -0.38 (0.12) 0.86 (0.13) -0.19 (0.11) 0.98 (0.13) -0.43 (0.11) 0.83 (0.12) -0.88 (0.16) 0.22 (0.23)
2001 -0.70 (0.19) 0.50 (0.26) -0.31 (0.12) 0.91 (0.13) -0.35 (0.12) 0.89 (0.12) -0.54 (0.17) 0.70 (0.21)
2002 -0.42 (0.16) 0.82 (0.17) -0.24 (0.12) 0.96 (0.13) -0.36 (0.13) 0.87 (0.13) -0.75 (0.21) 0.41 (0.30)
2003 -0.08 (0.41) 0.85 (0.25) -0.03 (0.17) 1.00 (0.13) -0.06 (0.33) 0.91 (0.20) -0.11 (0.78) 0.41 (0.37)
2004 0.50 (0.25) 0.71 (0.31) 0.20 (0.12) 0.97 (0.14) 0.20 (0.12) 0.97 (0.13) 0.67 (0.27) 0.51 (0.36)
2005 0.19 (0.62) 0.60 (0.34) 0.08 (0.26) 0.96 (0.15) 0.07 (0.23) 0.96 (0.14) 0.17 (0.51) 0.74 (0.29)
2006 -0.06 (0.29) 0.93 (0.17) -0.10 (0.41) 0.86 (0.27) -0.08 (0.31) 0.92 (0.21) -0.09 (0.64) 0.61 (0.38)
2007 -0.09 (0.29) 0.93 (0.14) -0.06 (0.21) 0.98 (0.15) -0.11 (0.34) 0.90 (0.17) -0.27 (0.79) 0.35 (0.34)
2008 -0.13 (0.41) 0.84 (0.28) -0.05 (0.17) 1.00 (0.13) -0.09 (0.27) 0.94 (0.14) -0.26 (0.76) 0.40 (0.36)
2009 -0.17 (0.37) 0.86 (0.23) -0.08 (0.19) 0.99 (0.16) -0.13 (0.30) 0.91 (0.20) -0.39 (0.65) 0.45 (0.37)
2010 -0.03 (0.21) 0.98 (0.14) -0.02 (0.14) 1.01 (0.13) -0.09 (0.44) 0.82 (0.29) -0.13 (0.78) 0.41 (0.38)
Table 4.3: Factor loadings of factor analysis for Labor.
The substantively significant results are displayed in Figure 4.2, which illustrates the
factor scores for Labor in each of the 129 countries in the sample in a particular year.
The estimates for subsequent years are not shown for reasons of space, so that the figure
stands as an exemplary display of the data created. For each country, the latent degree of
Labor’s interest congruence with either Finance or Industry are displayed, along with their
confidence intervals. Higher values indicate concurrence with the interests of Industry,
while lower values indicate more agreement with Finance.
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4.4.3 Estimating Industry
I subsequently estimate the bayesian factor analysis for Industry. Following the theoretical
considerations in Section 4.3 I use two variables to estimate Industry’s position with respect
to Finance and Labor. To capture the degree to which Industry caters to Labor, I include
the imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. The argument is that if imports
are high relative to GDP, domestic industry will depend on the general population as
consumers. Industry’s interests will therefore be aligned with those of Labor as it represents
the numerical majority in the population. To capture Industry’s propensity to cater to the
export market I will include the real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100). As an
appreciation of the exchange rate makes exports uncompetitive, higher values on this index
imply that Industry will be less inclined to cater towards the export market.
As was the case with the factor analyses for Labor, I reverse a single variable to harmo-
nize the ordering of the variables with the theoretical conceptions proposed in Section 4.3.
In this case, I multiply the values of the import measure with (-1) so that for all variables
higher values indicate Industry’s interests being more congruent with those of Finance,
while lower values represent alignment with Labor. All data is obtained from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012) and a separate model is estimated for each
year from 1990 through 2010.
Table 4.4 displays the model results. The column labeled λ displays the factor loadings
for the respective variables across years, while the column ψjj provides information on the
error variances.
The substantively interesting results of this model are displayed in Figure 4.3. As with
Labor, the figure displays the point estimates of Industry’s position relative to Finance and
Labor for each country in the sample. Here, higher values indicate concurrence with the
interests of Finance, while lower values indicate more agreement with Labor. While the
fit of the model itself is acceptable, the resulting point estimates are not extraordinarily
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Year Imports Real Exchange Rate
λ SD ψjj SD λ SD ψjj SD
1990 0.16 (0.59) 0.65 (0.42) 0.23 (0.67) 0.52 (0.43)
1991 -0.02 (0.60) 0.67 (0.42) 0.14 (0.69) 0.52 (0.43)
1992 0.03 (0.59) 0.68 (0.41) 0.06 (0.69) 0.53 (0.43)
1993 0.09 (0.57) 0.69 (0.41) 0.15 (0.69) 0.52 (0.44)
1994 -0.04 (0.63) 0.62 (0.42) -0.02 (0.69) 0.54 (0.43)
1995 -0.22 (0.61) 0.60 (0.42) -0.15 (0.67) 0.55 (0.42)
1996 0.03 (0.62) 0.63 (0.42) 0.06 (0.70) 0.53 (0.43)
1997 0.24 (0.56) 0.64 (0.42) 0.26 (0.61) 0.57 (0.43)
1998 -0.03 (0.57) 0.69 (0.40) -0.05 (0.73) 0.49 (0.43)
1999 0.01 (0.58) 0.69 (0.40) -0.04 (0.72) 0.50 (0.43)
2000 0.03 (0.60) 0.65 (0.42) 0.10 (0.67) 0.57 (0.43)
2001 0.03 (0.64) 0.61 (0.43) 0.07 (0.64) 0.60 (0.42)
2002 0.00 (0.62) 0.64 (0.43) 0.16 (0.64) 0.58 (0.44)
2003 0.13 (0.63) 0.60 (0.43) 0.18 (0.61) 0.61 (0.42)
2004 0.13 (0.64) 0.59 (0.43) 0.17 (0.61) 0.61 (0.42)
2005 0.03 (0.62) 0.64 (0.42) 0.16 (0.64) 0.58 (0.43)
2006 0.05 (0.57) 0.69 (0.42) 0.10 (0.67) 0.56 (0.44)
2007 -0.04 (0.53) 0.74 (0.38) 0.05 (0.70) 0.53 (0.43)
2008 -0.05 (0.62) 0.63 (0.44) 0.12 (0.64) 0.59 (0.44)
2009 -0.03 (0.52) 0.74 (0.39) 0.11 (0.69) 0.53 (0.44)
2010 0.05 (0.57) 0.69 (0.41) 0.03 (0.69) 0.54 (0.43)
Table 4.4: Factor loadings of factor analysis for Industry.
convincing.1
4.4.4 Estimating Finance
Lastly, I estimate the factor analysis for Finance. Following Section 4.3, Finance’s position
between Industry and Labor is determined by the degree to which it is the main provider
of financing to domestic industry. To capture this notion, I use the total claims existing
on the private sector (measured as annual growth as a percentage of broad money). The
more financing provided to domestic industry, the more interest Finance has in Industry’s
economic wellbeing. The more interwoven Finance’s interest is with domestic companies,
the more aligned its position will be with that of Industry. Second, I utilize the net
inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP to capture the amount of
foreign competition faced by Finance. Foreign investors can provide the funding necessary
1 I will address this issue with a superior model in Section 4.5.
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for investment projects that otherwise would have been supplied by domestic Finance. I
therefore assume that higher FDI is detrimental for domestic Finance. In other words,
if FDI is high, it is less likely that Finance’s interests are aligned with those of domestic
Industry.
All data is obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). I
transform the variable capturing FDI by multiplying it with (-1) to ensure that higher
values of all variables imply that Finance’s position is more congruent with that of Industry
rather than Labor. As before, I estimate a separate factor analysis for each year from 1990
through 2010.
A summary of the model results is displayed in Table 4.5. The column labeled λ
provides information of what can be thought of as the factor loadings or item discrimination
parameters for each variable-year. The column ψjj provides information regarding the error
variances. As can be seen by the deviations, the model performs well.
Year Claims on private sector FDI
λ SD ψjj SD λ SD ψjj SD
1990 -0.75 (0.24) 0.40 (0.34) -0.71 (0.24) 0.46 (0.34)
1991 -0.86 (0.15) 0.25 (0.23) -0.83 (0.15) 0.30 (0.23)
1992 -0.75 (0.25) 0.39 (0.35) -0.68 (0.24) 0.50 (0.35)
1993 0.18 (0.64) 0.57 (0.39) 0.20 (0.69) 0.51 (0.41)
1994 -0.72 (0.26) 0.42 (0.37) -0.67 (0.26) 0.50 (0.36)
1995 -0.78 (0.22) 0.36 (0.32) -0.74 (0.22) 0.43 (0.32)
1996 -0.77 (0.24) 0.37 (0.34) -0.68 (0.24) 0.51 (0.33)
1997 -0.75 (0.24) 0.40 (0.34) -0.70 (0.24) 0.48 (0.34)
1998 -0.73 (0.27) 0.41 (0.37) -0.65 (0.26) 0.53 (0.36)
1999 -0.72 (0.25) 0.43 (0.36) -0.68 (0.25) 0.49 (0.35)
2000 -0.72 (0.25) 0.43 (0.36) -0.68 (0.25) 0.50 (0.34)
2001 -0.70 (0.26) 0.45 (0.36) -0.70 (0.26) 0.47 (0.36)
2002 -0.66 (0.31) 0.48 (0.40) -0.58 (0.30) 0.60 (0.39)
2003 -0.06 (0.69) 0.54 (0.43) -0.11 (0.61) 0.64 (0.42)
2004 -0.21 (0.66) 0.53 (0.42) -0.21 (0.62) 0.60 (0.41)
2005 -0.33 (0.56) 0.60 (0.42) -0.32 (0.60) 0.57 (0.44)
2006 -0.14 (0.66) 0.56 (0.42) 0.00 (0.62) 0.63 (0.42)
2007 0.29 (0.62) 0.54 (0.41) 0.27 (0.62) 0.56 (0.42)
2008 0.03 (0.72) 0.51 (0.42) 0.09 (0.61) 0.64 (0.41)
2009 0.13 (0.69) 0.53 (0.44) 0.15 (0.57) 0.68 (0.42)
2010 0.00 (0.72) 0.51 (0.44) -0.04 (0.49) 0.77 (0.38)
Table 4.5: Factor loadings of factor analysis for Finance.
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The point estimates of Finance’s position between Industry and Labor are shown in
Figure 4.4. For each country, the latent degree of Finance’s interest congruence with either
Labor or Industry in 1997 are displayed. Higher values indicate concurrence with the
interests of Industry, while lower values indicate more agreement with Labor.
4.4.5 Identification of coalitions
The results from these bayesian factor analysis models provide information on the position
of Labor with respect to Industry and Finance, of Finance with respect to Labor and
Industry, and of Industry with respect to Finance and Labor. However, this information
needs to be integrated into a single categorical variable that indicates the type of coalition
present in a particular country for a given year.
For this reason, the point estimates obtained from the factor analyses are used to create
a categorical dummy variable indicating to which other actor a particular actor is closest.
As the bayesian factor analysis model used here produces results that are centered on the
absolute value of zero, I can use it as a ‘natural’ cut-point.2 Labor in countries with
positive latent scores are assumed to share interests with Industry, while countries with
negative scores are classified as sharing interests with Finance. I repeat this exercise for
both Industry and Finance.
The resulting dummies for Labor, Industry and Finance indicate the preferred coalition
partner of each actor in a particular year. Combining the information of the three dummies
in a particular year’s results is straightforward as the pattern must fall into one of the eight
possible combinations displayed in Table 4.1. Recording the particular combination of each
country-year allows me to create a categorical variable that classifies each country-year as
either a Corporatist coalition, Capital coalition, Consumer coalition, or the intransitive
situation.
2 For a more thorough discussion of this decision see Section 4.5.1.
Position of Labor, 1997
Georgia
Uganda
Bolivia
Togo
Guinea
Costa Rica
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Rwanda
Sudan
Chile
Kenya
Mexico
Haiti
TajikistanAlgeria
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Chad
Madagascar
Vanuatu
Yemen, Rep.
Syrian Arab Republic
Samoa
Macedonia, FYR
Myanmar
Sri Lanka
Turkey
Jordan
India
Seychelles
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Guatemala
L_employ4_lam
Gambia, The
Belarus
Uzbekistan
Bangladesh
F_bank8_psi
Pakistan
Cote d'Ivoire
F_bank8_lam
L_employ4_psi
Swaziland
Tanzania
Papua New Guinea
Armenia
Uruguay
Serbia
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Tonga
Jamaica
Mongolia
Montenegro
Paraguay
Albania
Botswana
Moldova
Mauritius
Colombia
AzerbaijanGuyana
Lebanon
Lesotho
Kazakhstan
Lao PDR
St. Kitts and Nevis
Nepal
Maldives
F_inv1_psi
South Africa
Ukraine
Malaysia
Bulgaria
Burundi
Burkina Faso
Russian Federation
L_inflation3r_lam
Peru
Mauritania
Zambia
Congo, Rep.
Mozambique
DjiboutiArgentina
Angola
Kosovo
Niger
Grenada
Latvia
Malawi
Ecuador
Cameroon
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Indonesia
Central African Republic
Honduras
Philippines
China
Senegal
Bhutan
Thailand
Romania
Brazil
Belize
Solomon Islands
El Salvador
Panama
Turkmenistan
FijiNicaragua
Lithuania
Comoros
Zimbabwe
Cape Verde
Dominican Republic
Ethiopia
Cambodia
Morocco
Sierra Leone
Nigeria
Afghanistan
Kyrgyz Republic
Guinea−Bissau
L_inflation3r_psi
St. Lucia
Mali
Tunisia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Liberia
Benin
Dominica
Eritrea
F_inv1_lam
Sao Tome and Principe
Gabon
Ghana
Somalia
−1 0 1 2 3 4
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 4.2: Latent degree of Labor’s interest congruence with Finance or Industry in 1997
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Figure 4.3: Latent degree of Industry’s interest congruence with Labor or Finance in 1997
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Figure 4.4: Latent degree of Finance’s interest congruence with Labor or Industry in 1997
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4.5 Latent Profile Analysis to estimate actor positioning
4.5.1 Limitations of factor analysis
The continuous latent variable resulting from the factor analysis above is an intuitive way
to represent the positions of Labor, Industry and Finance with respect to the remaining two
actors. However, the theoretical model of informal coalition formation proposed in Section
4.3 suggests that an informal coalition exists if the interests of two actors are congruent. In
other words, if Labor’s position is closer to Industry than to Finance and simultaneously
Industry’s ideal point is closer to Labor than Finance politicians have the incentive to think
of an informal coalition between Labor and Industry. This requires that the position of
each actor that was obtained on a continuous scale be transformed to a categorical variable
that classifies actors as being closer to the one or the other alternative.
This raises the question of how to define the cut-off point that determines whether an
actor is closer to one or the other alternative. Confronted with estimates of a continuous
latent variable the researcher is forced to make several decisions: Should one use the
mean factor score of the sample in a given year as the cut-off point or would the median
be more appropriate? Or should the researcher choose an absolute value, which might
be conceivable as the model produces estimates that theoretically should center on zero.
Whichever criterion is used, the researcher will still need to decide on which sample to apply
the criterion. Should the mean (median, etc). be calculated based on the cross-section of
the respective year, or across the pooled set of all country-years? Alternatively, the mean
(median) might be calculated for each country separately based on the historical values of
the actor in that country. Essentially, when confronted with an estimate of a continuous
latent variable, the research must make an ad hoc decision concerning the subsequent
classification instead of letting the data determine the classification in the first place. This
is a serious drawback of a factor analysis in the context of the problem at hand.
Secondly, as evidenced by the results in Section 4.4.3, the factor analysis implemented
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above did not always result in a good fit of the data. One of the reasons for such findings
might be that the factor analysis model implemented above does not allow for correlations
between the observed variables that were used to calculate the latent concept. For example,
the method assumes that measures such as inflation and employment are independent from
each other. This is clearly a highly questionable assumption as it is likely that inflation
and employment co-determine each other. We should therefore use a method that would
allow us to incorporate such correlations across constituent variables.
Lastly, recall that the factor analysis above required a separate estimation for each
year between 1990 and 2010. This precludes any possibility of incorporating temporal
dependence across years, so that being characterized by a Corporatist coalition in year t is
assumed to not have any effect on the type of coalition present in year t+ 1. This is again
a highly questionable assumption. Political scientists have a long tradition of identifying
path dependencies within political processes as well as the effect of institutions shaping
the overall context of politics in ways that reproduce themselves over time. It is therefore
necessary to utilize a method that allows for the incorporation of temporal dependence
when estimating the coalition present at time t+ 1.
4.5.2 The model
Considering these shortcomings of the factor analysis estimations obtained in Section 4.4,
this section presents an alternative model that will address the shortcomings discussed
above. I propose estimating a latent profile analysis with modifications that allow for the
incorporation of both temporal and contemporaneous correlations.
As indicated in Table 4.2, latent profile analysis assumes that the observable indicators
are continuous while the underlying latent variable is categorical. The literature on latent
variable models actually does not emphasize the difference between latent factor models
that assume a continuous latent variable and latent profile models that suggest a categori-
cal latent variable. For normally distributed data, a latent factor model and a latent profile
134
model can account for the observed correlations equally well. One example is Berry (1997)
whose theory allows for the continuous as well as categorical interpretation of the underly-
ing variable. An analogy might clarify why the conceptual distinction between a continuous
and categorical variable is not salient. Assume that we estimate the latent propensity of
alcohol consumption to examine its effect on health outcomes. Whether one considers high
alcohol use on a continuous scale or the category of heavy drinkers vs. occasional drinkers
is not central as the result of the analysis will be similar: excessive consumption of alcohol
will have negative health consequences. The literature therefore suggests that researchers
can pick the type of analysis that theory suggests is most appropriate. Considering the
discussion on the challenges of identifying an actor’s favored coalition partner, my coali-
tional theory would suggest that a latent profile analysis that assumes a categorical latent
variable is more appropriate than a latent factor analysis.
I therefore develop and implement a latent profile model that also addresses the ad-
ditional issues of contemporaneous correlation among constituent variables and inter-
temporal correlation across coalition estimates for particular years. The goal is to identify
three categorical variables that indicate the preferred coalition partner of each actor. In
other words, one categorical indicator would represent whether Labor’s interests are closer
to Finance or Industry, while the remaining two categorical variables would do the same
for Industry and Finance respectively.
An illustration of this model is presented in Figure 4.5. The rectangles represent ob-
served variables whereas the circles represent the categorical latent variables. At t = 1,
the three observable indicators x1, x2 and x3 are used to calculate the latent categori-
cal variable c1 at t = 1. The estimation of this direct relationship is represented by the
straight arrow. Importantly, while estimating c1, x1 through x3 are allowed to correlate as
indicated by the dotted lines. This modeling decision addresses the concern raised in the
context of factor analysis where variables such as inflation and employment were viewed
as completely unrelated.
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I incorporate the possibility of inter-temporal correlation as well. As discussed above,
due to path dependencies and historical legacies it is reasonable to expect that past coali-
tions affect the formation of future coalitions. I model this possibility by allowing any
estimation of cn with n > 1 to be determined
x2_2
x3_2
c_2
x1_2
x2_1
x3_1
c_1
x1_1
x2_3
x3_3
c_3
x1_3
Figure 4.5: Illustration of Latent Profile Model estimated. The rectangles represent ob-
served variables while the circles represent latent variables. Subscripts indicate time period.
The implementation of this model is achieved by estimating a latent profile analysis
with the structural conditions outlined above. Identification is achieved by fixing three
cross-correlations to the constant 1. The default estimator for this type of analysis is
maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. When estimating the factor analysis in
Section 4.4 I was required to conduct a total of 21 separate estimations (3 latent variables,
one of each actor, times 7 years, one for each cross-section between 2004 and 20103 ).
3 The decision to estimate the latent profile analysis for this time period only was derived from con-
siderations that will be more fully developed in Chapter 5. In short, my theory suggests that countries
have a choice between BRIC creditors and traditional creditors. However, BRIC loans have been available
only recently. In order to adequately model a government’s choice of creditor, then, it is necessary to only
consider the time period when the full set of loan options was available. As the first BRIC loan larger than
1 billion US$ was granted in 2004 I assume that this was the time when BRIC creditors were ‘large enough’
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In contrast, the latent profile analysis only requires three estimations: a single categorical
variable indicating the preferred coalition partner of each actor across time and for each
country in the sample.
4.5.3 Estimating the positions of Labor, Industry and Finance
While the latent profile model differs dramatically from the factor analysis implemented in
Section 4.4, I use the same set of constituent observable variables to estimate the underlying
latent variable. Consequently, when estimating the position of Labor with respect to
Finance and Industry, I use the employment in industry as a percentage of total employment
to capture how dependent Labor is on Industry in terms of employment opportunities.
Second, inflation as measured by the annual percentage of consumer price increases, is
used to represent Labor’s concern with respect to inflation. I again include the gross fixed
capital formation in the private sector as a percentage of GDP to capture the benefits of
increased employment opportunities as a result of domestic investment. Lastly, the net
inflow of foreign direct investment is used to proxy the employment opportunities created
by foreign investors as opposed to domestic Industry.
The results of the latent profile analysis for Labor are summarized in Table 4.6. Coun-
tries belonging to class 1 are characterized by Labor whose interests are congruent with
those of Industry, while countries classified as class 2 feature Labor whose interests are
aligned with those of Finance. As can be seen, the proportion of countries in the two
classes is roughly constant across time, with about half of the 129 countries in the sample
falling into each category.
However, the aggregate numbers do not necessarily speak to the stability of classifi-
cations for individual countries over time. Table 4.7 therefore presents the means for the
constituent variables across time for the three most common patterns of classification.4
to be a serious alternative to traditional creditors.
4 The decision to present only three classification patterns is due to space considerations. There are,
after all – with countries being assigned to two classes over seven years – a total of 128 classification patterns
possible.
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Year Class Count Proportion
2004 1 63.66 0.50
2 64.34 0.50
2005 1 63.66 0.50
2 64.34 0.50
2006 1 62.38 0.49
2 65.62 0.51
2007 1 55.42 0.43
2 72.58 0.57
2008 1 55.42 0.43
2 72.58 0.57
2009 1 55.42 0.43
2 72.58 0.57
2010 1 55.42 0.43
2 72.58 0.57
Table 4.6: Aggregate summary of the latent variable indicating the position of Labor based
on estimated posterior probabilities.
Labor’s position with respect to either Finance or Industry is stable as two of the three
most common classification patterns do not change over time. They remain classified as
class 1 (positioning close to Industry) or class 2 (interests aligned with Finance) for all
seven years. In some countries, however, Labor changes positions over time. The most
common pattern for these countries shows that Labor is aligned with Industry for the first
three years and then moves closer to Finance in the remaining years.
I implement latent class analysis for Industry with the same constituent variables that
were already used in the factor analysis. To capture the degree to which Industry caters
to Labor, I include the imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, as high
imports indicate Industry’s dependence on the general population as consumers. Industry’s
propensity to cater to the export market is incorporated by the inclusion of the real effective
exchange rate index (2005 = 100). As an appreciation of the exchange rate makes exports
uncompetitive, higher values on this index imply that Industry will be less inclined to cater
to the export market.
Table 4.8 presents the summary statistics of the resulting classifications. Countries
classified as class 1 are characterized by Industry whose position is close to that of Finance.
Industry in countries that fall into class 2, on the other hand, is characterized by interests
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Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pattern 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Pattern 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value
Inflation 2004 -12.34 5.28 0.02 -12.34 5.28 0.02 -6.29 0.69 0.00
2005 -12.98 5.04 0.01 -12.98 5.04 0.01 -6.55 0.55 0.00
2006 -27.90 20.09 0.17 -27.90 20.09 0.17 -6.44 0.59 0.00
2007 -8.67 1.07 0.00 -5.91 0.53 0.00 -5.91 0.53 0.00
2008 -14.64 1.41 0.00 -10.84 0.72 0.00 -10.84 0.72 0.00
2009 -6.64 1.09 0.00 -4.21 0.58 0.00 -4.21 0.58 0.00
2010 -6.49 0.88 0.00 -4.47 0.40 0.00 -4.47 0.40 0.00
Employment 2004 16.57 1.26 0.00 16.57 1.26 0.00 22.71 1.09 0.00
in industry 2005 14.11 2.12 0.00 14.11 2.12 0.00 22.24 1.44 0.00
2006 18.49 1.46 0.00 18.49 1.46 0.00 23.03 1.33 0.00
2007 17.98 2.02 0.00 23.99 1.06 0.00 23.99 1.06 0.00
2008 17.93 2.16 0.00 24.40 1.10 0.00 24.40 1.10 0.00
2009 13.40 3.83 0.00 22.60 1.20 0.00 22.60 1.20 0.00
2010 18.10 0.81 0.00 25.40 1.86 0.00 25.40 1.86 0.00
Domestic 2004 10.60 0.88 0.00 10.60 0.88 0.00 18.95 1.21 0.00
investment 2005 12.51 0.91 0.00 12.51 0.91 0.00 19.33 1.10 0.00
2006 12.51 1.25 0.00 12.51 1.25 0.00 19.40 0.85 0.00
2007 12.23 1.11 0.00 20.24 0.95 0.00 20.24 0.95 0.00
2008 12.30 1.17 0.00 20.50 0.97 0.00 20.50 0.97 0.00
2009 10.85 0.91 0.00 19.05 0.80 0.00 19.05 0.80 0.00
2010 11.94 0.95 0.00 18.56 0.82 0.00 18.56 0.82 0.00
FDI 2004 4.72 0.64 0.00 4.72 0.64 0.00 3.94 0.85 0.00
2005 4.47 0.70 0.00 4.47 0.70 0.00 4.05 0.78 0.00
2006 7.23 1.18 0.00 7.23 1.18 0.00 4.37 0.69 0.00
2007 8.07 1.52 0.00 5.65 0.78 0.00 5.65 0.78 0.00
2008 8.93 1.64 0.00 5.18 0.70 0.00 5.18 0.70 0.00
2009 6.82 1.27 0.00 3.74 0.52 0.00 3.74 0.52 0.00
2010 7.17 1.49 0.00 3.69 0.54 0.00 3.69 0.54 0.00
Table 4.7: Means of constituent variables by latent class pattern for Labor.
closer to those of Labor. Again, the aggregate proportion of the two classes is stable over
time.
Analyzing the classification patterns of individual countries reveals that the aggregate
stability of classifications is again caused by the consistent classification of individual coun-
tries over time. As shown in Table 4.9 the pattern 1111111 (indicating that the country was
always identified as class 1) and the pattern 2222222 (always coded as belonging to class
2) are among the three most common classification patterns. In these countries, Industry’s
interests are always aligned with those of Finance (class 1) or always congruent with those
of Labor (class 2). However, there are countries characterized by Industry whose position
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Year Class Count Proportion
2004 1 45.18 0.36
2 80.82 0.64
2005 1 45.18 0.36
2 80.82 0.64
2006 1 45.18 0.36
2 80.82 0.64
2007 1 45.18 0.36
2 80.82 0.64
2008 1 46.64 0.37
2 79.36 0.63
2009 1 49.07 0.39
2 76.93 0.61
2010 1 49.07 0.39
2 76.93 0.61
Table 4.8: Aggregate summary of the latent variable indicating the position of Industry
based on estimated posterior probabilities.
with respect to Finance and Labor changes over time. Of these countries, the most com-
mon pattern exhibits Industry being aligned with Finance initially and then moving closer
to Labor.
Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pattern 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 Pattern 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value
Imports 2004 -67.09 5.19 0.00 -35.46 2.07 0.00 -35.46 2.07 0.00
2005 -69.37 5.03 0.00 -36.37 2.18 0.00 -36.37 2.18 0.00
2006 -70.77 5.36 0.00 -36.07 2.45 0.00 -36.07 2.45 0.00
2007 -72.83 5.71 0.00 -36.68 2.44 0.00 -36.68 2.44 0.00
2008 -74.33 6.04 0.00 -38.35 2.72 0.00 -38.35 2.72 0.00
2009 -63.54 4.55 0.00 -63.54 4.55 0.00 -34.25 2.79 0.00
2010 -65.59 4.25 0.00 -65.59 4.25 0.00 -34.81 3.15 0.00
Real 2004 99.60 0.45 0.00 96.13 1.36 0.00 96.13 1.36 0.00
Exchange 2005 100.00 0.01 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
Rate 2006 100.68 1.02 0.00 103.63 1.07 0.00 103.63 1.07 0.00
2007 100.56 1.62 0.00 105.51 1.55 0.00 105.51 1.55 0.00
2008 104.14 3.15 0.00 111.00 2.52 0.00 111.00 2.52 0.00
2009 107.07 3.04 0.00 107.07 3.04 0.00 124.55 13.60 0.00
2010 106.63 2.70 0.00 106.63 2.70 0.00 138.93 25.41 0.00
Table 4.9: Means of constituent variables by latent class pattern for Industry.
Lastly, I estimate the latent profile analysis for Finance using the same set of constituent
variables as with the factor analyses for Finance reported above. Recall that Finance’s
position between Industry and Labor is determined by the degree to which it is the main
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provider of finance to domestic industry. I therefore use the total claims existing on the
private sector (measured as annual growth as a percentage of broad money) to capture
the notion that the more financing Finance has provided to domestic industry, the more
entangled it is with Industry’s economic wellbeing. Second, I utilize the net inflows of
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP to measure the degree to which foreign
investors might provide the funding necessary for investment projects that otherwise would
have been supplied by domestic Finance. I therefore assume that higher FDI implies more
competition for domestic Finance which implies that Finance’s interests are less likely to
be aligned with those of domestic Industry.
Aggregate classification patterns resulting from this latent profile analysis are presented
in Table 4.10. Countries that fall into class 1 are characterized by Finance whose interests
are aligned with those of Industry, while class 2 captures instances of congruent interests
of Finance and Labor. It is intuitive that in the large majority of cases Finance’s interests
are closer to those of Industry than Labor.5
Year Class Count Proportion
2004 1 112.37 0.88
2 15.63 0.12
2005 1 112.37 0.88
2 15.63 0.12
2006 1 114.57 0.90
2 13.43 0.10
2007 1 112.86 0.88
2 15.14 0.12
2008 1 110.15 0.86
2 17.85 0.14
2009 1 10.26 0.08
2 117.74 0.92
2010 1 10.26 0.08
2 117.74 0.92
Table 4.10: Aggregate summary of the latent variable indicating the position of Industry
based on estimated posterior probabilities.
5 The fact that this changes in the years 2009 and 2010 might be the result of the global financial
crisis that occurred in 2007 and 2008. In the aftermath of such a crisis it is reasonable to expect that
Finance would turn away from large investment banking activities and focus on the core businesses of
offering financial services to the general population.
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The aggregate pattern of classifications appears to be stable over time. As was the
case with Labor and Industry, this stability is based on the consistent classification of
individual countries over time. Among the three most common classification patterns are
again the cases where Finance is consistently classified as being closer to Industry than
Labor (pattern 1111111) as well as the opposite case (pattern 2222222). Amongst the
instances where Finance exhibits a change in relative position between Industry and Labor
the pattern 1111122 is most common, indicating that Finance starts being aligned with
Industry and only for the last two years moves closer to Labor.
Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 Pattern 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value
FDI 2004 -3.73 0.33 0.00 -3.73 0.33 0.00 -8.73 3.41 0.01
2005 -3.74 0.39 0.00 -3.74 0.39 0.00 -8.14 2.79 0.00
2006 -5.76 0.57 0.00 -5.76 0.57 0.00 -5.64 1.46 0.00
2007 -6.71 0.62 0.00 -6.71 0.62 0.00 -6.35 2.52 0.01
2008 -6.88 0.74 0.00 -6.88 0.74 0.00 -6.11 1.59 0.00
2009 -19.93 2.43 0.00 -3.76 0.31 0.00 -3.76 0.31 0.00
2010 -23.47 3.44 0.00 -3.57 0.30 0.00 -3.57 0.30 0.00
Claims on 2004 8.12 1.54 0.00 8.12 1.54 0.00 39.83 8.97 0.00
private sector 2005 10.50 1.23 0.00 10.50 1.23 0.00 44.54 10.26 0.00
2006 12.24 1.76 0.00 12.24 1.76 0.00 56.86 18.61 0.00
2007 14.71 2.32 0.00 14.71 2.32 0.00 70.26 18.76 0.00
2008 13.07 1.37 0.00 13.07 1.37 0.00 38.39 6.54 0.00
2009 1.12 3.80 0.77 6.51 0.91 0.00 6.51 0.91 0.00
2010 5.98 3.45 0.08 9.34 1.00 0.00 9.34 1.00 0.00
Table 4.11: Means of constituent variables by latent class pattern for Finance.
Following the estimation of the three latent profile analyses for Labor, Industry and
Finance I follow the method outlined in Section 4.4.5 to construct a categorical variable
indicating the type of coalition present. For each country-year, I therefore examine which
two of the three actors have congruent interests, that is, which actors prefer the respective
other as their coalition partner. As the possible combinations of preferred coalition partners
must fall into one of the eight possible configurations displayed in Table 4.1, I can create
a categorical variable that classifies each country-year as either a Corporatist coalition,
Capital coalition, Consumer coalition, or the intransitive case.
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4.6 Appraisal
The challenge presented by the theory put forward in Chapter 2 is to connect a set of
unordered actors (Labor, Industry and Finance) to a set of unordered coalitions (Capital,
Corporatist and Consumer), which in turn are to be connected to a set of unordered bor-
rowing options (BRICs, DACs, IFIs and private creditors). The theory of informal coalition
formation proposed in Section 4.3 provides a solution for the first step of connecting actors
to informal coalitions. By assuming that politicians have the incentive to cater to two out
of the three actors simultaneously, the model elegantly provides both a causal mechanism
through which informal coalitions might be formed as well as a way to operationalize the
concept of informal coalitions. In addition, the theory is also able to address situations in
which no informal coalition was present by allowing for intransitive configurations of inter-
ests. The ability to account for this possibility is a contribution to the existing literature
of coalition formation.
A second conceptual strength of this coalition model is its applicability to both democ-
racies and non-democracies. Admittedly, it is more intuitive in the context of democracies
to assume that office-motivated politicians observe the structural conditions of the political
economy in order to infer whose interests are aligned that then can be catered to simulta-
neously. However, existing research on the politics of non-democratic regimes has reached
the consensus that even in these countries political competition is at play. Weeks (2008,
2012) shows that conventional wisdom significantly underestimates the degree to which
autocratic leaders are held accountable domestically. A large body of literature following
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) shows that in non-democracies leaders have to
With respect to the empirical implementation, my theory of informal coalition for-
mation holds several advantages. First, data for this type of analysis is widely available
both across time and across a large set of countries. This is an improvement over the
need to find data on unionization rates in developing countries in order to capture Labor’s
strength. Further, working with latent variable approaches avoids the need for proxies
143
but implements the theoretical notion of an informal coalition directly into the statistical
model. Latent variable models allow researchers to explicitly model the direct relationship
between observable indicators and the underlying latent concept. Further they also allow
scholars to account for the contemporaneous correlation among the observable indicators.
More importantly, latent variable models can be modified to incorporate inter-temporal
correlation. In a context characterized by historical legacies and path dependencies it is
important to recognize that yesterday’s informal coalition is likely to have an effect on the
informal coalition present today. The empirical strategy I pursued in this chapter allows
me to incorporate these considerations directly into the statistical model.
Nevertheless, the approach proposed in the chapter does have drawbacks. On a theoret-
ical level, my model requires strong assumptions. For example, I suggest that politicians
are office-motivated and have no interests besides re-election. The possibility of policy-
motivated politicians is excluded. In addition, the model suggests that informal coalitions
are formed on the basis of interest congruence but ignores the relative ‘strength’ of actors.
It is undoubtedly plausible to take the relative power of actors into consideration.
However, I argue that the focus on the strength of Labor, Industry and Finance also
necessitates strong assumptions as strength alone does not provide information on which
actors will form a coalition: that the two strongest actors form a coalition of strength, or
that smaller actors colLaborate to be jointly more powerful than the single strong actor. In
addition, it is challenging to obtain data on the relative strength of various domestic groups.
One might think about using union coverage as a proxy for Labor strength. However, such
data is often not available for developing countries, and even if it is, it might not capture
the concept of interest. For example, Labor is a powerful actor in Ecuadorian politics, yet
the Labor force is by and large not unionized. Such discrepancies preclude the possibility
of finding a measure of an actor’s strength that could be used with confidence.
Chapter 5
Predicting the Composition of
New Loans – An Inference Model
5.1 Data
5.1.1 The dependent variable
In Chapter 4, I create a measure indicating what type of coalition characterizes a particular
country in a specific year. In this chapter, I use this newly created variable to test whether
governments’ borrowing decisions are explained by the type of coalition present.
Such an analysis requires data on the loans obtained by developing countries. Data
on the loan amounts extended by the traditional creditors – the IFIs, DACs and private
creditors – is readily available. However, this is not the case for the BRICs. In particular,
China treats data on the loan amounts extended by its lending institutions as state secrets.
In addition to the dollar amount lent, I will need data under the terms on which the money
is lent. I will utilize information on the ‘price’ of loans to control for the possibility that
the cost of loans affects borrowing decisions. Unfortunately, obtaining data on the interest
rate, grace period or maturity of loans is challenging not only for emerging creditors. Even
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traditional creditors do not provide systematic information on the conditions of their loans.
Existing work has tried to address this issue by focusing on the supply side. For
instance, scholars such as Brautigam (2009) have poured much effort into obtaining more
detailed information from the Chinese on their lending volume and terms. The Chinese
Statistical Yearbook provides some aggregated data on the total Chinese lending volume
to the entire world, sometimes broken down by region. Scholars have therefore attempted
to disaggregate this data in order to derive the loan amounts given by the Chinese to
individual countries. Others have attempted to obtain information on the terms of these
loans by undertaking fieldwork in Beijing with the intention of speaking with Chinese loan
officers in the headquarters of lending institutions such as the Chinese Development Bank.
So far, these attempts have been unsuccessful in obtaining systematic data on the lending
volume and terms of BRIC lenders.
Faced with this challenge, I chose to pursue a different route to obtain this data. Instead
of focusing on the supply side of lending by estimating the capital outflows from BRICs to
developing countries, I concentrated my efforts on the demand side. Every loan extended
by a creditor must have a recipient. It therefore should be possible to ‘look through the
books,’ so to speak, of developing countries in order to determine which creditors they have
used in the past. By systematically exploring their capital inflows, I am able to reverse-
engineer information on the lending activities by BRICs. At the same time, this approach
allows me to obtain comparable data across all types of creditors. For example, in the case
that western governments have an incentive to underreport loans to particular countries,
the strategy of focusing on the recipient side will allow me to uncover such behavior.
I was fortunate to be granted access to the internal databank of the World Bank to ac-
complish this undertaking. As a membership organization, all members of the World Bank
not only have certain rights but also some obligations. One of these is the requirement
for each country to report detailed information on their financial position in the context
of the Debtor Reporting System (DRS). This includes information on their revenues and
146
expenses, disaggregated to an extraordinary level of detail. On the revenue side, govern-
ments are required not only to report data on income from taxes, but also on transfers of
external resources such as foreign aid as well as loans from external creditors. The World
Bank granted me access to the latter, which allowed me to compile a dataset that includes
information on all loans obtained by developing countries as well as the terms upon which
these loans were acquired. The coverage of this data is exceptional, considering that World
Bank membership is almost universal among developing countries (see Section 3.2)
However, there are some limitations of the data acquired using this approach. First
and foremost is that fact that the data was obtained from the internal databank of the
World Bank. As such, the information acquired is of confidential nature, as governments
have reported their information on the sources of income on good faith terms to the World
Bank. To quote the email of a World Bank official “by supporting your work we are
exposing creditors based on debtor’s data, which is always a concern to us.” By securing
access to this data I was required by the World Bank to sign waivers that prohibit me from
distributing this data myself, and restrict publication of the information to forms that
prevent the identification of particular loans. I recognize that this is a serious obstacle to
the spirit of replication that governs academic work. However, in order to make replication
possible I offer fellow researchers the following: I will make my entire dataset available to
researchers, with the exception of the four variables that contains information on lending
volumes and the respective terms (interest rate, grace period, maturity). In order to obtain
these four variables, I ask interested researchers to contact me directly in order to obtain
the contact information of my contact at the World Bank as well as the file number of
my request. This will allow researchers to acquire the same data I obtained directly from
the World Bank. All data is therefore available to researchers interested in replicating my
findings.
With respect to the data itself, there are additional limitations. As indicated above,
the information on creditors is obtained based on data by debtors. There is the possibility
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of debtors underreporting the loan amounts obtained from particular creditors. For ex-
ample, governments might be less inclined to be forthcoming about loans obtained from
emerging creditors when reporting their data to the World Bank, a traditional creditor.
However, similar limitations exist with respect to data provided by creditors themselves:
western governments might want to underreport their loans to non-democratic countries.
In contrast, data obtained from an international organization that has observers in each
member country and therefore some degree of insight into whether the data reported is
accurate is superior to data that was compiled without any supervision.
The data obtained from the World Bank is more disaggregated than any other data
currently available on BRIC lending. Nevertheless, the information obtained only includes
information on the totals received by a particular country in a particular year. I therefore
cannot differentiate between the case where a creditor grants one large loan or two separate
small loans. Accordingly, the information on interest rate, grace period and maturity are
averages for all loans obtained by a specific creditor in a specific country-year.
In addition, some loan amounts received are recorded as ‘other’ or ‘unspecified’ due to
reporting problems over the years. The World Bank therefore provided this data under
one category called ‘other’ which is not comparable across countries. As it cannot be used
in a cross-country fashion, I have excluded this information from the analysis.
Lastly, the World Bank data did not include all information required for my analysis.
For example, short-term debt, private non-guaranteed debt data and IMF debt data were
all compiled at an aggregate level. This implies that there is no information on the average
terms for these categories. In addition, the DRS did not include data on private creditors.
However, information on both IMF loans as well as private creditors is available from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). With respect to the latter, the data
includes information on the total amount obtained for each country-year. However, no
data is available on the identity of the private creditors. I therefore do not know which
banks have granted syndicated loans and the identity of the bond holders is unknown.
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Despite these limitations, the data obtained represents a major advance in the study of
lending activities, particularly with respect to BRICs. My dataset is the first that features
systematic information on four types of creditors – IFIs, DACs, BRICs and private creditors
– not only on their respective lending volume but also the terms of the loans (i.e. interest
rate, maturity and grace period). This data is disaggregated and therefore available for
129 developing countries over the period from 1970 through 2010. Such detailed coverage
on a disaggregated basis is unprecedented in the literature to date.
5.1.2 The independent variable
The independent variable of importance is the type of coalition present in a recipient
country. In short, if a country is characterized by a Corporatist coalition, I expect its
government to favor borrowing from BRIC creditors at the expense of private and IFI
loans. In contrast, if a Capital coalition is present, I hypothesize that the government will
prefer loans from private creditors and, to a lesser degree, from IFIs. Lastly, a Consumer
coalition is expected to lean towards DAC loans.
The data regarding what country is characterized by which type of coalition was de-
rived in Chapter 4. I incorporate this information by using dummies indicating the type
of coalition present in a particular country-year. This results in a total of four dummies
for the Corporatist, Capital and Consumer coalitions, as well as the situation of intransi-
tive preference orderings where no coalition is formed. Of these four dummies I exclude
the dummy for the Corporatist coalition to avoid dummy variable trap. Excluding the
Corporatist coalition facilitates interpretation as the remaining dummies then indicate the
degree of difference between the base category and the type of coalition captured by the
respective dummy.
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5.1.3 The control variables
Besides the dependent and the independent variable of importance, I also include a number
of control variables. In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce a variety of models
that may be used to test my theory. It is important to note, however, that in order to
facilitate comparison across models, I will use the same set of control variables in each of
the models.
For example, in each model I control for the cost of the loans by including the interest
rate, the grace period and the maturity of each loan. While I could have used the grant
element implicit in each loan, this measure only aggregates the information on the interest
rate, maturity and grace period into a common scale. However, as it is of interest whether
governments respond more to one aspect of loan costs than another, I include these variables
separately. This data was obtained from the World Bank along with the loan data described
in Section 5.1.1. I also control for the total external debt stock of each borrower, measured
as a percentage of GNI, at the time of the current borrowing decision. This accounts
for the possibility of not obtaining additional loans if the existing debt stock is already
comparatively large. In addition to these controls applicable to all types of creditors, I also
include additional controls to account for creditor-specific factors.
BRICs With respect to BRIC loans, a number of scholars have suggested that China
only lends to countries that do not recognize the political sovereignty of Taiwan (Large and
Chien, 2008; Ellis, 2009; Dreher and Fuchs, 2011). I therefore include a dummy variable
obtained from Rich (2009) to control for the possibility that China favors countries that
do not recognize Taiwan.
In addition, researchers have indicated that emerging creditors use loans as a means
to obtain access to natural resources in the recipient countries (Rotberg, 2008; Melber,
2008, 2009). If this is the case, countries with natural resources should obtain more and
larger loans from BRICs. I therefore include a measure of the total natural resource rents
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developed by the World Bank (2012) in the respective recipient countries.
DACs Scholars have also suggested variables that explain lending from DACs to devel-
oping countries. In particular, along the lines of the literature on foreign aid, it is argued
that western countries use loans (either bilateral loans or indirectly through the IMF) to
buy their governments votes in international organizations such as the United Nations
(Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2008). To control for this
possibility, I follow Copelovitch (2010a) and include the average S-score of the G5. The
variable is based on the S-score data by Strezhnev and Voeten (2012) and captures the de-
gree of voting similarity between the G5 as a group (i.e. the US, the UK, France, Germany
and Japan) and each developing country.
IFIs The IMF has long been a subject of academic inquiry, producing several theories
explaining its lending determinants. However, as a member organization dominated by
western governments, the explanations proposed are interwoven with those of DACs, as
discussed above, and private creditors from western countries as will be discussed below.
I nevertheless include an additional variable to account for factors that might affect IMF
lending in particular, independent from the influence of western governments or private
creditors. Section 3.2 discusses in detail how IMF membership determines whether or not
a government has the right to borrow from the IMF. I therefore include a dummy indicating
IMF membership in the estimations obtained from the IMF (2013b).
Private creditors Conventional wisdom suggests that private creditors are risk adverse.
Following the work of Tomz (2007) defaulting on existing debt or building up arrears on
payments due would destroy the confidence of private creditors who would subsequently
stop lending to countries classified as high risk. To control for this possibility I include data
on the arrears on principal and interest payments due which are available from the World
Bank (2012). First, I account for the arrears on debt obtained from official creditors such
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as the IMF. Scholars have argued that the IMF has a certain signaling capacity, allowing
the organization to act as a catalyst for private capital flows to developing countries. This
applies both in the positive as well as the negative sense. In other words, no arrears
on debt owed are a positive signal, while arrears on principal or interest payments to
official creditors are understood to be a negative sign. In particular, it is argued that
private lending is highly sensitive to the repayment status of official loans. I therefore add
the arrears on principal and interest owed to private creditors. By controlling for official
arrears as well as private arrears, I can account for the possibility that private creditors
react more heavily to missed payments, which may represent early warning signs of a
country’s imminent default.
Note that there are two reasons why I chose to account for a country’s risk by including
its arrears instead of using that country’s sovereign debt rating by rating agencies such as
Standard & Poor’s, Fitch or Moody’s. First, private actors in particular will look out for
early warning signs of a default. Paying attention to a country’s arrears is therefore likely
to provide the information sought faster than waiting for a rating agency to assess the
situation and then decide to adjust a country’s credit rating. In addition, concerns have
been raised regarding the rating agencies’ neutrality. I therefore argue that using arrears
instead of sovereign debt ratings is a more accurate measurement of default risk. The
second reason is pragmatic in nature. The number of countries that have received credit
ratings by rating agencies is small in comparison to the countries covered by the World
Bank’s data. Even when using the average of all bond ratings available from Standard &
Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s in order to increase country coverage, I still lose about half of
my observations due to missing data on the rating variable alone. In contrast, including
the data on payment arrears results in a loss of observations of less than 2%.
Other controls Besides variables that directly pertain to the four types of creditors I
include additional controls accounting for country characteristics obtained from the World
Bank (2012). For instance, I include the log of GDP per capita to account for differences
152
in development across recipient countries. Further, the need for external resources might
differ across governments. It is reasonable that the degree of necessity for external resources
might affect a government’s incentive to seek out loans and a creditor’s willingness to
extend it. To account for a country’s need of a loan, I therefore control separately for
government income as well as government spending. With respect to the former, I include
government revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP, while the latter is accounted
for by incorporating government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
In addition, the degree to which a developing country is a successful exporter as well as the
degree to which a country relies on imports might affect its borrowing strategy. I therefore
include both the exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP as
control variables.
5.2 Linear panel model
5.2.1 Model specification
Considering the availability of loan data across both time and recipient countries, the
application of panel data estimators is the logical first step. The goal of such an analysis is
to predict the expected loan amounts that each type of coalition would obtain from each
of the four types of creditors.
I therefore estimate a random effects model of the following form
yit = α+ γyit−1 + βxit + ψzit + it (5.1)
where t covers the time period from 2004 through 2010. The choice of t is motivated
by theory. I argue that governments choose between four types of creditor based on the
preferences of the dominant societal coalition. However, BRICs are emerging creditors that
have not been active for a long period of time. To apply my theoretical framework onto
a time period where BRICs were still inactive would result in biased estimates. For this
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reason, I identified the first instance of a BRIC lending more than $1 billion US dollar,
which was a Chinese loan to Angola in 2004. I therefore assume that from 2004 onward
BRIC creditors were sufficiently active to be considered by recipient governments as a
viable alternative. With the data obtained from the World Bank ending in 2010, the panel
is characterized by t = 7 and N = 129.
A common concern with panel data is the possible presence of serial correlation across
time. In short, it might be the case that existing debt would have an effect on a cur-
rent year’s loans. However, the dependent variable measures the new loans obtained in
a given year, not the overall debt stock already obtained from a particular creditor. The
dependent variable therefore captures the first differences rather than the level of debt,
which should moderate concerns about serial correlation. Nevertheless, having established
a good working relationship with a particular creditor might provide governments with the
incentive to favor that particular creditor over time. To account for this possibility of serial
correlation, I follow the common practice of including a lagged dependent variable yit−1 to
further alleviate such concerns.
In addition to concerns about autocorrelation, my estimates must also address the
problem of selection effects. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003a) show
with respect to the IMF that the selection into IMF programs may be non-random. In
other words, the same variables that explain loan size may also explain the likelihood
of obtaining a loan in the first place. Such reasoning applies not only to the IMF. It is
reasonable to assume that the likelihood of obtaining a BRIC loan also affects the size of the
BRIC loan obtained. To address this selection problem I follow Copelovitch (2010b) and
employ propensity score matching – albeit modified to take into account the possibility of
borrowing from four separate creditors as opposed to Copelovitch’s specification that only
considers one creditor. I therefore create propensity scores z1, z2 and z3 that capture the
predicted probability of obtaining a BRIC loan, DAC loan or private loan, respectively. The
propensity score for IFIs is excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap. Essentially, these
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propensity scores measure the probability of obtaining one of the respective loans given the
covariates of the observation (i.e. each country-year). The inclusion of these propensity
scores implements the idea of matching each observation with a ‘control’ observation for
which are values of the explanatory variables are as close to identical as possible.
Including z1−3 in the panel regression minimizes selection bias and enables the use of
standard, parametric regression techniques (Ho et al., 2007). As such, for example, it allows
me to use cluster-robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator that results in an error term 
that is identically and independently distributed over the clusters, but correlated within
each cluster. Without accounting for this correlation the OLS point estimates would be
consistent, while the standard errors of the variance-covariance estimation would not.
5.2.2 Results
The results of the panel regressions are displayed in Table 5.1. As noted above, I estimate
Equation 5.1 in four separate specifications. In model 1, the dependent variable is the
logged loan amount obtained from BRICs. Consequently, the lagged dependent variable
refers to the lagged log loan amount acquired from BRICs. To account for the cost of
loans, I include the corresponding grant element for the BRIC loans obtained. In contrast,
model 2 uses the logged loan amount from DACs along with the corresponding lagged
dependent variable and grant element. The dependent variable of model 3 are logged
IFI loans, while model 4 is estimated with the logged loan amount obtained from private
creditors. However, other than the differences in dependent variable, lagged dependent
variable and corresponding grant element, the model specification is identical across the
four regressions.
The results indicate that Capital coalitions borrow less from BRICs than Corporatist
coalitions, while the opposite is the case with private creditors. The same conclusion can
be drawn when comparing a Consumer coalition to a Corporatist coalition, as both the
magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance are remarkably similar.
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While the interpretation of marginal effects provides some insights, my theory suggests
that the absolute amount of loans obtained from each creditor should vary across coalitions.
The quantity of interest is therefore the predicted loan amount that each coalition obtains
from the four creditors. I therefore estimate the predicted loan amount by coalition. To
facilitate the interpretation of the results I use simulation techniques to visualize the sub-
stantive results of interest. This information is displayed in Figure 5.1. The location of each
curve’s highest point indicates the point prediction of the loan amount that the respective
coalition is estimated to obtain on average. The shape of the curve provides information
about the certainty of the estimate, with wider curves indicating larger uncertainty.
With respect to the top panel, Corporatist coalitions are estimated to borrow more
heavily from BRICs than either Capital or Consumer coalitions. Translating the loga-
rithmic scale into absolute amounts reveals that Corporatist coalitions are estimated to
borrow an average of 268 million US$ per year, while Capital coalitions are expected to
obtain about 46 million US$ and Consumer coalition around 54 million US$. I test whether
these differences are statistically significant by conducting a series of difference-in-means
tests1 . The difference between the Corporatist and the Capital coalition yields a χ2 of
4.85 which implies a p-value of 0.028. The probability that a Capital coalition borrows
a larger amount from BRICs than a Corporatist coalition is therefore less than 3%. The
t-test for the difference between Corporatist and Consumer coalition is also statistically
significant (χ2 = 4.73, p = 0.030). Lastly, the difference between BRIC loans obtained by
Capital and Consumer coalition is not statistically significant (χ2 = 0.07. p = 0.788). In
short, my theoretical expectations with respect to BRIC loans are confirmed by the data.
DAC loans, however, do not appear to be determined by social coalitions. The second
panel indicates that Corporatist coalitions, on average, obtain lower loan amounts from
DACs than either Capital or Consumer coalitions. However, these differences are not
1 I calculate two-tailed difference-in-means tests. While I could achieve statistical significance for
additional estimates reported in this section if I were to use one-tailed t-tests, I deem their use inappropriate
in this case. After all, I need to account for the possibility that the BRIC loan amount by a Capital coalition
is either lower or higher than that of the Corporatist coalition.
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Figure 5.1: Predicted loan amounts by creditor and coalition. Estimates based on Panel
OLS Model.
statistically significant, as the difference-in-means test for the Corporatist-Capital pair
results in a χ2 of 2.04 (p = 0.154) and that for the difference between Corporatist and
Consumer coalition in a χ2 of 0.74 (p = 0.389). The predicted DAC loan amounts for
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Consumer and Capital coalition do not differ either (χ2 = 0.39, p = 0.534).
A similar picture is revealed in the degree to which governments obtain loans from
IFIs. Neither of the three coalitions appears to obtain significantly larger amounts from
IFIs than the respective other coalitions. Difference-in-means tests confirm the estimates
displayed in the third panel of Figure 5.1. The difference between Corporatist and Capital
coalition is insignificant (χ2 = 0.16, p = 0.688) as is the difference between the Corporatist
and Consumer coalition (χ2 = 0.02, p = 0.897) and the Capital and Consumer coalition
(χ2 = 0.40, p = 0.529).
In contrast, the predicted loan amount that the three coalitions are expected to ob-
tain from private creditors differ markedly. The bottom panel of Figure 5.1 shows that
governments of countries characterized by a Corporatist coalition utilize private creditors
less extensively than those characterized by both Capital and Consumer coalition. On
average, the model predicts Capital coalitions to obtain 433 million US$ while Consumer
coalitions would borrow 521 million US$ per year. In contrast, Corporatist coalitions are
predicted to borrow only 216 million US$ per year. The p-value for the difference between
Corporatist and Capital coalition is 0.046 (χ2 = 3.97), and that for the difference between
Corporatist and Consumer coalition is 0.005 (χ2 = 7.85). In contrast, the difference be-
tween Capital and Consumer coalition is not statistically significant (χ2 = 0.20, p = 0.652).
My theoretical predictions are therefore strongly supported, as Corporatist coalitions ob-
tain significantly fewer resources from private creditors than either Capital or Consumer
coalitions.
In sum, the panel estimates presented in this section provide support for the hypotheses
derived in Section 2.5. Even when controlling for a host of methodological issues (selection
effect, temporal autocorrelation) and alternative explanations, social coalitions appear to
determine the choice of creditor. There are significant differences between the Corporatist
coalition, which excludes Finance, as compared to either the Capital or the Consumer
coalition which both include Finance. While the former tend to favor borrowing from
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BRICs, the latter prefer to obtain loans from private creditors. In other words, Capital and
Consumer coalition borrow about 10 times as much from private creditors than BRICs per
year. In contrast, Corporatist coalitions borrow more from BRICs than private creditors.
5.2.3 Appraisal
Linear panel data models are valuable because they allow for estimating the loan amount
that each coalition is expected to acquire. However, recall that my theory suggests an
interdependency among creditors. Faced with the constraint of a maximum amount of
loans that can be obtained, a government’s choice for one creditor is simultaneously a
choice against another. However, the approach with panel data requires me to estimate
the predicted loan amount obtained separately for each type of creditor. Panel models
are therefore inherently unable to account for the interdependencies I derive in Chapter 2.
To adequately test my theory, I therefore need to turn to estimation methods that allow
for the borrowing decisions of governments among the different creditors to be estimated
jointly.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BRICs DACs IFIs Private
Capital coalition -1.759** 0.687 0.134 0.695**
(0.799) (0.482) (0.333) (0.349)
Consumer coalition -1.598** 0.461 -0.044 0.881***
(0.735) (0.534) (0.341) (0.314)
intransitive situation -0.087 0.560 0.039 0.388
(0.557) (0.484) (0.370) (0.325)
L.BRICs 0.353**
(0.175)
Interest rate, BRICs 0.085
(0.326)
Grace period, BRICs -0.299*
(0.154)
Maturity, BRICs 0.133**
(0.061)
L.DACs 0.434***
(0.118)
Interest rate, DACs 0.102
(0.159)
Grace period, DACs -0.033
(0.077)
Maturity, DACs 0.022
(0.040)
L.IFIs 0.204***
(0.056)
Interest rate, IFIs -0.072
(0.071)
Grace period, IFIs -0.099
(0.064)
Maturity, IFIs -0.006
(0.014)
L.Private 0.432***
(0.112)
Interest rate, Private 0.314***
(0.060)
Grace period, Private 0.048
(0.038)
Maturity, Private -0.012
(0.026)
Taiwan recognized -0.856 -0.150 -0.124 -0.456
(2.073) (0.948) (0.405) (0.497)
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.067 -0.007 -0.026* 0.009
(0.047) (0.025) (0.014) (0.017)
S-score of G5 -3.215 2.084 0.926 2.538***
(2.948) (1.295) (0.844) (0.837)
1.IMF Membership (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
. . . .
Principal arrears, official creditors (US$) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest arrears, official creditors (US$) -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Principal arrears, private creditors (US$) -0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest arrears, private creditors (US$) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita -0.535 0.149 -0.006 0.271
(0.755) (0.286) (0.194) (0.306)
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 0.063 -0.041 0.009 -0.088***
(0.061) (0.035) (0.023) (0.028)
Gov’t consumption expenditure (% of GDP) -0.155* 0.005 -0.013 0.087***
(0.093) (0.047) (0.027) (0.028)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.081 -0.010 -0.036*** -0.008
(0.069) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.095 0.018 0.005 0.004
(0.061) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 0.011 -.006 0.003 -.008
(0.024) (0.007) (0.003) (.003)
z1 0.158 -0.236 -0.636 -0.000
(1.526) (1.098) (0.802) (0.926)
z2 1.682 2.241 0.370 1.001
(2.240) (1.841) (1.106) (1.080)
z3 0.546 -0.926 0.330 -1.119**
(0.686) (0.615) (0.257) (0.458)
z4 -4.962e+07 -1.896e+07 443924.560 -4.868e+07
(34619973.900) (24545706.585) (7327629.744) (33640166.470)
Constant 13.012** -1.287 5.708* -3.081
(5.835) (4.072) (3.190) (2.320)
N 49 140 199 179
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.1: Model results of OLS panel regression.
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5.3 Multinomial logit model
5.3.1 Model specification
As indicated above, it is questionable whether linear panel data models are appropriate for
the question at hand as they are unable to account for the interdependency among creditors.
Fortunately, there are alternatives available. For example, instead of conceptualizing the
dependent variable as a continuous measure of the loan volume obtained, one could directly
analyze the choices for or against a creditor. Multinomial logit models, for instance, use
a discrete variable that captures a range of unordered outcomes as the dependent variable
to then estimate the predicted probability that a particular outcome is chosen. This class
of models is particularly appealing as it considers the available choices jointly. In other
words, the decision-makers are assumed to simultaneously face all of the possible choices
and then decide to choose one of the possible outcomes.
It appears straightforward to see how this model might be applied to the question
at hand. Governments are presented with loan proposals (see Section 3.3) and need to
choose among them. It is therefore reasonable to conceptualize the dependent variable as
the choice between BRICs, DACs, IFIs and private creditors and to subsequently estimate
whether the type of coalition present affects the predicted probability of choosing one over
the other type of creditor.
However, the model assumes that each government chooses only one of the available
options but not multiple. As there are instances in my data where governments obtain loans
from several creditors in a single year, I am forced to transform the dependent variable. I
do so by creating a variable the indicates whether the loan from a particular creditor has
been the largest loan obtained by a government in a particular year.
More formally, the latent utility approach that is typically used to motivate multinomial
logit models can be directly applied to the question at hand. Each government has a utility
Uij associated with each choice of creditor j. That utility Uit has a stochastic part ij and
161
a systematic part µi. The latter is assumed to be a function of the variables associated
with the respective country, such as the type of coalition dominating the domestic political
economy (that is, µ)i = Xiβi). The government then chooses among the alternatives in
such a way that maximizes its utility, so that
Pr(Yi = j) = Pr(Uij > Ui`∀`j ∈ J) (5.2)
Assuming a Type I Extreme Value distribution (i.e. a Gumbel distribution) the probability
of Equation 5.2 can subsequently be expressed as
Pr(Yi = j) =
exp(Xiβi∑J
j=1 exp(Xiβj
(5.3)
5.3.2 Results
The results of these estimations are presented in Table 5.2. To identify Equation 5.3
the research is required to choose a base category against which the other outcomes are
compared. I follow the common practice of choosing the most frequent category as the
base category, which in my case is the choice for IFI loans. The table therefore does
not display results for this choice, even though it was included in the estimation. Note
that the coefficients for the included choices are displayed in separate columns for space
considerations, but were actually estimated jointly.
However, because of the functional form of multinomial logit estimators, the interpre-
tation of the resulting coefficients is not intuitive. To facilitate the interpretation of the
model results I therefore calculate the predicted probabilities across the three coalitions to
identify how the type of coalition affects the probability that a loan of a particular creditor
is the largest loan obtained in a particular year. Figure 5.2 displays the predicted probabil-
ities that a particular coalition obtained its largest loan from one of the four creditors. As
can be seen, the results are not convincing. With the exception of the very low predicted
probability that BRIC loans are the largest loan obtained by Consumer coalitions, none of
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the remaining predicted probabilities are significantly different across coalitions.
5.3.3 Appraisal
The lack of significant results is not surprising. To be sure, the multinomial logit model
appears appropriate for the question at hand at first sight because it accounts for the choice
amongst the four creditors jointly. However, the model makes the assumption that each
government only chooses one of the available creditors – the option that gives it the highest
utility. The model cannot accommodate instances in which countries chose to borrow from
two or more creditors in the same year. Estimating a multinomial logit model with the loan
data available therefore required a transformation of the dependent variable. I addressed
this requirement by creating a variable indicating if a government’s loan from a particular
creditor was the largest loan obtained in a given year.
However, this transformation is highly dubious, for several reasons. First, this trans-
formation loses information on the additional, yet smaller, loans that a country might have
obtained in the same year. For example, Table 5.3 shows that only about a quarter of
all country-years chose only one creditor. It would be only for this subset of cases that
the dependent variable as conceptualized for the multinomial logit model above would be
appropriate. For the remaining 75% of cases the dependent variable used would lose the
information on one or more loans that were obtained in the same year, but that were
smaller than the respective largest loan acquired.
In addition, the transformation of the dependent variable loses information not only
with respect to the number of loans considered, but also truncates qualitative information.
For example, a discrete measure of loan choice disregards whether the largest loan was 1
billion US$ or 10 million US$ as long as either of these two loans are larger than any other
loans obtained in that year. Similarly, if two or more loans were acquired, the relative
volume of loans is ignored. In other words, it does not matter whether the largest loan
was larger by 1 million US$ of 1 billion US$. Clearly, however, the details on the size of
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the loans, both absolute and relative, are important information. However, in the context
of multinomial logit models such information cannot be incorporated into the dependent
variable.
Lastly, the transformation of the dependent variable also makes the assumption that
all creditors, in principle, have comparable chances of being the largest loan obtained.
This might be reasonable for the comparison of government’s choice among the traditional
creditors. The IFIs, DACs and private creditors have established themselves as creditors
to developing countries over a longer period of time. In contrast, BRICs have entered
the stage only recently. It is therefore unreasonable to expect that BRICs have the same
chance of being the largest loan obtained in a single year as traditional creditors.
(1) (2) (3)
BRICs DACs Private
Interest rate, BRICs 1.201***
(0.317)
Grace period, BRICs -0.484***
(0.169)
Maturity, BRICs -0.200*
(0.106)
Interest rate, DACs -0.138
(0.186)
Grace period, DACs 0.095
(0.086)
Maturity, DACs -0.103**
(0.049)
Interest rate, Private 1.304***
(0.343)
Grace period, Private 0.774***
(0.158)
Maturity, Private -1.071***
(0.177)
Capital coalition 1.734 -1.460 2.362
(1.792) (1.121) (2.020)
Consumer coalition -5.700*** -0.603 0.365
(2.113) (1.371) (3.777)
intransitive situation -6.402** -0.727 0.798
(2.923) (1.093) (2.510)
Taiwan recognized -26.506*** 0.149 -3.170
(4.512) (1.176) (3.739)
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.078 -0.062 -0.101
(0.060) (0.042) (0.077)
S-score of G5 -23.632** 0.609 6.384
(9.231) (2.442) (8.191)
IMF Membership (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
. . .
Principal arrears, official creditors (US$) 0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest arrears, official creditors (US$) -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Principal arrears, private creditors (US$) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest arrears, private creditors (US$) -0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita -3.862*** -0.866 -1.477
(1.374) (0.641) (1.246)
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 0.058 -0.013 -0.056
(0.089) (0.058) (0.103)
Gov’t consumption expenditure (% of GDP) -0.124 0.125 -0.173
(0.129) (0.091) (0.230)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.011 -0.076* 0.002
(0.059) (0.040) (0.065)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.112 0.159*** 0.124*
(0.075) (0.054) (0.073)
External debt stocks (% of GNI) -0.067** -0.017 -0.052**
(0.028) (0.017) (0.024)
Constant 67.381*** 4.532 9.744
(23.339) (5.943) (22.142)
N 330 330 330
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.2: Model results of Multinomial Logit analysis.
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Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities by coalition that the loan obtained from the respective
creditor is the largest of all loans obtained.
Freq. Percent
BRIC only 15 1.66
DAC only 5 0.55
IFI only 171 18.94
Private only 56 6.20
BRIC, DAC 10 1.11
BRIC, IFI 80 8.86
BRIC, Private 20 2.21
DAC, IFI 68 7.53
DAC, Private 18 1.99
IFI, Private 95 10.52
BRIC, DAC, IFI 38 4.21
BRIC, DAC, Private 5 0.55
BRIC, IFI, Private 37 4.10
DAC, IFI, Private 138 15.28
all creditors 87 9.63
no loan 60 6.64
Total 903 100
Table 5.3: Frequency and distribution of creditor set chosen by all governments.
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5.4 Differentiated Product Model
5.4.1 Model specification
Methodological issues of the multinomial logit model
The multinomial logit model has a number of additional drawbacks, beyond issues with the
dependent variable identified above. For example, it assumes that we observe all charac-
teristics of the loans offered. In other words, the model used in Section 5.3 does not allow
for unobserved project characteristics. However, we do not have data on the conditions
of individual loans. Rather, I have assumed that loans from BRICs have specific char-
acteristics, namely that they are attached to particular investment projects. In contrast,
IFI loans are thought of possessing characteristics that link them to fiscally conservative
macroeconomic outcomes. In sum, I have used rather crude classifications to characterize
differences across loans. An ideal estimation method should relax this assumption to allow
for product characteristics ξi that are observed by government entities but not reflected in
the data available to researchers.
Second, the multinomial logit model implicitly assumes that the decision among com-
peting goods is made by a homogenous entity. In Political Science this has led to the appli-
cation of such models to the estimation of voting behavior by individual citizens (Whitten
and Palmer, 1996). Accordingly, I have implicitly assumed that the amount borrowed from
a country in a particular year was borrowed by a homogenous entity.
However, recall that the data I obtained from the World Bank only reports the total
amount that a country obtained from a particular creditor in a specific year. I do not
have information on the number of loans that were obtained nor information on which
government entity has obtained the loan. It is, however, entirely reasonable to assume
that the total volume of loans obtained consists of the sum of individual loan agreements
reached by individual government entities. In fact, my fieldwork indeed suggests that this
is the case (see Section 3.3). After all, infrastructure is financed by the transportation
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ministry while the finance ministry obtains loans to supplement the general budget.
This has important implications, as it allows me to view the loan data as aggregate
market data. In other words, each country-year is more accurately described as its own
market where individual government entities have made discrete choices for or against
specific loan proposals. Aggregating these borrowing decisions results in a total obtained
N, (qj , pj , xj) : j = 1, 2, ..., J (5.4)
where N is the number of government entities in a country with the ability to borrow, qj is
the aggregated quantity of the loans obtained from creditor J , while pj stands for the price
of the loan by creditor J . xi, ..., xj represents the vector of characteristics of the respective
loans. In my case, J = 4 which allows me to construct the market shares for each creditor.
Instead of conceptualizing loans as completely independent of each other (as I did in
Section 5.2) or considering the loan data only in a very truncated form (see Section 5.3) I
can now focus on the composition of the total debt obtained. In other words, I will focus
on explaining the respective share of loans that the government in total (i.e. the sum of
loans obtained by its individual entities) will acquire.
Most importantly, though, conceptualizing the dependent variable in this manner allows
me to account for the decision to not borrow in the first place. In other words, I can define
the outside good as
s0 = 1−
∑ qj
N
(5.5)
Following the theory outlined in Chapter 2 I assume that the debt portfolio composition of
a Corporatist coalition will differ from that of a Capital or Consumer coalition. Namely, the
former is expected to rely more heavily on BRICs as the source of loans while discounting
the importance of IFIs. In contrast, Capital coalitions are assumed, on average, to favor
IFIs and private creditors in the composition of their debt portfolio. Consumer coalitions
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are also expected to favor traditional creditors, primarily DACs.
The model
In sum, the multinomial logit model is inappropriate as it truncates the dependent vari-
able, ignores unobserved heterogeneity, and assumes individual-level data which I do not
have. Fortunately, Berry (1994) proposes a model explaining the demand for differentiated
products that avoids these issues. In what follows I will introduce this model and modify
it for my purposes.
I begin by assuming that the utility a government entity i obtains from not acquiring
a loan is zero.
Ui0 = 0 (5.6)
This is a reasonable assumption in the context of my theory, as I assume politicians running
the government entities have the incentive to cater to the dominant societal interest groups
in order to secure their re-election. Not borrowing, and thereby depriving the dominant
interest group of the expected positive distributional consequences that such a loan would
have, would therefore not gain the politician anything. Consequently, the politicians utility
obtained from obtaining the loan j is given by
Uij = xjβ − αpj + ξj + ij
= δj + ij
(5.7)
where δj is the mean utility for loan j that is common across all government entities i. ij
is a characteristic of product j that is unobserved by the researcher but observed by both
creditors and borrowers. If we make the logit assumption that ij ∼ iid across government
entities i and creditors j we can define choice indicators yij that equal 1 if i chooses loan
j and 0 otherwise. Given these assumptions, the choice probabilities on the level of the
individual government entity i take the multinomial logit form
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Pr(yij = 1|β, xj′ , ξj′ , j′ = 1, ..., J) = exp(δj)∑J
j′=0 exp(δj′)
(5.8)
On the aggregate level for each country-year, however, the subsequent aggregate market
shares for loan j arising from the individual government entity decisions are as follows:
sj =
exp(δj)∑J
j′=1 exp(δj′)
(5.9)
which is equal to
sj =
exp(x′jβ − αpj + ξj)
1 +
∑J
I=1 exp(x
′
Iβ − αpI + ξI)
(5.10)
The analogous exercise yields the following market share for the outside good, i.e. for the
option of not borrowing in the first place.
s0 =
1
1 +
∑J
I=1 exp(x
′
Iβ − αpI + ξI)
(5.11)
The data
Before estimating the model, I need to transform my data to fit this structural form. I
therefore convert the data on the aggregate loan amount obtained in a country-year by
creditor j into shares of that loan in comparison to the total market size M . In the context
of my theory, the M indicates the amount of debt that a country could possibly obtain. In
other words, I need a measure of the ‘room to borrow’ available to a country in a particular
year. This involves a modeling assumption, as there is no direct way to infer a maximum
debt limit and calculate the subsequent room to borrow. To derive the total market size
M , I therefore follow the standard approach of expressing the overall indebtedness of a
country as a ratio between the total external debt stock and the country’s GDP. I then
identify the country with the highest ratio in my dataset, which is Liberia in 2005 with
a ratio of Liberia 2.175. It therefore appears to be the empirical reality that countries
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are theoretically able to borrow up to about 2.2 times their GDP. Using this ratio I then
calculate the corresponding maximum absolute amount of external debt that a country
theoretically could obtain. I subsequently subtract the already existing amount of debt
to arrive at an estimate of the market size M (i.e. the ‘room to borrow’) of a particular
country-year. Incidentally, this method of calculating the ‘room to borrow’ should alleviate
concerns about serial correlation. Loans obtained at time t become part of the debt stock
at time t + 1 which is subsequently subtracted from the theoretical debt limit. Thus,
the calculation of Mt+1 incorporates the amount of debt obtained in the previous year,
accounting for the effect that it might have on the capacity for renewed borrowing at time
t+ 1.
Having estimated M , I can calculate the market shares for each creditor j with
sj =
aj
M
(5.12)
where aj is the absolute loan amount obtained from creditor j in a particular country-year.
To obtain the market share of the outside option is straightforward with
s0 =
M −∑4j=1 aj
M
(5.13)
The estimation
The data therefore contains the observed shares s˜j = 1, ..., J that together with the parame-
ters identified in the model allow for the estimation of the predicted shares sˆj(α, β, ξ1, ..., ξJ), j =
1, ..., J . The idea of the model is to estimate the parameters α and β by finding those values
which ‘match’ the observed shares to the predicted shares. More formally, the model seeks
to find α and β so that sˆj(α, β) is as close to s˜j as possible for j = 1, ..., J .
This is a rather difficult challenge. Assuming that there exist instruments Z, so that
E(ξZ) = 0, the sample analog of this moment condition is
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1
J
J∑
j=1
ξjZj =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(δj −Xjβ + αpj)Zj (5.14)
which converges as J → ∞ to zero at the true values α0 and β0. However, estimating
α and β by minimizing the sample condition is not possible as we do now know δj . The
solution to this problem is the largest contribution by Berry (1994). He suggests a two-step
approach where the first step involves an inversion followed by a linear regression.
In the first step, Berry suggests to equate s˜j to sˆj(α, β, ξ1, ..., ξJ),∀j to arrive at a
system of J nonlinear equations in the J unknowns δ1, ..., δJ .
s˜1 = sˆ1(δ1(α, β, ξ1), ..., δJ(α, β, ξJ))
...
...
s˜J = sˆ1(δ1(α, β, ξ1), ..., δJ(α, β, ξJ))
(5.15)
It is possible to invert this system of equations to solve for δ1, ..., δJ as a function of the
observed s˜1, ..., s˜J . In my specific case, the predicted share is equal to Equation 5.9, namely
sˆj(δ1, ..., δj) =
exp(δj)∑J
j′=1 exp(δj′)
(5.16)
The system of equations that matches the actual to the predicted shares is therefore
s˜0 = 11+PJj=1 exp(δj)
s˜BRIC =
exp(δBRIC)
1+
PJ
j=1 exp(δj)
s˜DAC =
exp(δDAC)
1+
PJ
j=1 exp(δj)
s˜IFI =
exp(δIFI)
1+
PJ
j=1 exp(δj)
s˜PRI =
exp(δPRI)
1+
PJ
j=1 exp(δj)
(5.17)
Note that the outside good is j = 0. Since 1 =
∑J
j=0 s˜j I implicitly normalize δ0 to zero.
To obtain a system of linear equations for δj ’s I then take the logs which results in
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ln(s˜0) = 0− ln(1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(δj)
ln(s˜BRIC) = δBRIC − ln(1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(δj)
ln(s˜DAC) = δDAC − ln(1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(δj)
ln(s˜IFI) = δIFI − ln(1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(δj)
ln(s˜PRI) = δPRI − ln(1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(δj)
(5.18)
This results in
δj = ln(s˜j)− ln(s˜0), j = 1, ..., J. (5.19)
Following Berry’s second step, I can then run a so-called logistic regression of the following
form:
(lnsj − lns0) = Xjβ − αpj + ξj +  (5.20)
5.4.2 Results
After calculating the market sizes along the lines of Section 5.4.1 I subsequently transform
the data to create the dependent variable required by Equation 5.20. I then estimate the
model with the same set of control variables that were used in the previous models to
ensure comparability. The model results are presented in Table 5.4.
However, to facilitate the interpretation of the model results, I draw on one of the
major advantages of a Differentiated Product Model. As it is based on data representing
the share of loans obtained from a specific creditor in comparison to the overall amount of
loans obtained in a particular year, the results can be presented in the same manner. In
other words, the model allows for the calculation of the predicted mix of creditors that a
country, conditional on its characteristics, will obtain in a given year. For this reason, I
first recover sji for each type of coalition c across the four types of creditors j using
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Figure 5.3: Predicted loan shares by coalition based on Differentiated Product Model.
sjc =
exp(x′jcβ)
1 +
∑4
j exp(x
′
jβ)
(5.21)
However, because Berry’s model requires the market size M to be arbitrarily large, the
resulting shares by creditor-coalition combination are unreasonably small in comparison to
the option of not choosing a loan, s0. As I am primarily interested in the relative loan shares
of the four creditors, I will focus the information the model provides on these parameters.
I therefore omit s0 to facilitate the representation of differences across sjc. This is possible
because s0 does not differ significantly across coalitions. Figure 5.3 therefore displays the
share of obtained
There are clear differences in the mix of creditors used by the various coalitions. In
particular, the differences between the Corporatist coalition and both the Capital and
Consumer coalition are striking. In each country-year, government entities in countries
characterized by a Corporatist coalition acquire 44% of the total loan amount obtained in
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that year from BRICs. In contrast, government agencies in countries with either Capital
coalitions or Consumer coalitions utilize BRIC creditors to a much lesser extent, borrowing
only 11% or 16% on average and are relying more heavily on IFIs and private creditors.
With respect to the IMF, governments facing Capital and Consumer coalitions obtain more
than half of their annual borrowing amount from IFIs (55% and 56%, respectively). While
Corporatist coalitions are predicted to still obtain a sizable amount from IFIs, with 39%
of the overall borrowing amount its share is about 30% smaller than that of the other
coalitions. Lastly, Corporatist coalitions utilize private creditors to a minimal degree as
only 9% of their annual total loan amount obtained comes from this source. In contrast,
both Capital and Consumer coalition borrow almost three times as much from private
creditors. The former obtains 26% of the annually borrowed amount from private creditors,
while the figure stands at 24% for the Consumer coalition.
Figure 5.4 focuses on the differences across coalitions as compared to a hypothetical
average country that obtains the mean share of loans from the four creditors as observed
in the entire sample. The three panels then display the percent deviations from the mean
of the loan shares acquired by each of the coalitions. In comparison to an average country,
Corporatist coalitions obtain a much larger share of the total volume of loans obtained
annually from BRICs, while Capital and Consumer coalitions underutilize this creditor.
In this respect, the differences across coalitions are remarkable. In contrast, there do not
appear to be significant differences in the degree to which the three coalitions utilize DAC
creditors. While Corporatist coalitions rely heavily on BRIC creditors, the opposite is true
with respect to both IFIs and private creditors. In comparison to an average country, the
predicted loan share of IFIs and private creditors is about 11% below average, while both
Capital and Corporatist coalitions utilize these creditors to a higher degree than an average
country.
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Figure 5.4: The difference in predicted loan share for each coalition in comparison to loan
share obtained by an average country.
lnsj − lns0
BRIC loan & Corporatist coalition 0.692*
(0.354)
BRIC loan & Capital coalition -0.020
(0.470)
BRIC loan & Consumer coalition -0.135
(0.278)
DAC loan & Corporatist coalition -0.469*
(0.269)
DAC loan & Capital coalition -0.572**
(0.287)
DAC loan & Consumer coalition -0.603**
(0.267)
IFI loan & Corporatist coalition 0.946***
(0.286)
IFI loan & Capital coalition 1.006***
(0.241)
IFI loan & Consumer coalition 1.701***
(0.242)
Private loan & Corporatist coalition -0.249
(0.270)
Private loan & Capital coalition 0.497*
(0.263)
Private loan & Consumer coalition 0.909***
(0.267)
Interest rate 0.248***
(0.033)
Grace period 0.068***
(0.017)
Maturity 0.031***
(0.009)
Taiwan recognized -0.121
(0.233)
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.015
(0.009)
S-score of G5 1.412***
(0.431)
IMF Membership (dropped)
.
Principal arrears, official creditors (US$) 0.000
(0.000)
Interest arrears, official creditors (US$) -0.000**
(0.000)
Principal arrears, private creditors (US$) 0.000**
(0.000)
Interest arrears, private creditors (US$) -0.000**
(0.000)
GDP per capita -0.093
(0.094)
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) -0.039***
(0.012)
Gov’t consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 0.073***
(0.018)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.004
(0.007)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.014*
(0.008)
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 0.007***
(0.002)
Constant -24.463***
(1.038)
N 840
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.4: Model results of Differentiated Product Estimation.
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5.5 Summary of findings
The methodological advantages of the Differentiated Product Model over alternative ap-
proaches are compelling. Unlike linear panel data models, it allows estimating the demand
for all four types of creditors simultaneously, instead of in separate regressions. In contrast
to multinomial logit models, it makes full use of all available data on borrowing patterns
across countries and makes more appropriate assumptions about the data-generating pro-
cess. The model explicitly incorporates the ‘room to borrow’ that a country has available.
Unlike other estimators, the Differentiated Product Model can therefore elegantly account
for the interdependency among creditors. As derived from my theory, a maximum amount
of debt that can be obtained implies that a country’s decision for one creditor is simul-
taneously a decision against another. This further allows the model to explicitly account
for the choice by governments to not borrow at all. Lastly, the results of this estimator
allow for the calculation of the degree to which countries utilize particular creditors. In
other words, it provides a consistent and efficient way to predict the composition of the
total amount of loans obtained per year conditional on country characteristics. In contrast,
existing scholarship on sovereign borrowing has only focused on explaining the choice for
or against a single creditor while disregarding simultaneous borrowing from other sources.
The estimation method proposed here thus represents a significant methodological con-
tribution to the study of sovereign debt as it focuses on the overall composition of loans
acquired.
The substantive results obtained from the Differentiated Product Model provide strong
support for the argument that social coalitions matter when governments decide among
creditors. In particular, the mix of creditors used in a given country-year differs remark-
ably between the Corporatist coalition and both the Capital and Consumer coalition. As
predicted by my theory, Corporatist coalitions provide governments with the incentive to
favor BRIC creditors while utilizing IFIs and private creditors less heavily. Further, both
Capital and Consumer coalitions were predicted to discount BRIC loan offers and instead
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primarily use traditional creditors.
Even though the theoretical predictions made in Chapter 2 are largely confirmed, the
similarity between the composition of new loans obtained by Capital and Consumer coali-
tion is striking. While I had predicted both coalitions to favor traditional creditors over
BRICs, I had expected differences in the degree to which they would utilize DACs, IFIs,
and private creditors. The fact that the predicted composition of borrowing does not differ
significantly among Capital and Consumer coalitions might point to the relative impor-
tance of Finance in the political arena. Recall that the Corporatist coalition is the only
coalition that excludes Finance, while both the Capital coalition between Industry and
Finance as well as the Consumer coalition with Finance and Labor include this actor. Fu-
ture work might therefore focus on the difference between social coalitions that include
Finance versus coalitions that exclude Finance. While the theoretical emphasis on societal
coalitions is confirmed, it might be the case that a more parsimonious model of societal
coalitions has just as much empirical traction as the more sophisticated model presented
in Chapter 2.
Chapter 6
Qualitative Evidence on Coalition
Formation and Loan Choice
In 2011, I conducted fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia in order to complement the
statistical analysis presented in the previous chapters with qualitative evidence. Previous
sections have already drawn heavily on the qualitative insights gained in the field. For
example, in Section 3.7 I have recapitulated the statements made by interviewees of Labor,
Industry and Finance to show that their preferences across creditors differ systematically.
Similarly, my theory of informal coalition formation presented in Section 4.3 was inspired
by my conversations with politicians in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia.
So far, however, I have drawn on my fieldwork primarily in order to show how individual
actors – either the societal actors Labor, Industry and Finance, or the politicians respond-
ing to these societal actors – have exhibited consistent behavior across these countries. In
contrast, this chapter will focus on the fact that the configuration of these actors differs
across the three countries, which results in each country being characterized by different
informal coalitions. This chapter will therefore focus on the political dynamics that led to
the emergence of particular coalitions. I will argue that for the time frame under consid-
eration, 2004 - 2010, Ecuador can be characterized as a Corporatist coalition, Colombia as
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a Capital coalition, and a Consumer coalition as dominant in Peru. I then trace how the
presence of these particular coalitions influenced the respective governments’ borrowing
decisions.
6.1 Methodological approach
6.1.1 Case selection
My case selection was guided by theoretical considerations derived from my conceptual
framework. In doing so, I followed the advice of King, Keohane and Verba (1994, p.19)
to focus on the observable implications of my theory that need to be verified. I therefore
selected cases that allow for counterfactual analysis. This is essential, as it offers the
possibility to assess causality by comparing the outcome of the “treatment” to the “control”
case (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p.78). I therefore avoided selecting on the dependent
variable and did not focus on the most dramatic examples of BRIC lending (i.e. the loans to
Angola). Instead I looked for countries that exhibit variation on the independent variable
that my theory suggests to be important.
With these considerations in mind, I selected Colombia, Peru and Ecuador as my cases.
Secondary literature suggests that the relative strength of domestic interest groups differs
significantly across the three countries. Colombia is characterized by an absence of civil
society representation, particularly labor or social movements. This is partly due to the
context of ongoing war, where progressive groups were labeled to be part of terrorist groups
which prevented an institutionalized movement of labor and civil society. However, it is also
partly due to the political landscape being dominated by two strong parties representing
the interests of the domestic elite. In contrast, the popular sector in Ecuador is considered
strong in comparison to those of capital owners. Since the mid-1990s, social movements,
such as the indigenous movement, environmentalist groups, and labor groups, became a
visible presence in Ecuadorian domestic politics. They have demanded a stronger voice in
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the political process ever since. Lastly, Peru’s experience falls somewhere between these
two extremes. While labor and other groups were repressed during the Fujimori regime, the
liberal policies implemented were consistent with the existing strong interests of Finance
and Industry. Yet, Labor has not necessarily resisted this neoliberal agenda since Fujimori’s
demise.
While these countries differ markedly in the relative influence of various domestic in-
terest groups, they share characteristics in political systems, natural resource endowments,
and distance from China. These ceteris paribus conditions therefore allow me to control
for several alternative explanatory variables and focus on examining the explanatory power
of the hypothesized independent variables. In the search for additional analytical traction,
I was faced with the question concerning the number of cases I should include. To test
each of the hypotheses proposed in Section 2.5, I would have to conduct fieldwork in six
countries. However, as this was not feasible with the resources available, I chose to select
cases that varied with respect to their coalitional set up, but not the ratio between the
required winning coalition and the size of the selectorate, W/S (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2005). Holding W/S constant allows me to test the coalitional mechanism proposed in
Section 2.4. This decision comes with the cost that the qualitative evidence collected will
not be able to verify the theoretical mechanisms suggested in Section 3.2. However, I will
test this mechanism in Chapter 5 when conducting the large-n statistical analysis on a set
of countries that does vary with respect to W/S. Nevertheless, I will present qualitative
evidence collected in the field to substantiate the claim that W/S is indeed constant across
the three cases Ecuador, Peru and Colombia.
The final considerations with respect to the case selection concern the number of cred-
itors and the time span. I chose to focus on loans from China only as opposed to all BRIC
countries. As figures 1.1 and 1.3 indicate, both the lending volume and distribution is
largest with respect to the Chinese as compared to Brazil, Russia and India. I therefore
focus on Chinese loans, as it is most reasonable to assume that the Chinese might have
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potentially offered loans of substantial size to either Ecuador, Peru or Colombia. Also,
since BRIC loans of considerable size are a relatively recent phenomenon as evidence by
Table 1.2, I focused on the time period of 2005 through 2011.
I will not pretend that the guidance provided by my theory in the process of selecting
cases was ideal in every respect. Undoubtedly, the theory presented in Chapter 2 has been
informed by my experiences in the field, just as my fieldwork was shaped by my theoretical
expectations. In fact, the following quote by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) captures
the essence of this interaction:
We need not have a complete theory before collecting data nor must our the-
ory remain fixed throughout. Theory and data interact. As with the chicken
and the egg, some theory is always necessary before data collection and some
data are required before any theorizing. Textbooks on research teach us that
we use our data to test our theories. But learning from the data may be as
important a goal as evaluating prior theories and hypotheses. Such learning
involves reorganizing our data into observable implications of the new theory.
This reorganizing is very common early in many research processes, usually
after some preliminary data have been collected; after the reorganization, data
collection then continues in order to evaluate the new theory. (King, Keohane
and Verba, 1994, p.56).
6.1.2 Identifying interviewees
To test my theory with qualitative methods, I needed to interview decision-makers within
the government, representatives of societal groups such as Labor, Finance and Industry,
and spokespersons for the various creditors. In short, I needed to conduct elite interviews
as my subject group consists of public officials, members of parliament, and leaders of
business associations.
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The reasons for selecting these types of interviewees are straightforward. First, inter-
views with representatives of the domestic public sector (Prime Ministers, Finance Min-
isters, Senators, as well as officials working in Public Debt departments) would allow me
to verify whether governmental decision-makers are taking domestic interest groups into
account when deciding between creditors. Second, I also needed to interview a broad range
of actors in the domestic private sector such as domestic banks, business associations, or
labor and civil society representatives. These conversations would allow me to substantiate
the theoretical expectation regarding the distributional consequences: I needed to confirm
whether each type of actor – Finance, Industry or Labor – indeed expected to benefit
from a particular type of loan. Lastly, besides the relevant domestic actors, I needed to
interview the various creditors, particularly officials of multilateral institutions and west-
ern development agencies as well as Chinese officials, both from the public sector (Chinese
Development Bank, Chinese embassies) and the ‘private’ sector (Chinese banks, Chinese
mining companies). Interviews with these actors would allow me to verify if the different
creditors were indeed in competition, and if domestic considerations of recipient countries
are a genuinely overlooked determinant of lending patterns.
6.1.3 Recruitment process
Gaining access to elites presents a particular challenge. Traditionally, obtaining interviews
with non-elites is understood as requiring sympathetic understanding towards the subject.
For instance, Taylor and Bogdan (1998) suggest that interviewers should be attentive to
their ‘superior’ position in society relative to that of the typical subject, and therefore
should pay attention to not be perceived as patronizing. In contrast, elite interviews
present a different challenge as “the issue is rather a matter of proving one’s professional
credentials and standing. Researchers must demonstrate they are worthy of the time and
support of busy and often powerful individuals” (Welch et al., 2002, p.612). In other words,
researchers only “get in and get useful data from them if [the researchers] know others that
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[elites] know and respect.” (Ostrander, 1993, p.12)
In order to be perceived as a credible interviewer, I followed the advice of Peabody
et al. (1990) and Richards (1996) and obtained institutional affiliations in each country. For
example, I was affiliated with the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia. In Peru
I worked with the Centro de Investigacin´ at the Universidad del Pac´ıfico in Lima, and in
Ecuador with the Universidad de San Francisco in Quito. These affiliations were invaluable
as they provided me with initial contacts to public and private actors. In addition, several
former high-level officials were on staff at these institutions, providing a good starting point
for subsequent ‘snowballing’ that allowed me to expand the set of interviewees beyond
my initial connections. Lastly, I also cold-contacted potential interviewees whose contact
information I had obtained from United Nations and IMF conference attendance lists or the
respective institutions websites. Because some individuals refused requests for interviews,
it was impossible to obtain a random sample – a common challenge for elite interviews
given the small population from which to draw (Richards, 1996)1 . This was exacerbated
by the fact that much of the recruitment was based on personal connections that I made
while in the field. In the words of [p. 2136]McDowell (1998) “it is impossible to know
whether some people refused to speak to me because of antipathy or competition, perhaps,
between them and my sponsors.”
However, contrary to the assessment regarding the prospects of gaining access to elites
by Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p. 673), I had little difficulty obtaining interviews.
Instead, my experience confirms the reports by (Ostrander, 1993) and (Delaney, 2007)
that the difficulties of gaining access to elites have been exaggerated. A list of all interview
partners is available in the Appendix A.1.
1 It is even more crucial, therefore, that I test the generalizability of my qualitative findings using
large–n statistical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5
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6.1.4 Interview setting
The vast majority of interviews were conducted face–to–face at the workplace of the in-
terviewee, while a handful of interviews were done over the phone. Meeting elites at their
office introduces a particular sensitivity with respect to the power dynamics between in-
terviewee and interviewer. In non-elite settings, the interviewer is assumed to be the one
with higher status (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998, p.111). However, the issue may be different
when interviewing elites. In addition, as elites are typically accustomed to public speaking,
whether on behalf of their organizations or themselves, it is common that elite intervie-
wees dominate the interview. They are “used to addressing a wide range of audiences
and developing elaborate and persuasive arguments; they are used to taking command and
being deferred to; and they are confident that their opinions are deserving of attention
and respect” (Welch et al., 2002, p.612). Because of this imbalance, scholars suggest that
researchers might risk “overestimating the importance of what elites have to say, assuming,
for example, that they necessarily know more and better what is going on in an organi-
zation” (Ostrander, 1993, p.19). Researchers may therefore attribute causality to elites
where none in fact existed (Welch et al., 2002).
This is a serious issue of which I was aware while in the field. But what to do about
it? I opted for the following approach: If I would have conceptualized the relationship
between the elite-subject running the interview and myself as competitive I would have
been forced to ‘fight back’ in order to re-seize control. However, rather than understanding
the process of interviewing as an aggressive battle for control, I treated this experience as
an opportunity for learning itself. This approach is best captured by Delaney:
I accept the fact that the interviewee will act as a spokesperson, may treat
me as status subordinate, and may try to control the interview. Given these
tendencies, how can I best gain what I need from the interview? [ ...] I have no
problem assuming the role of someone who needs to learn something (after all,
that is the essence of interviewing). In fact, being a status subordinate’ can be
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turned to an advantage in that it allows you to say in a very non-threatening
way, ‘I don’t really understand that, can you explain ...’ Delaney (2007, p.215)
.
In addition, the research design mediated this threat insofar as I was pressed to talk to
a variety of elites in different positions – Finance, Industry, Labor, domestic government
and foreign creditors. This multitude of sources allowed me to triangulate information ob-
tained from a single elite-subject, as recommended by Berry (2002). In addition, observing
official arguments made by the subjects allowed me to gain insights into the process of
preference aggregation that my theory suggests. While some scholars have cautioned that
the responses by elites might leave researcher disappointed, as subjects might assume the
role of a ‘spokesperson’ (Ostrander, 1993) for their organization or institution, this would
only be a problem if I were interested in the feelings and interpretations of the interviewee.
However, my theory suggests that the leaders of societal interest groups should act on be-
half of their constituencies, so the ‘spokesperson’ concern did not echo with my experiences
in the field. In fact, I was surprised by the frankness of many responses. This corresponds
to Sinclair and Brady (1987), who observed that the level of frankness was directly related
to the interviewee’s seniority: The higher in the hierarchy, the more candid the statements.
As you will see below, I had similar experiences.
6.1.5 Interview consent
In contrast to the United States, the notion of danger and prevention of human subject
research has developed differently in South America. In the countries included in this case
study, the equivalents to the Internal Review Board (IRB) of the University of Minnesota
only deal with medical research. Therefore, the requirements of IRB (such as a consent
forms) are rather unfamiliar research practices for both researchers and research subjects
in South American settings. In addition, written consent poses cultural problems as it is
regarded as a breach of trust between the interviewer and interviewee. Therefore, instead
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of written consent forms, I used an oral explanation of the consent process. First, I gave
interviewees my contact information as well as general information of my research project.
Then I asked four items before starting the interview: (1) whether their participation was
voluntary, (2) whether they gave their verbal consent, (3) whether they wanted to remain
anonymous, and (4) whether they allowed me to use a voice recorder. Nevertheless, I had
prepared consent forms in both English and Spanish in case an interviewee would want
a hardcopy of my verbal explanations, or preferred written consent over verbal consent.
These consent forms are available in Appendix A.3.
6.1.6 Interview method
I used a semi-structured, open-ended interview method. While structured interviews ask
the list of questions in exactly the same order with most questions only allowing a closed
response, semi-structured interviews give the subject the opportunity to expand on ques-
tions in whichever way they see fit, while keeping the set of questions consistent across
interviewees (Huit and Peabody, 1969, p.28). While this approach compromises the direct
comparability of interviews as the order of questions may differ, I agree with Aberbach
and Rockman (2002) that the advantages of the conversational depth of the responses
outweigh the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering. After all, an open-ended approach
gives interviewees the opportunity to organize their answers within their own frameworks
and thus increases response validity. In addition, as eluded to above, elites are typically
confident speakers that are accustomed to dominating discourse. As such, they “do not
like being put in the straight-jacket of closed-ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman,
2002, p.674).
The process by which I arrived at the set of questions was also shaped by the partic-
ularities of elite interviews. Since the number of questions that can be asked is generally
limited considering the amount of time available with elites, I generally proceeded by ask-
ing the most important questions first. In addition, I started with the factual questions in
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order to move to the more judgmental-oriented queries later on. I also ran pilot interviews
with Colombian academics to test the time it took to administer the interview, and to
experiment with different question wording and ordering (see Peabody et al., 1990). By
the end of this process I arrived at three sets of interview questions for each subject type I
intended to interview: Government officials of the recipient country, representatives of the
domestic interest groups (i.e. Finance, Industry, and Labor), and representatives of exter-
nal creditors. The sets of questions that guided my interviews are available in Appendix
A.2.
In terms of formalities, I asked each interviewee at the beginning of our conversation if
he or she wanted to conduct the interview in English or Spanish. Most of the time, English
was preferred as it is the professional language of elites. Before asking the first substantive
questions, I stressed that the interview was for academic purposes only to alleviate any
trust issues. In addition, I shared my background as a student, a German citizen, who was
educated in the UK, studying in the US, and a researcher interviewing in Latin America
about China, which revealed that I did not have any business interests, but was genuinely
interested in the topic as an academic persuit.
In sum, therefore, the methodological approach to testing my theory with qualitative
methods is characterized by a case selection guided by the independent variables proposed
in the theoretical framework. In addition, careful attention was given to the particularities
of elite interviews with respect to the process of identifying, recruiting and interviewing
elite-subjects.
6.2 Ecuador - a Corporatist coalition
6.2.1 Correa exploiting existing sentiments
Much anecdotal evidence exists indicating that politicians conduct polls to maximize the
appeal of their message to voters. During my fieldwork, I encountered that this observation
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holds for politicians in developing countries as well. In the context of Ecuador, for example,
one member of the constitutional assembly told me that Correa’s staff did several surveys
prior to the start of his first campaign in 2005 to learn more about the concerns of different
segments in society (Paredes, 2011).
The existing sentiments dominating societal discourse were characterized by a strong
antipathy to IMF loans. A former finance minster told me that following the financial
crisis in 1999 Labor and Industry were under the impression that IMF policies undermined
the productive capacity of Ecuador. The conditions of the IMF program were thought of
as contributing to developments that left 3 million businesses bankrupt, and the emigra-
tion of 20% of the productive population (Salgado, 2011). The interviewee was therefore
not surprised that political movements demanding employment and investment instead of
austerity measures sprung up against IMF policies. The preferences of Labor and Indus-
try were openly revealed: Labor was less concerned with inflation, but more interested in
increasing the levels of domestic investment to create employment opportunities. Indus-
try was tired of austerity measures that undermined efforts to increase public investment.
Interestingly, virtually all observers concurred that these sentiments were present in the
population prior to Correa’s campaign, as evidenced by interviews with a Central Banker
(Anonymous, 2011b), a former Finance Minister (Salgado, 2011), a director of a conser-
vative think tank (Albornoz, 2011), and an academic (Ja´come Estrella, 2011). In fact,
observers note that Correa capitalized on these sentiments by aligning his campaign with
the preferences of Labor and Industry.
This sentiment against multilateral creditors was complemented by aversion to private
debt. In Ecuador’s recent past, various debt rollovers were managed so poorly that ob-
servers were certain of corruption (Rast, 2011). This impression was heightened when
videotapes were leaked in February 2007 showing Ecuador’s Minister of the Treasury Ri-
cardo Patin˜o and his advisor, He´ctor E´gu¨ez, meeting with two representatives (Carlos
Abadi and Alan Dayan) of Abadi & Company, an American firm that renegotiates poor
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countries’ foreign bonds. The meeting was arranged by the former Ecuadorian minister of
the Treasury, Armando Rodas, who was also present. During the meeting the business-
men appeared to suggest that the government should announce their refusal to pay $135
million in interest on private bonds. The resulting panic would allow insurance companies
to increase their profit as the value of their contracts with debt holders would multiply.
While it was claimed that subsequent stock market transactions would save Ecuador about
$150 million, public outrage over the leaked videos was immense. Correa again exploited
this opportunity for immediate political gain with respect to securing the favors of La-
bor and Industry. An interviewee with intimate knowledge of this process told me that
Armando Rodas and Ricardo Patin˜o met in a talk show after the incident. During a com-
mercial break, Patin˜o supposedly told Rodas that “I know that you are a good guy, but
this is politics” (Rodas, 2011), adding to the notion that Correa’s government behaved
opportunistically to maximize votes.
I also found the decision regarding which creditor to use was controlled by politicians,
not bureaucrats: “Why Ecuador has borrowed from China instead of the IMF just has
political reasons” (Anonymous, 2011b). While the existing literature on economic devel-
opment features prominent examples of exceptionally powerful bureaucracies – see South
Korea (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995) – my experience in the field suggested
otherwise. Loan officers typically were not isolated from government interests. Instead I
found them to directly implement orders of elected officials. For example, when asking
Ecuadorian loan officers about the reasons for borrowing from the Chinese, I was told “It
is a political decision. I am just following orders.” Similarly, the governments of countries
such as Ecuador and Angola have created specific positions within their bureaucracy whose
appointees are responsible for negotiating loan agreements with the Chinese. Lastly, the
lending procedures described in Section 3.3 indicate many opportunities at which politi-
cians can interject their preferences in this process. I therefore argue that politicians, not
bureaucrats, determine borrowing decisions.
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In sum, politicians in Ecuador perceived the interests of Industry and Labor to be
congruent, while Finance was left out. The political decision to focus on loans from China
as opposed to the IMF or private creditors was a logical conclusion, if politicians wanted
to increase their appeal to Industry and Labor.
6.2.2 Corporatist state-society structure and social movements
While the section above presents evidence that politicians perceived an informal coalition
between Labor and Industry, why did decision-makers listen to the demands by the coalition
as opposed to the single actor, Finance? I suggest that if the political and institutional
characteristics are such that only a small winning coalition is necessary in relation to the
selectorate, the likelihood of minimizing the costs of securing that support by catering to
the interests of the single actor increases. However, if the country’s characteristics require
politicians to obtain a comparatively large part of the selectorate to secure a sufficient
winning coalition, the likelihood that they will cater to the informal coalition increases.
I argue that the Ecuadorian political economy is characterized by a large number of
veto points, and consequently requires politicians to obtain a relatively large winning coali-
tion to attain office or maintain incumbency. In this regard, several interviewees referred
to the corporatist structure of the political arena. For instance, one interviewee stated
that Ecuador is characterized by a decentralized political arena, in contrast to Peru and
Colombia who have fairly centralized political systems (Perez, 2011). It was suggested
that the reason for this lies in the presence of a comparatively strong middle class that
has its origins in the oil boom of the 1970s (Pachano, 2011, see also Mele´ndez (2007);
Pachano (2009); Paramio and Hopenhayn (2010)) as well as the policies of the military
government at the time (Acosta, 2011). This middle class demanded political representa-
tion, which resulted in the founding of various new political actors, such as the Democratic
Left [Izquierda Democra´tica] or the Democratic People’s Movement [Movimiento Popular
Democra´tico]. However, over time there was no consolidation of the various actors, which
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gave rise to the corporatist structure of the political economy. Thus, a wide range of insti-
tutionalized associations, such as chambers of commerce and small unions, and a variety of
non-institutionalized movements are present. This variety of organizations are thought of
as keeping each other in check to a larger degree than in Peru or Colombia, where power
is distributed more asymmetrically (Pachano, 2011, see also Mejia-Acosta (2004); Acosta
(2009))2
In particular, the civil society in Ecuador was able to insert itself into this structure and
hence has a comparatively large voice in the political arena (Espinoza, 2011). This results
from the fact that the political parties in Ecuador are dissolving as they are currently viewed
as corrupt and not representative. In particular, the financial crisis in 1999 discredited the
traditional parties (Paredes, 2011) and revealed them to be instruments of the oligarchy
(Acosta, 2011), particularly the banks (Rast, 2011).
Social movements therefore appeared as a viable alternative (Espinoza, 2011). For one,
the financial crisis was an opportunity for different social groups to “get their act together”
(Salgado, 2011). They were therefore the only political actors openly protesting in the
streets. While many people might not have joined them, they were sympathetic to the
fact that “someone was doing something” (Paredes, 2011). Consequently, the electorate
began to vote for people and movements rather than parties. The first example of this
might be the election of Lucio Gutie´rrez in 2003, who was the candidate of the January 21
Patriotic Society Party [Partido Sociedad Patrio´tica 21 de Enero], named for the date of
the protest in 2000. He proposed an alliance with the indigenous Pachakutik Plurinational
Unity Movement [Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo Pa´ıs]. He was
elected on a platform against Finance, promising the reversal of neo-liberal reforms and
fighting corruption. However, it appears that Gutie´rrez’ reasons for catering to the interests
2 The large number of veto points resulting from the corporatist structure has been used to explain
economic outcomes other than the borrowing strategy. For example, Pachano (2007) argues that the
implementation of neo-liberal reforms failed because of the multitude of veto points.
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of Labor and Industry were opportunistic, as he broke his alliance and continued the neo-
liberal reforms of his predecessor, even increasing the amount of bilateral debt obtained
from the United States. His government therefore lost legitimacy quickly (Paredes, 2011;
Reyes, 2011). The election of Rafael Correa and his Proud and Sovereign Fatherland
Alliance [Alianza PAISPatria Altiva y Soberana] can be seen as a natural progression of
these developments. It further contributed to the degeneration of established parties that
cater to specific constituencies and supported the growth of broader social movements that
took their place. Several interviewees consequently concluded that Correa is the result,
rather than the cause, of this development (Pachano, 2011; Detsch, 2011).
In sum, there is much evidence that the current institutional environment requires
Ecuadorian politicians to secure the support of a relatively large part of the selectorate in
order to obtain a winning coalition. Because of the corporatist structure, there is “more
space for a multitude of actors to participate in the political process” (Piedra Vivar, 2011).
In addition, the degeneration of institutionalized parties and rise of broader movements
meant that “[Ecuadorian] governments were more receptive to popular demands” (Es-
pinoza, 2011). In a context characterized by a large number of veto points as well as a
vast number of actors, it is no surprise that Correa opted for implementing policies that
satisfy the preferences of two actors simultaneously. He chose to cater to the interests of
the coalition between Industry and Labor, to the detriment of the single actor Finance,
thereby maximizing the appeal of his policies to a wide range of actors.
6.2.3 Favoring Labor and Industry to the detriment of Finance
Both the process of preference aggregation and the required size of the winning coalition
give Ecuadorian politicians the incentive to cater to the interests of Industry and Labor.
My interviews with government officials confirmed this hypothesis. Specifically, Ecuadorian
politicians stated that they favor Chinese loans. The reasoning behind these statements
echoed the preferences that representatives of Industry revealed in interviews (see Section
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3.7.2. For example, a high-ranking executive of the National Institute of Procurement [In-
stituto Nacional de Contratacion Pblica (INCOP)] stated that Chinese loans were chosen
because Ecuadorian companies receive subcontracting opportunities that would otherwise
not have been available. Similarly, a top-level official of the National Secretariat for Plan-
ning and Development [Secretar´ıa Nacional de Planificacio´n y Desarrollo (SENPLADES)]
also did not expect negative distributional consequences from Chinese loans, even if they
are tied, reiterating statements by Industry representatives (Villalbo Andrade, 2011).
Politicians further echoed the sentiments expressed by Labor representatives during
my interviews. For example, one government official in the Public Debt department of the
Finance Ministry noted that:
the government needed to have the political force to implement all the consti-
tutional and legal changes that we were elected to do. However, this was not
possible with the IMF being around, as it demanded specific changes to laws
whenever the Fund was asked to provide a loan. Thus, the political costs were
greater than the economic benefits. (Abarca Runruil, 2011)
A different interviewee summarized the government’s position with respect to IMF loans as
“Our economic model was compromised by these conditions. There are huge social costs”
(Anonymous, 2011c). Considering this discourse, what type of policies did politicians
implement?
My theory predicts that a government catering to a coalition between Labor and In-
dustry will exhibit a high probability of borrowing from BRIC creditors while tending to
avoid loans from traditional lenders. Ecuador’s aggregate borrowing patterns – summa-
rized in Figure 6.1 – confirm these theoretical expectations. BRIC loans have increased
significantly, while Ecuador’s exposure to traditional creditors has diminished at the same
rate. In addition, interviews with government officials allowed me to gain further details on
the loans that Ecuador signed with BRIC creditors (Abarca Runruil, 2011; Minoli, 2011;
Villalbo Andrade, 2011; Anonymous, 2011b; Soria, 2011).
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Figure 6.1: Ecuador’s borrowing trends with respect to the four types of creditors.
As of December 2011, Ecuador has obtained a total of six loans from China and one
from Russia. In 2010, Ecuador obtained a $1.682 billion loan from the China EXIM bank
to finance 85% of the the Coco Codo Sinclair project, a remarkably large hydropower
dam that will product 1,500 MW of electricity. This tied loan resulted in the project
being awarded to the Chinese company Sinohydro who began construction shortly after
the agreement was signed. Ecuador obtained a second tied loan from the China EXIM
bank a year later, in 2011. This time, the Chinese loan, amounting to $0.6 billion, is
used to fund the construction of the Sopladora Electrical project that is expected to yield
487.8 MW. The contract was awarded to the Chinese consortium China Gezhouba Group-
Fopeca. In addition to Chinese loans tied to specific infrastructure projects, Ecuador has
also obtained a tied loan from the Russian EXIM bank. The loan – sources estimate it at
$123 million, but I was unable to confirm this number – is used to finance the expansion
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of the Toachi Pilaton hydropower project that will yield 252 MW. It is to be constructed
by the Ecuadorian company Constructora de los Andes, COANDES C´ıa. Ltda, while the
Chinese firm Harbin Electric Machinery Co. Ltd. will supply the electrical turbines.
The government has also obtained three loans from the Chinese Development Bank
(CDB). In 2010, $1.0 billion was obtained by the government, of which $200 million is
supposedly tied to a specific project, even though I was unable to find further details on
this loan. The remainder is intended to finance various projects in the Plan Nacional de
Inversion, but at the discretion of the Ecuadorian government. A year later, Ecuador again
borrowed from the Chinese Development Bank. This time it obtained a $1.4 billion untied
loan that is denominated in US dollars. In addition, it also obtained $0.6 billion, this time
denominated in Remnibi and tied to a specific project. Again, it was not possible to obtain
further information about the project to be financed.
In addition to these explicit loans, Ecuador has obtained implicit loans. As government
representatives do not count these transactions as loans, they are not recorded as such in
the budget. However, these transactions involve so-called ‘advance sales of oil,’ through
which Ecuador obtained $1 billion in 2009 and again $1 billion in 2011. These deals involve
the prepayment of future oil exports to China, at a given price today.
The terms of Chinese loans are rather expensive in comparison to funds available from
multilateral organizations, but are comparable to the terms offered by the EXIM banks
of western governments such as the US EXIM bank or the German Hermes Bank. The
average terms of the Chinese loan commitments of 2010 are characterized by a grace period
of 4.5 years with a maturity of just over 11 years while the average interest rate is 6.56%.
This results in an average grant element of 14.66%.
As a result of these borrowing decisions, Finance is angry while Labor and Industry are
content. One interviewee, for example, told me that “The rich are not happy [...]. They
[would] rather have relations with the US or Europe” (Villalbo Andrade, 2011). Similarly, a
Peruvian businessman had just returned from a visit to Ecuador where he had spoken with
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his partners, most of whom are in the financial sector, and all of whom were ‘depressed’
because “Correra is somewhat of a nut” (Kuczynski, 2011). Private Ecuadorian bankers
lamented that the government is listening to the interests of social movements rather than
Finance. After all, “the Jubileo 2000 group are crazy people. The CAIC was a circus
rather than an investigation” (Anonymous, 2011c). Yet, the approval rating of Correra is
consistently between 60% – 70%. One observer noted that “this is because people think
that there is finally someone who takes their problems seriously” (Detsch, 2011).
In addition to borrowing decisions reflecting the joint interests of Labor and Industry,
the Ecuadorian government also implemented policies in other areas that cater to the
interests of this coalition. For example, all investment protection treaties that Ecuador had
signed before 2008 were renounced that year and the order given that such treaties are not
to be signed again in the future. The reason was that these treaties “overprotected foreign
investment” by granting foreign firms more rights than domestic companies. For example,
the arbitration clauses of these treaties allowed foreign companies to sue Ecuadorian public
and private actors in foreign courts, while domestic firms did not have this possibility
(Piedra Vivar, 2011).
Similarly, Ecuador has not signed the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
within the World Trade Organization (WTO). This agreement would give foreign compa-
nies the same rights domestic firms enjoy with respect to procurement processes. However,
a government official confirmed that Ecuador would like to preserve the option to imple-
ment industrial policies in order to nurture domestic companies. After all, “When big
international firms come Ecuador does not stand a chance” (Gonzalez, 2011). A govern-
ment official further told me that they follow academic research on the topic of industrial
policy, such as Ha–Joon Chang’s book Kicking Away the Ladder (Chang, 2002). Similarly,
his department produced a Spanish translation of a paper entitled “Public Procurement
as an industrial policy tool – An option for developing countries?” (Kattel and Lember,
2010).
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In sum, the policy decisions by the Ecuadorian government can be explained with a
straightforward political calculus. Correa faced an environment where the interests of La-
bor and Industry are congruent. In addition, because of the corporatist structure of the
political arena, he required a relatively large number of supporters to create a winning
coalition. His decision to implement policies that satisfy the demands by two actors si-
multaneously maximizes his political gain. The decision to borrow from BRIC countries
instead of traditional lenders therefore represents a coherent political strategy.
6.3 Colombia - a Capital coalition
6.3.1 The Dutch Disease and export worries
On August 16th, 2011, the front-page story of Colombia’s largest daily newspaper ‘El
Tiempo’ was concerned with President Santos’ proposal to contain the negative effects of
the ‘enfermedad Holandesa,’ the so-called Dutch Disease. This ‘disease’ can befall countries
that discover new reservoirs of natural resources, just as Colombia had at the time. Its
symptoms include rising inflation as well as a loss in competitiveness of the export sector.
According to my theory, this would imply that the conditions of the Colombian economy
would indicate that the interests of Finance and Industry would be congruent. In fact,
when talking with Colombian politicians, the keywords ‘export competitiveness’, ‘infla-
tion’, and ‘domestic finance’ were among the most frequently used terms. For example, an
interview with a Colombian senator quickly zoned in on this issue, discussing the different
approaches that have been suggested with respect to containing the negative macroeco-
nomic effects. For his part, he proposes to capture these windfalls in order to strengthen
the domestic industrial sector by setting up a fund that would finance public investments
(Laserna, 2011). Other observers note that much of Colombia’s industrial sector is export
oriented (Espinoza, 2011). Because of this characteristic, several interviewees mentioned
that they are concerned about the effects of the Dutch Disease on domestic industry. In
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the words of a former Deputy Minister for Business Development, “The Dutch Disease
could hurt domestic industry” (Duarte, 2011). While “we will become very rich in terms
of exporting raw materials” (Junguito, 2011), the macroeconomic effects of the Dutch
Disease include the contraction of the domestic tradable sector such as manufacturing.
Analysts consequently expect that Industry is more concerned with the political discourse
on the Dutch Disease than the possibility of obtaining Chinese loans (Reina, 2011). A
former deputy minister of the National Planning Department [Departamento Nacional de
Planeacio´n (DNP)], predicted that the effected businesses are busy lobbying government
to do something about it (Escobar Arango, 2011). A representative of Colombia’s National
Business Association [Asociacio´n Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI)] confirms
that its members have urged ANDI to take action. After all, “When ANDI calls, people
listen” (Salamanca, 2011)
The desire to assist Industry and Finance is also visible in the way politicians talk
about the National Development Plan [Plan Nacional de Desarrollo]. This plan includes
all investment projects the government intends to initiate over the course of its term. A
former representative of the National Planning Department suggests that it is the primary
instrument with which politicians organize their electoral support (Escobar Arango, 2011).
Others point to this process as a source of campaign financing from businesses in their
constituencies (Rettberg, 2011). As the timing of the political business cycle is conducive,
electoral support can be secured by promising investment projects that are to be con-
structed by Industry and financed by Finance. For example, President Santos was elected
on August 7, 2010, and the constitution mandated that the National Development Plan
had to be approved by May 2011. However, the regional elections were scheduled for Octo-
ber 2011. As this sequence of events is the same for every incoming administration, there
is always an incentive for politicians to secure their electoral support in regional elections
via the projects that are negotiated just prior to these elections. An interviewee provided
me with the example of coal mines in the mountains just north of Colombia’s capital city,
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Bogota. In order to exploit these resources, a new road and better transport options on
the nearby river were needed. Naturally, Industry showed much interest in this project and
therefore lobbied in Congress to have it included in the list of projects of the Development
Plan (Escobar Arango, 2011). In addition, analysts point out that businesses have a strong
voice in the process of creating the National Development Plan. As Congress only votes on
the entirety of the plan, most of the political action occurs in the subcommittees where the
constitution requires that all relevant stakeholders must be included in the consultations.
However, observers note that both Industry and Finance are overrepresented in these com-
mittees, while organizations associated with Labor (i.e. indigenous or societal groups) are
underrepresented (Rettberg, 2011).
The Plan has been described as a “monster” that results from an evolutionary process
where in the end “something appears” (Laserna, 2011). Initially, there are hundreds of
projects suggested, and the Planning Department then proceeds to filter projects. However,
once the first draft comes back to Congress, a Congressman tells me that “we pump in as
many demands as we can and then hope for a good batting average. [...] After all, I am
a conservative, and I am running a populist campaign against the two foreign investors in
my region” (Laserna, 2011). Because of this process, “anything can happen. [...] Congress
is a black box – a very threatening black box” (Reina, 2011). However, when it comes to
the actual implementation, observers note that primarily the pet-projects of the politicians
get implemented, while the projects suggested by the technocrats in the Planning Ministry
are likely to fall off the table (Reina, 2011).
In sum, it appears that the characteristics of the Colombian economy provided politi-
cians with the incentive to think of Industry and Finance as an informal coalition. Faced
with the dangers of the Dutch Disease, their interests are aligned. In addition, the interests
of this coalition are overrepresented in comparison to those of the single actor, Labor. It is
therefore no surprise that the politicians I talked with conceptualized Finance and Industry
as an informal coalition opposed to the single actor Labor.
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6.3.2 Politics managed by elites for elites
How do politicians choose between implementing policies in the interest of the coalition or
those of the single actor? I argue that the political economy of Colombia gives politicians
an incentive to cater to the coalition between Industry and Finance, rather than the single
actor Labor.
Colombian politics appears to be managed by elites. Interviewees describe the political
system to be dominated by the “oligarchy” that resulted in a relatively exclusive political
system, as a ‘pact’ between the Liberals and Conservatives essentially consolidated their
power (Pachano, 2011; Espinoza, 2011). Nevertheless, there is some change: ever since the
new constitution was implemented in 1991, small and regional parties have been springing
up. However, these were either incorporated by existing parties (Pachano, 2011, also, see
Leongo´mez (2002)), or vanished again as they were based on the aspirations of office-seeking
politicians that did not stand a chance against the established parties (Nupia, 2011). Thus,
unlike in Ecuador, the Colombian party system is not unraveling3 .
Part of the reason for this phenomenon is that parties have strong ties to some parts of
society – namely Industry and Finance – while Labor is not strongly represented (Espinoza,
2011). Several interviewees mentioned that business groups are the primary social forces in
Colombia (Junguito, 2011; Reyes, 2011). In particular, business associations representing
export industries have developed a strong capacity to lobby on behalf of their constituency
(Rettberg, 2011). Also, one academic told me that “Colombians are not sitting there and
waiting for foreigners to come to Colombia. [...] There exists already a stock of domestic
entrepreneurs who are capable of investing and defending their interests” (Thiell, 2011).
In addition to strong business groups, broad popular movements that might represent
Labor have not been able to develop. In the context of the Colombian internal war, there
was no political space for social groups. One interviewee told me that “if you were a bit
3 Despite the fact that both of the most recent presidents, Uribe and Santos, won their presidencies
officially on independent tickets, informally they have strong ties to existing parties.
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left, then you were immediately thought of being part of the FARC4 ” (Salgado, 2011). In
contrast to Ecuador, the war in Colombia precluded any opportunity for social movements
to get a foothold in the political system, further contributing to the consolidation of parties
representing Finance and Industry (Acosta, 2011; Reyes, 2011; Piedra Vivar, 2011).
Even though Colombian politics appears to be managed by elites, the likelihood of
politicians catering to the single actor is not higher than in Ecuador. The reason is simple:
While the required size of the winning coalition is smaller, so is the selectorate. Thus, the
exclusion of Labor from the political area weighs less heavily as the elite themselves are
diverse. Several interviewees stated that Colombian elites are dispersed geographically, as
there are several industrial hubs (see Cali, Bogota, Medellin, etc) unlike in Peru where all
political and economic life is concentrated in Lima (Pachano, 2011; Alvarez, 2011; Paramio
and Hopenhayn, 2010). In addition, elites differ in terms of their roles in the economy as
there are both strong banking interests as well as business interests. In other words, both
Industry and Finance control veto points.
In sum, because a smaller minimum winning coalition coincides with a smaller selec-
torate in addition to a high level of heterogeneity within the elites, Colombian politicians
have the incentive to cater to the interests of both Finance and Industry.
6.3.3 Politicians partial towards Finance and Industry and neglecting
Labor
As a result of these domestic considerations, politicians need to consider the interests of
Industry and Finance in international negotiations. For example, Peruvian officials have
noted that the Colombian private sector has quite some influence over economic foreign
policy (Anonymous, 2011g). For instance, a Peruvian official involved in negotiations in
the context of the Free Trade Area with the United States recalled that Peru wanted to
4 FARC stands for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia. A MarxistLeninist revolutionary guerrilla organization, among the most prominent armed
groups involved in the war.
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negotiate en bloc with the Colombians. However, this proved to be difficult, because Peru
was much more willing to liberalize economically than Colombia. The interviewee stated
that “the Colombians were quite complicated. They can be difficult. Why? Because
Colombia has a strong private sector that pressures the government to be more cautious”
(Illescas, 2011).
Similar caution is visible with respect to sovereign loans. Recall that Section 2.3 char-
acterizes BRIC loans as so-called tied loans. For example, the Chinese typically require
debtors to use the loan to obtain services or materials from Chinese companies. While these
arrangements do not deter Ecuadorian officials from BRIC loans as there are no Ecuado-
rian companies capable of constructing the projects, the situation is different in Colombia
where the industrial sector is more developed. Thus, tied loans would mean crowding out
Colombian companies in favor of Chinese ones. Another Colombian observer noted, “If
the Chinese come to Colombia, then they must have outmuscled somebody else” (Steiner,
2011), while a Colombian observer added that “Peru has been much more neoliberal than
Colombia. They opened up totally and believed in the internationalization of the economy.
Colombia is one step behind. We believe in Free Trade, but not that much” (Reina, 2011).
Consequently, Colombian politicians are generally against tied loans. For example, a
former official of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations told me that “while the
government wants to establish more ties to China, it is also somewhat hesitant. We see
a big monster – and we don’t know what they want” (Garcia, 2011). Official borrowing
guidelines therefore disadvantage BRIC loan proposals. While there is no explicit law that
prohibits these type of loans, Colombian law does mandate that all projects financed with
external resources must go through a sequence of bidding processes. The government will
first attempt to secure funding through a bidding process, soliciting loan offers. Once
the funding is obtained, a separate bidding process awards the contract for the project
construction. Naturally, this puts Chinese loan offers at a disadvantage, as proposals that
require the funds be used for a particular construction company are not permitted.
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In addition to the difficulties of participating in the first bidding process on the financial
aspect of projects, several interviewees stated that the Chinese are also disadvantaged with
respect to the second bidding process concerning the project construction. They are caught
in a dilemma: In order to win a contract, a foreign company needs a Colombian partner
(Salamanca, 2011; Chaco´n Pen˜a, 2011b; Guarin, 2011). However, as evidenced by Section
3.7.1, it is difficult for Chinese companies to win that Colombian partner. This makes
it difficult to establish a track record in the Colombian economy, which incidentally is
another requirement for eligibility to bid on public tenders (Perry, 2011). In the words of a
former Colombian ambassador to China, “companies are required to show that they have
some experience in making business in Colombia as an indication that you are able to do
business successfully. However, this is a Catch 22: You only get experience by having won
a tender, which you can’t win without experience. It is like a glass wall - the Chinese can
see the light at the other side, but they can’t get there. They just bang their heads at the
glass wall. It is a Dead-Flies-Syndrome” (Gaviria ’Angel, 2011).
By assuming a seemingly neutral role as an arbiter with an exclusive focus on organizing
a bidding process, the government can effectively exclude Chinese loans and companies in
favor of domestic Finance and Industry. One official in the Colombian Foreign Ministry
therefore stated that:
[The Chinese] always have the government-to-government process in mind, but
it works differently there. As essentially all [Chinese] enterprises are state
owned, for them, if a government official says that I want you to undertake
this project, then it is understood that it is a specific project given to a certain
country or a certain company. However, we always have to go through a bid-
ding process. Thus, they have to enter and compete [with other companies in
the bidding process]. This process is open to any investor, whether domestic
or foreign. But we cannot direct a bidding process to a specific country - we
cannot discriminate among investors. [...] It has been quite difficult with [the
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Chinese], as it is another way of doing business. It is understandable that they
say ’I am giving you a very cheap financing option, thus I have to be the one
to implement it,’ but we cannot do it as it would imply to direct the bidding
process (Benetti, 2011).
In sum, this leads to the situation where public officials can credibly claim that “If
the Chinese want to come and if they meet the legal requirements set out then they are
more than welcomed” (R´ıncon, 2011). Yet, it is extremely difficult for the Chinese to
participate in this process. Thus, while it is true that – in the words of a Colombian
senator – “Colombia has the better institutions than the other countries where there is
more Chinese investment” (Laserna, 2011), the implicit notion that the Chinese only go
where there are bad institutional environments is not necessarily correct. Rather, at least
for the Colombian case, the Chinese would like to go to a place with good institutions, but
they cannot do so. There is no legal discrimination based on nationality, which would be
illegal as Colombia is a member of the WTO (Pen˜a, 2011). Yet, de facto discrimination
against the Chinese exists, and it serves the interests of Finance and Industry. The former
benefits from these rules as it is in a strong position to offer financing to the government,
securing a captured clientele. After all, “you have to use a bidding process by which to
give concessions to private actors” (Benetti, 2011). The latter benefits, as it does not
face strong competition from Chinese enterprises that also could construct the respective
projects.
It is not the case, however, that Colombian politicians are not tempted by Chinese
loans. Particularly large infrastructure projects require massive investments. As one official
noted, “the development banks in Asia are usually prepared to fund these large projects”
(Rojas Hayes, 2011). The official added that the Colombians would be fine with the Chinese
financing and building the project, but only if the Chinese would be willing to win both
bidding processes separately. Another official admits that “[our process] makes it more
difficult to undertake certain kinds or projects. For example, sometimes some countries
207
have a better technology than others, so you [as a government] prefer them, but you cannot
direct the bidding process to them” (Benetti, 2011). Thus, in the end, public officials side
with domestic Industry and Finance: “Of course [the Chinese loans] are very interesting as
they are cheap and have long periods of amortization and grace periods - thus they would
be good for the debt portfolio. [...] Obviously, free money is interesting, but free money
also comes with an agenda – it’s all tied, and it is difficult and cumbersome” (Rojas Hayes,
2011)
Following these considerations, it comes as no surprise that Colombia has not obtained
loans from China. However, it is challenging to prove that there were Chinese loan offers
if actual loan agreements never materialized. My fieldwork nevertheless confirmed that
Colombia had several opportunities to borrow from the Chinese. After all, a public official
in the department that coordinates Colombia’s external relations with Asian countries
stated that ”loans with China have not yet worked out” (Anonymous, 2011e), implying that
there were talks. For one, the Chinese are available for negotiations. In fact, the Chinese
Development Bank has maintained a permanent office in Bogota since 2007 (Guarin, 2011).
In addition, loan offers have been extended to the Colombian government. Public officials
told me of loan proposals by the China Export-Import bank that were rejected by the
government (Chaco´n Pen˜a, 2011a). The economic and commercial counselor to the Chinese
ambassador also confirmed loan offers, but noted that the Colombian government has been
hesitant to accept these offers (Quan, 2011).
In addition to these general loan offers, it is known that the Chinese offered to finance
several public works projects. For example, in 2005 Colombia wanted to build an alternative
to the Panama Canal, a so-called Canal Seco [Dry Canal]. The government inquired
whether foreign creditors – the Chinese among them – would be interested in financing this
project. While an official involved in this process told me that the Chinese were initially
thought of highly, they were not selected for the project (Garcia, 2011; Leiteritz, 2011).
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In addition, government officials confirmed that the Chinese offered a loan to the State-
Owned Enterprise ColPetrol. Yet again, this loan offer was rejected (Rojas Hayes, 2011).
Lastly, Colombia rejected a Chinese loan offer for financing a hydropower project, the
Acueducto Metropolitano de Bucaramanga. Instead it favored borrowing from a regional
multilateral organization, the Andean Development Corporation [Corporacio´n Andina de
Fomento (CAF)]. However, as these negotiations fell through, Colombia still did not use
Chinese money but rather borrowed from a private creditor, Bancolombia.
Figure 6.2: Colombia’s borrowing trends with respect to the four types of creditors.
In sum, the Colombian government had many opportunities to obtain loans from China.
Instead, it chose to explicitly reject those loan offers and borrow from traditional lenders
such as the IMF, western governments and the private capital market. As evidenced by
the aggregate data displayed in Figure 6.2, Colombia continuously expanded its exposure
to multilateral and private creditors. Yet, it did reduce its dependence on bilateral loans
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from DAC countries. As the decisions of the Colombian government are consistent with
the theoretical expectations with respect to a Capital coalition, this case therefore provides
strong evidence for my theoretical framework.
6.4 Peru - a Consumer coalition
6.4.1 Projects as signals
Several interviewees emphasized that one crucial difference between Colombia and Peru is
the role that Industry plays in the political arena. Colombia has a strong manufacturing
basis and a solid stock of entrepreneurs, while Peru’s exports are primarily stemming from
foreign-owned mining operations. A former government official therefore noted that the
Colombian government has to pay much more attention to domestic Industry’s concerns
than Peru. According to him, the reason for these differences in the political influence of
Industry lie in recent economic history. Peru’s economic crisis in the 1990s was solved with
radical doses of neoliberal medication, which hurt businesses with fixed capital more than
mobile capital (Illescas, 2011). Similarly, other interviewees see the crisis as the reason for
Labor’s role in the political discourse. As the depth of the financial crisis in Peru was much
stronger than in Ecuador – primarily due to failed leftist economic policies of President
Alan Garcia in the 1980s – Labor “hailed anything new as the new solution” (Espinoza,
2011). Thus, Fujimori was able to succeed in establishing the liberal project. It appears
that the success of those policies curbing inflation have had a long-lasting effect on Labor’s
political preferences, similar to how Germany’s anti-inflationary preferences are commonly
explained with the memory of hyperinflation in the 1930s. In sum, Labor’s interests appear
to be aligned with those of Finance rather than Industry.
At the same time, there are indications that Finance’s interests are generally more
aligned with Labor than Industry. For example, a high-ranking manager of a private Peru-
vian bank revealed that his bank has significant difficulties competing with the multitude
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of foreign banks that have come to Peru since its financial liberalization. This necessi-
tated a change in strategy: instead of competing with foreign banks for funding large,
capital-intensive projects, his bank is now focusing on serving consumers or even small
entrepreneurs in the informal sector. He stated that this is a logical decision as “the mar-
gins are bigger and we can avoid the competition of foreign banks, particularly because
we have more local knowledge” (Quevedo Ocampo, 2011). A representative of a different
bank told me that they also changed their strategy for similar reasons. Thus, they are not
providing financing for large projects anymore, but rather focus on administering accounts
and offering financial services for smaller clients (Alzamora, 2011).
Considering that Finance and Labor appear to have congruent preferences, politicians
appear to think in terms of an informal Consumer coalition. Thus, they have the incentive
to cater to these societal groups. For example, a former prime minister of Peru noted that
there was general support for establishing a Free Trade Agreement with China. While the
local textile industry lamented the expected negative effect on domestic clothing produc-
tion, the population was in favor of lower prices – which propelled the government to sign
the FTA agreement (Kuczynski, 2011).
A more elaborate illustration of politicians catering to Finance and Labor is the way
the governmental department, Proinversion, works. Just as Colombia’s National Planning
Department coordinates domestic investments, it also organizes the process of selecting
projects that are to be financed and implemented over the course of the incumbent’s term.
This process is a major political battleground, as politicians seek to secure electoral sup-
port by obtaining projects for their constituencies (von Hesse, 2011). However, unlike in
Colombia where politicians act primarily in the interests of Industry and Finance, Peru-
vian politicians’ behaviors cater to the interests of Labor and Finance while disregarding
Industry. For example, one former government official told me that in 2008 and 2009 the
president issued two decrees to boost the economy during the economic downturn. The
highly-publicized decrees ordered that 12 and 20 investment projects, respectively, were to
211
be implemented within a year. However, only five of these 32 projects were realized. One
observer noted that “this was a populist action to show the people that the government
is doing something. However, these kinds of projects need more time for preparation”
(Illescas, 2011).
More generally, the process of selecting public investment projects appears to be mo-
tivated by populist reasons, rather than business considerations. One indication for this
is the different quality of project preparation when comparing Colombia and Peru. As
Colombia caters to the interests of Industry, the Colombian government has an interest in
proposing realistic projects that can be expected to be implemented, and therefore actually
benefit Industry. In contrast, Peru’s Proinversion appears to announce projects despite a
lack of preparation. A former Deputy Minister of the Economy admitted that in Peru there
is no priority list of projects that the public hand wants to undertake: “There is no plan,
and consequently no technical studies regarding the feasibility and viability of potential
projects” (Moro´n Pastor, 2011). Officials of the Central Bank further indicated that there
are two types of project proposals. Some proposals are well prepared and come with feasi-
bility studies, while others lack sufficient documentation (Armas, 2011; Va´squez Sanabria,
2011). This was confirmed by an official working within Proinversion (Herrera, 2011).
Several interviewees made consistent statements regarding the reasons for this state
of affairs. The problem is that the board of Proinversion consists of five Ministers –
not technocrats familiar with project finance and implementation (Illescas, 2011). It is
therefore not surprising that technical experts do not have a voice at board meetings.
Under the condition of anonymity, one former participant of these board meetings told me
that a Minister barked at him: “If you are not a minister, you are just taking notes.” He
added that “that’s why my wife is quite happy that I changed jobs. It is hard to raise my
voice when something can happen to you.” Another interviewee added that “the meeting
is completely informal. There are no rules. There is not even the obligation to present
written reports before presenting a project to the board” (Illescas, 2011).
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Under these conditions, politicians“[...] have the political incentive to propose projects
regardless of their cost-benefit analysis” (von Hesse, 2011). Consequently, “technical deci-
sions were not respected if [the board members] wanted something” (Moro´n Pastor, 2011).
A former public official pointed out that the well-prepared projects, which included a for-
mal presentation along with the necessary legal and technical reports disseminated prior to
the meeting, were generally the projects prepared by Proinversion staff members. However,
if projects were proposed by Ministers, they were generally presented in an ad hoc fashion,
without prior documents, without technical expertise disseminated beforehand, and even
without PowerPoint slides – just a oral presentation at the meeting (Illescas, 2011). In
addition, the political business cycle appears to further reinforce the tendency to produce
poorly-prepared proposals. Interviewees noted that the political cycle of incumbents being
elected for either 4- or 5-year terms does not coincide with the cycle of a typical project
that lasts about seven years from planning to implementation. Thus, for a politician to use
a project as a signal to his constituency, he needs to speed up the process. This can most
easily be accomplished by disregarding the need for careful legal and technical studies (von
Hesse, 2011).
To summarize, the high number of project proposals, their poor preparation, and the
subsequently low number of projects realized suggest that this process serves populist
considerations rather than business interests. Project announcements serve as signals by
incumbents to Labor, while the interests of Industry in viable project preparation are
disregarded. Considering the lack of domestic manufacturing, as well as the high number
of firms operating in the informal sector, this focus on the interests of Labor is logical.5
In conclusion, the structural characteristics of the Peruvian political economy gives
5 However, to be fair, it is difficult to determine whether projects are done for Labor or for Industry.
While my account above is consistent with most views articulated by interviewees, there were voices implying
that Industry is the beneficiary of this process. After all, there are instances where “it is not what the
government deems important that is implemented, but pressures from the private sector generate the
project” (Moro´n Pastor, 2011). Similarly, there are instances where private investors approach Proinversion
to propose a project. Thus, the lack of information on the part of the project proposals could also be
explained by the lack of ownership. Nevertheless, on balance, my experiences with interviewees in Peru –
213
politicians the incentive to think of an informal coalition between Labor and Finance.
6.4.2 Finance for the people
If politicians have the incentive to think in terms of an informal coalition between Finance
and Labor, with Industry being the single actor, will politicians cater to the coalition or
the single actor? I argue that the characteristics of the political economy give Peruvian
politicians reasons to act in the interests of the coalition.
While interviewees noted that Peru does not have a large middle class, it does have a
large popular sector (Pachano, 2011). However, its representation is somewhat vague: left
parties were discredited by unsuccessful economic policies in the 1980s, and subsequently
“destroyed” by Fujimori (Acosta, 2011). At the same time, the popular sector did not orga-
nize in social movements either, partially because of their repression by Fujimori (Salgado,
2011) and cultural factors (Reyes, 2011). The crisis of representation due to Fujimori’s dic-
tatorship also resulted in weak parties generally, none of which are particularly appealing
to the popular sector (Espinoza, 2011). This led one interviewee to note that “there are
only independent politicians who run on the platform of their own newly-founded party. To
win elections, these newly founded platforms need to find a way to get votes” (von Hesse,
2011). This suggests that the size of the selectorate is considerable, and thus requires a
comparatively large winning coalition.
Yet, several interviewees also pointed out that in contrast to Ecuador, Peru has a con-
solidated political arena, partially because of Lima’s geographic concentration and isolation
(Espinoza, 2011; Paredes, 2011). However, it appears that the oligarchic elite are of finan-
cial rather than industrial character. Interviewees noted that it was probably easier for
owners of mobile capital to survive the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s in comparison to
owners of fixed capital, which might be the reason why Colombian Industry is judged to
have more influence over foreign economic policy of their government than their Peruvian
particularly in comparison to Colombia – gave me reasons to conceptualize the processes in favor of Labor
as opposed to Industry.
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counterpart (Anonymous, 2011g).
In sum, Peru, of late, appears to be characterized by a strong political position of
Finance with some support required from the large popular sector. It therefore appears
as if the ratio of winning coalition required and the size of the selectorate are similar to
that of Colombia and Ecuador. This is confirmed by the estimates of W/S by (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2005). Consequently, Peruvian politicians would also have the incentive
to cater to the interests of the coalition instead of the single actor – the difference being
that the coalition here is between Finance and Labor, as opposed to Finance and Industry
(Colombia) or Industry and Labor (Ecuador).
6.4.3 Support for Labor and Finance while Industry is passed over
Following these considerations, we should expect Peruvian politicians to implement poli-
cies catering to the interests of Finance and Labor. The contrast between the treatment
of domestic Industry in Colombia and Peru is instructive in this regard. For example,
unlike Colombia, Peru does not have a governmental program designed to help domestic
industry to become competitive on international markets. Instead, Peruvian industry has
been complaining about the lack of government support. One interviewee told me about
projects proposed by Industry that were stalled by local communities. As Industry was
out on a limb in such a situation, a ‘No’ by the local community usually meant the end
of the project. Industry therefore demanded that the national government play a role in
these negotiations in order to ensure that the community revises its opinion if the proposal
is indeed reasonable (Moro´n Pastor, 2011). In addition, unlike in Colombia, there are no
registration requirements by the Peruvian government for foreign investors. A representa-
tive of a Chinese institution that asked to remain anonymous noted that “after the decision
is made to invest, there is no requirement to register this investment. There is absolutely
no obligation to tell the Peruvian government that you are in the country” (Anonymous,
2011d). Lastly, as eluded to in Section 6.3, Colombian lawmakers ensure that tied loans
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are impossible by requiring that the financing of the project is obtained first before the
bidding on the actual contract begins. In Peru, the opposite is the case as a company first
wins the bid for a particular project, and is only then responsible for securing the necessary
funds from either public or private sources (von Hesse, 2011). In the words of an official
of Proinversion, “There is no requirement to first obtain financing and then organize the
procurement separately. I am just looking for you to invest. It is up to you how you finance
the project. It’s your business. We are only interested in royalties” (Herrera, 2011)6 .
Considering this procedure, it is not surprising that the Peruvian government did not
solicit Chinese loans for particular projects. There are no tied loans because projects can
be financed by the companies directly. The companies, in turn, use the Chinese policy
lending institutions such as the China EXIM bank or the Chinese Development Bank
(CDB) (Tangri, 2011). If there is a Chinese element to the project, the banks state that
“we are glad to support them” (Su, 2011). In particular, with respect to the Peruvian
case, representatives of the CDB told me that their headquarters in China can transfer the
resources directly to the Chinese company HQ that is also located in China. While the
money therefore never leaves China, “Peru doesn’t care where the money comes from as
long as there is investment in Peru” (Su, 2011; Ming, 2011). Peruvian observers only see
that the Chinese use their own resources and do not even have to issue equity to finance
their operations (Alzamora, 2011; Kuczynski, 2011; Cooper, 2011)
Examples of this practice are the Toromocho Mining project, where the Chinese com-
pany ChinalCo obtained $2.5 billion from the Chinese EXIM bank (Barrenechea Ch, 2011).
Similar financing arrangements also amounting to $2.5 billion were made for the Galeno
copper mine by China MinMetals. Lastly, the $1 billion expansion of the Marcona mine
owned by Shougang was financed with “$800 million of Chinese resources and only $200
million by various Peruvian banks. However, they don’t really need our money,” as a
6 However, one interviewee stated that the sequence is actually the other way around: Once the financing
is obtained, the responsible Ministry starts a bidding process for the execution of the project (Felix, 2011).
While a credible interviewee, he was the only one suggesting this order of events.
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Peruvian banker told me (Alzamora, 2011).
Considering that this financing practice is possible in Peru, the government has conse-
quently not borrowed from BRIC countries since their rise to become major creditors, as
confirmed by both Central Bankers and government officials (Armas, 2011; Anonymous,
2011g; Carbajal Vela, 2011). While Figure 6.3 shows an increasing trend in BRIC borrow-
ing, it remains at a minimal level in comparison to borrowing from other sources. In line
with the theoretical expectations from a Consumer coalition between Finance and Labor,
the government has reduced its exposure to mutlilateral loans in recent years. While there
are still some multilateral loans, one Peruvian observer commented that the last World
Bank loan was obtained “less for the money, but more to get the technical cooperation”
(Moro´n Pastor, 2011). However, contrary to the theoretical expectations, Peru covered the
majority of its financing needs not by borrowing from DAC creditors. Instead, it chose
to borrow from another traditional creditor, the private market. In sum, two of the four
borrowing patterns exhibit trends that are consistent with my theory, while the two re-
maining trends do not. However, I do not view these last two ‘incorrect’ trends as strong
evidence against my theory. After all, one traditional creditor (DACs) was substituted
for with another traditional creditor (private creditors), but not with an emerging creditor.
I therefore conclude that the qualitative evidence collected in Peru provides support for
my theory regarding its fundamental theoretical mechanisms suggested, while the observed
borrowing patterns provides only partial support for my theory.
In sum, the findings from the fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia provide support
for the argument that informal social coalitions have a strong impact on the borrowing deci-
sions of their governments. The qualitative evidence presented in Section 3.7 demonstrates
that the preferences of Labor, Industry and Finance vary across the creditors available.
This chapter complements the analysis by establishing that governments are sensitive to
the distributional consequences that follow from their choice of loans. It is therefore no
surprise that the governments of Ecuador, Peru and Colombia respond to the preferences of
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Figure 6.3: Peru’s borrowing trends with respect to the four types of creditors.
the social coalition that dominates their respective political arena by favoring the preferred
creditors of the respective social coalition.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Theoretical advances
Loans from BRICs to developing countries have increased substantially over the course of
the last decade. The emergence of these new sovereign creditors has had tremendous impact
on both sovereign borrowers and traditional creditors. For the first time in recent history,
developing countries have an outside option, and, therefore, the opportunity to decide
against borrowing from the traditional creditors. The emergence of BRICs is responsible
for the erosion of the quasi-monopolistic position traditional creditors benefitted from in
the past.
The central aim of this study is to explain the choices that governments make when
presented the opportunity to borrow either from traditional creditors or emerging lenders.
Conventional wisdom was quick to provide answers to this question, pointing to issues such
as natural resources or the recipient government’s ideology. I show that these explanations
fall short of providing a comprehensive explanation for BRIC loans. Instead, I argue that
the decision between BRICs, DACs, IFIs and private creditors is explained by domestic
social coalitions whose preferences vary across creditors based on the distributional con-
sequences they expect from the respective loans. The nature of my argument introduces
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several theoretical advances to the study of sovereign debt.
First, the current literature on sovereign debt primarily focuses on whether or not
governments borrow from a single type of lender. Scholars have therefore analyzed when
developing countries borrow from the IMF (Copelovitch, 2010b; Vreeland, 2007) or the pri-
vate market (Tomz, 2007). However, I argue that countries – just as individuals – are faced
with a maximum amount of debt they can obtain. Given such a constraint, the decision to
borrow from one creditor is also a decision to not borrow from another. I therefore develop
an argument that takes account of these interdependencies. My theory provides a unifying
framework that explains how developing countries choose between several borrowing op-
tions. This advancement on the conceptual level is matched by a novel empirical strategy
that focuses on estimating debt portfolios instead of loan amounts obtained from a single
creditor in isolation.
Second, existing scholarship has attempted to explain lending decisions primarily from
the creditor’s perspective. This applies both to the literature on traditional creditors, such
as the IMF (Copelovitch, 2010a; Stone, 2004), as well as the emerging scholarship on Chi-
nese lending (Brautigam, 2009). However, I argue that recipient governments cannot simply
be conceived of as passive factors. Instead, developing countries need to be conceptualized
as actors with their own incentives, preferences, and motivations. The theory outlined in
this study accounts for this by proposing a demand-side theory that understands recipients
as dynamic actors.
Lastly, with few exceptions, scholars working on issues of sovereign debt have conceptu-
alized recipients has unitary actors (Marchesi, 2003; Putnam, 1988). While disaggregating
the unit of analysis is commonplace in the related literature on the political economy of
trade, the scholarship on debt assumes that recipient governments are a homogenous unit.
This prevents existing scholarship from analyzing the implications of coalitional dynamics
between various domestic interest groups for sovereign debt. My theory addresses this
shortcoming by explicitly modeling the diverging references of various societal groups as
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well as the mechanism by which these preferences are aggregated and consequently imple-
mented as governmental policy. I match this conceptual advance with a novel empirical
approach by employing latent variable models to estimate the position of the societal groups
with respect to their preferences across creditors.
Incorporating these three conceptual advances – explaining the choice amongst cred-
itors, focusing on the demand-side, and emphasizing preferences of sub-national societal
groups – into a common theoretical framework represents a novel approach to the study
of sovereign debt. As a consequence, my framework provides new insights into previously
unresolved puzzles in the literature on sovereign debt.
For example, my theory reconciles the contradictory finding that IMF programs cause
public protest and yet are frequently signed despite such protest. Vreeland (2003b) de-
scribes instances where political leaders sign IMF agreements despite large public protests
against such agreements. Further, Sidell (1988) and Killick (1995) argue that IMF pro-
grams helped existing governments to maintain office despite instances of public protest.
My theoretical framework reconciles these observations. While the minority actor – say
Labor – may be in the streets protesting, I provide an explanation for why a government
catering to a Capital coalition has the incentive to implement the preferred policy of Fi-
nance and Industry over Labor.
In addition, my theory provides new insights into the phenomenon of recidivism. Schol-
ars have been puzzled by the empirical fact that a country which has received IMF loans
in the past is more likely to receive an IMF loan again than a country that has never had
dealings with the IMF. This so-called recidivism cannot be explained by economic factors
alone as econometric studies show that the differences in probabilities persist even when
controlling for economic measures. Political scientists have therefore suggested that the
domestic audience costs of obtaining IMF loans with its macroeconomic conditions differ
systematically across these two sets of countries. In particular, participating in IMF pro-
grams incurs so-called ‘sovereignty costs’ as the public is expected to accuse the government
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of ‘selling out’ to the international institution. However, sovereignty costs decrease over
time if the current government can point to previous leaders that have turned to the IMF
in the past. With lower sovereignty costs, the likelihood of turning to the IMF again and
again is higher than in countries that still would incur high sovereignty costs if they were
to enter an IMF agreement for the first time (Vreeland, 2003a).
While this hypothesis can explain the dynamics of a country after it has signed its first
IMF agreement, no explanation is given as to why it would ever sign an initial agreement.
After all, initially, both sets of countries were identical as neither had received an IMF
loan. In contrast, my theoretical framework can explain the heterogeneity in sovereignty
costs across countries without reference to some exogenous shock while also explaining
recidivism. The focus on the political dynamics of domestic interest groups can therefore
explain what type of countries are more likely to enter into an agreement with the IMF
in the first place as well as why they are more likely to return to the IMF over and over
again.
7.2 Normative implications
Besides the academic contributions, what are the implications of my study outside of the
ivory tower? Why should policy makers care about who chooses BRIC loans rather than
loans from traditional creditors? My explanation for why some developing countries rely
more heavily on BRIC loans than others offers insights into the likely repercussions for the
countries that choose to obtain these loans. In particular, my argument suggests that BRIC
loans might have unique implications for issues of power, development and democracy.
Power With respect to power, scholars and politicians alike previously assumed that
granting loans to foreign countries would provide creditor countries with a degree of power
over the recipient (Waltz, 1979). However, the emergence of non-traditional creditors
offers developing countries the opportunity to choose among several creditors. My findings
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provide powerful evidence that countries make use of this opportunity as I have shown that
their choices vary.
Because of the availability of alternatives, governments in developing countries are less
dependent on a traditional creditors. In other words, the emergence of BRICs as an alter-
native source of finance is undermining the quasi-monopoly that western creditors inherited
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Instead of being ‘forced’ to resort
to traditional creditors, governments now have certain room to maneuver. The availability
of a creditor that offers loans to fundamentally different conditions allows countries to pur-
sue policies that western creditors would have been unwilling to fund. It might therefore
be the case that governments are now able to pursue a development path similar to that
of the East Asian Tigers and contrary to the prescriptions of the neoliberal Washington
Consensus. While I do not want to make a statement as to the benefits of this situation, I
do recognize that the increased room to maneuver implies a higher degree of sovereignty for
developing countries. Particularly in democracies, this implies that the population in these
countries has gained autonomy to choose their own political course with less interference of
creditors they dislike. My work therefore illuminates how globalization actually increases
flexibility for small states in an increasingly globalized world.
Besides the increase in sovereignty, the availability of choices to governments implies
more competition among creditors. The fact that governments have a Best Alternative To
A Negotiated Agreements (BATNA) available in negotiations with a particular creditor
appears to have an effect on the conditions to which loans are offered. For example, Figure
7.1 displays the effect that borrowing from BRIC appears to have on the conditions of loans
that are subsequently offered by traditional creditors. For this figure, I first calculate the
average interest rate of all loans obtained from the respective type of traditional creditors
in the 5 years prior to the first BRIC loan of more than $US 100 million. I then calculate
the average interest rate of loans obtained from traditional creditors in the 5 years after
this large BRIC loan. The figure displays the difference in the average interest loans before
223
DAC IFI Private
-4 -2 0 2 4
Congo, Rep.
Angola
Ukraine
Gabon
Romania
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Zimbabwe
Brazil
Nepal
Morocco
India
Cambodia
Venezuela, RB
El Salvador
Philippines
Senegal
Thailand
Kenya
Vietnam
Turkey
Argentina
Bhutan
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Mauritius
Dominican Republic
Costa Rica
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ethiopia
Ghana
Armenia
Pakistan
Moldova
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Uzbekistan
Mauritania
-6 -4 -2 0 2
Moldova
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Turkey
Mauritius
Madagascar
Morocco
Pakistan
Argentina
Romania
Thailand
Indonesia
Philippines
India
Belarus
Brazil
El Salvador
Kyrgyz Republic
Cameroon
Bhutan
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Ghana
Mozambique
Senegal
Nicaragua
Kenya
Congo, Rep.
Nepal
Mauritania
Maldives
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Vietnam
Armenia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Angola
-6 -4 -2 0 2
Zimbabwe
Maldives
Thailand
Sri Lanka
El Salvador
Bolivia
Mauritania
Mauritius
Pakistan
Dominican Republic
Brazil
Romania
Morocco
Vietnam
Ghana
Nicaragua
India
Tajikistan
Turkey
Mozambique
Nepal
Venezuela, RB
Philippines
Moldova
Madagascar
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Senegal
Costa Rica
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Bhutan
Cambodia
Cameroon
Chad
Kyrgyz Republic
Sudan
Togo
Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia
Gabon
Angola
Indonesia
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Uzbekistan
Kenya
Argentina
Figure 7.1: Difference in average interest rates of loans from traditional creditors obtained
in the 5 years before and the 5 years after a country obtained its first BRIC loan of at least
100 million $US.
and after obtaining a large BRIC loan. It appears that traditional creditors ‘feel the heat’
of the competition. Once governments show that they are willing to use BRICs as a source
of loans, traditional creditors appear to improve the terms of their subsequent loan offers.
This might imply that the emergence of BRICs might lead to a ‘race to the top,’ resulting
in better lending terms for developing countries.
My research also speaks to whether the IMF will remain relevant in the near future. I
have shown that certain types of countries, in particular those characterized by a Corpo-
ratist or Consumer coalition, will continuously prefer borrowing from traditional creditors
instead of emerging lenders. The IMF may therefore rest assured that its services and
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loans will continue to be demanded in the future, albeit only by a subset of countries.
Development Since their emergence as creditors, policy makers and development orga-
nizations alike have been concerned with the effect of BRIC loans on issues of development.
Do Chinese loans assist development or do they retard growth? Figure 7.2 presents a first
step towards assessing the macroeconomic consequences of BRIC loans. It compares the
average GDP per capita in the 5 years prior to acquiring the first BRIC loan larger than
$US 100 million with the average GDP per capita in the 5 years after that loan has been
obtained. It appears that the GDP per capita is generally not negatively affected by BRIC
loans. In fact, the majority of countries exhibits higher GDP per capita in the period
following the acquisition of a large BRIC loan. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that
these descriptive statistics are only the first step towards assessing the quantitative conse-
quences of BRIC loans on GDP.
The insights obtained from my interviews in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia point to a
qualitative dimension on which BRIC loans might have a positive impact. The conditions
attached to loans from traditional creditors advance a neo-liberal concept of development
by emphasizing education and health. In contrast, BRIC loans are typically associated
with specific investment projects, particular in the infrastructure and transportation sec-
tor. While improving health and education is undoubtedly important, it might be that
improvements in infrastructure are more efficient and effective for advancing development.
According to Foster et al. (2008, p.23), the gap in infrastructure investment in African coun-
tries alone amounts to $10 billion annually, which has been estimated to reduce Africa’s
GDP growth by about 1% (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; Calderon and Serve´n, 2004).
Due to their different sectoral emphasis, BRIC loans might therefore help resolve a crucial
bottleneck preventing growth.
225
-1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000
Ukraine
Tajikistan
Moldova
Bolivia
Uzbekistan
Zimbabwe
Madagascar
Togo
Cameroon
Nepal
Chad
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Senegal
Ghana
Morocco
Mozambique
Ethiopia
India
Pakistan
Thailand
Armenia
Nigeria
Sudan
Congo, Rep.
Gabon
Nicaragua
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Mauritania
Serbia
Cambodia
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Vietnam
Philippines
El Salvador
Costa Rica
Angola
Dominican Republic
Venezuela, RB
Turkey
Brazil
Mauritius
Maldives
Belarus
Argentina
Figure 7.2: Difference in average GDP per capita in the 5 years before and the 5 years
after a country obtained its first BRIC loan of at least 100 million $US.
Democracy Besides concerns regarding the impact of BRIC loans on development, a
number of observers have argued that BRIC loans might undermine democracy in recipi-
ent countries. For example, at the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm in 2007, German Finance
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Minister Peer Steinbru¨ck stated that BRIC loans undermine the promotion of ‘good gov-
ernance’ by western creditors (Wenping, 2007). Others have argued that the Chinese in
particular are more likely than western creditors to grant loans to non-democratic govern-
ments, thereby providing leaders with resources which allow them to remain in office longer
than otherwise possible.
My study provides insights into the likely effects of BRIC loans on democracy, and
they differ from this pessimistic view. My argument rests on analyzing the distributional
consequences of different loans. I find that IMF loans benefit the capital owners who
are already rich. In contrast, BRIC loans benefit Labor which is comprised of the poorer
segments of society. Considering that BRIC loans therefore materially benefit the numerical
majority, these loans might contribute to a reduction in inequality. Following Boix (2003)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), reducing inequality makes democracy more likely.
Chinese loans might therefore have an indirect pro-democratic effect.
Preliminary analysis of the relationship between BRIC loans and democracy scores
appears to support this line of reasoning. Figure 7.3 represents the change in polity scores
of countries that received their first BRIC loan larger than $US 100 million. I calculate
the average polity score in the 5 years prior to receiving the BRIC loan and compare it
with the average polity score of the 5 years following the acquisition of this loan. I want to
emphasize that this data only represents the first step towards understanding the effect of
BRIC loans on democracy. Nevertheless, it appears that there is no indication that BRIC
loans might retard democracy, but rather that the opposite is the case.
7.3 Directions for future research
The analysis presented in this study has been constrained by the fact that BRIC lending
is a relatively recent phenomenon. Considering the relatively short period of time in which
BRICs represented a reasonable option as a source of loans for governments in developing
countries, the lack of long time-series data prevents the analysis of the political dynamics
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Figure 7.3: Difference in average Polity score in the 5 years before and the 5 years after a
country obtained its first BRIC loan of at least 100 million $US.
that are initiated by BRIC loans.
This study has therefore focused on the analysis of political dynamics that lead to BRIC
loans. Future analysis could center on the effects that BRIC loans themselves have on the
political dynamics that produced them. For example, while I have shown how certain types
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of coalitions tend to borrow from BRICs while others do not, it would be worthwhile to
investigate the nature of the macroeconomic consequences of these loans and how these
effects shape the societal coalitions in future years. For example, it is conceivable that
BRIC loans lower unemployment as they are typically tied to investment projects that
typically create employment opportunities. Following the logic of Chapter 4, this would
couple the positions of Labor and Industry in favor of each other, thereby cementing the
likelihood of a Corporatist coalition which in turn makes BRIC loans more likely. However,
such an analysis requires long time-series data that is currently not available. We will have
to ‘wait and see.’
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Appendix A
Fieldwork information
A.1 List of interview partners
I interviewed a total of 112 individuals in 2011. The names of the individuals that gave
permission are listed below, sorted alphabetically and by country.
A.1.1 Colombia
A´lvarez, Martha Cecilia
Benetti, Juan Guillermo Castro
Buchs, Thierry
Chaco´n Pen˜a, Manuel Andres
Concha Corzo, Angelica
Creutzfeldt, Benjamin
Duarte, Ricardo
Escobar Arango, Andres
Fergusson, Leopoldo
Fernandez, Andres
Garcia, Juana
Gaviria A´ngel, Gustavo
Gazon, Be´ne´dicte
Guarin, Maria Fernanda
Hofstetter, Marc
Ibarra, Carolina
Junguito, Roberto
Laserna, Juan Mario
Leo´n, Javier
Leiteritz, Ralf
Mantilla, Jaime
Martinez, Oscar
Mathieu, Hans
Mendoza de Galofre, Patricia
Montes Uribe, Enrique
Moreno Henao, Camila
Nupia, Oskar
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Pen˜a, Angelica
Perry, Guillermo
Piwek, Sonia
Posada, Miguel
Quan, Zhou
Quinones, Rocio
R´ıncon, Hernan
Reina, Mauricio
Rettberg, Angelika
Richy, Fabrice
Rojas Hayes, Carolina
Romero, Iza Fernanda
Salamanca, Sandra
Sanchez, Daniela
Steiner, Roberto
Suescun, Rodrigo
Technical report
Thiell, Marcus
Vargas, Camilo
one anonymous interview
A.1.2 Peru
Alzamora, Gonzalo Miguel Alvarez
Calderon
Ara´oz, Mercedes
Armas, Adrian
Arteaga, Mario F
Bajarano, Waldy
Barrenechea Ch, Alvaro
Beltran, Arlette
Benavented, Patricia
Carbajal Vela, Liliana
Cooper, Claudia
Felix, Marcos
Galarza, Francisco
Gomez Gamarra, Zoila del Rosario
Gonzalez Vigil, Fernando
Heller Ledgard, Vanessa
Herrera, Carlos A
Illescas, Javier
Ka´miche, Joanna
Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo
Ming, Lv
Moro´n Pastor, Eduardo Andre´s
Quevedo Ocampo, Isabel
Salhuana, Roger
Su, Adriana
Tangri, Xiaohuan
Va´squez Sanabria, Fernando
von Hesse, Milton
Xiaohe, Hong
four anonymous interviews
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A.1.3 Ecuador
Abarca Runruil, Madeleine
Acosta, Alberto
Albornoz G, Vicente
Bayas Paredes, Santiago
Burbano, Gabriela
Checa, Eduardo
Detsch, Claudia
Espinoza, Carlos
Gonzalez, Jorge Luis
Ja´come Estrella, Hugo
Mancero de Viterio, Piedad
Minoli, Gino
Oleas M, Sebastia´n
Pachano, Simon
Paredes, Pablo Lucio
Pen˜a Villarruel, Rene
Perez, Wilson
Piedra Vivar, Pablo
Rast, Lothar
Reyes, Milton
Rodas Espinel, Armando
Rodas, Andrea
Romero, Pedro
Salgado, Wilma
Soria, Andres
Villalbo Andrade, Mateo
three anonymous interviews
A.1.4 Germany
Bartels, Matthias
Gleichmann, Colin
Kaiser, Ju¨rgen
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A.2 Interview questions
Note that I conducted semi-structured interviews. Thus, the question order and wording
varied across interviews, as it was more important to have a conversation. Open-ended
questions were used.
A.2.1 Questions for Recipient Government Representatives
 What is the process by which loan agreements are reached?
 What financing options does the government typically have available? Are you credit
constrained?
 Are there situations in which you have to choose between offers? Have there been
instances where you rejected offers?
 How do you evaluate BRIC vs. DAC vs. Multilateral vs. Private debt? Which do
you prefer and why?
 Have there been Chinese loans obtained by the government? If yes, why?
 If there are none, where loan offers made? Why were they rejected?
 How do domestic constituencies think about Chinese loans? DAC loans? etc. Who
benefits and who loses?
 Does it matter to your decision making process what domestic constituencies think?
 If there are losers, why does an agreement come into existence? How do losers try to
prevent losing? Why do winners win?
 Why are the borrowing strategies of Ecuador, Peru and Colombia so different?
A.2.2 Questions for Representatives of Finance, Industry and Labor
 Why are the borrowing strategies of Ecuador, Peru and Colombia so different?
 Does it matter to you what type of loan the government obtains? What do you get,
if anything?
 How do you evaluate BRIC vs. DAC vs. Multilateral vs. Private debt? Which do
you prefer and why? What are the distributional consequences, if any?
 How do you see Chinese loans vs. Chinese investment vs. Chinese trade?
 Do you lobby the government re: the type of debt that it should obtain? If so,
through which channels? Are politicians responsive?
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 Have there been Chinese loans obtained by the government? Why were they ac-
cepted?
 If there are none, where loan offers made? Why were they rejected?
A.2.3 Questions for Creditor Representatives
 What is the process by which loan agreements are reached?
 Have there been Chinese loans obtained by the government? If yes, why?
 If there are none, where loan offers made? Why were they rejected?
 Is there competition between you and other creditors?
 Have there been instances where your loan offer was rejected? If so, why?
 Why are the borrowing strategies of Ecuador, Peru and Colombia so different?
 How do you evaluate the borrowing strategy by the government?
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A.3 Consent Form
FORMULARIO DE CONSENTIMIENTO
¿Por que´ algunos pa´ıses en desarrollo solicitan pre´stamos a pa´ıses de mercados
emergentes, y otros no?
Usted esta´ invitado a participar en mi investigacio´n doctoral en la Universidad de Min-
nesota. En este estudio indago sobre las razones por las cuales algunos pa´ıses deciden
solicitar pre´stamos a los mercados emergentes como China mientras que otros pa´ıses no lo
hacen. Usted ha sido seleccionado como posible participante por ser un funcionario pblico
involucrado en la decisio´n de solicitar pre´stamos o porque hace parte de los grupos de
intere´s que pueden verse beneficiados o perjudicados si su pa´ıs acepta pre´stamos de China.
Le pido por favor que lea este formulario y me haga cualquier pregunta que tenga antes de
aceptar participar en el estudio.
Este estudio esta´ siendo realizado por:
Jonas Bunte
Universidad de Minnesota (University of Minnesota)
Ciencia Pol´ıtica (Department of Political Science)
Antecedentes El propo´sito de este estudio es comprender las razones por las que algunos
pa´ıses en desarrollo deciden pedir prestado a pa´ıses de mercados emergentes (como China),
mientras que otros pa´ıses en desarrollo no lo hacen.
Procedimientos Si acepta participar en este estudio, se le pedira´ que haga lo siguiente:
La entrevista tendra´ una duracio´n de 1 hora y tendra´ lugar en la sede de la institucio´n
gubernamental o asociacio´n respectiva. Las preguntas son acerca de (1) las ventajas y
desventajas de las diferentes ofertas de pre´stamo, (2) la opinio´n de los grupos de intere´s
con respecto a las ofertas de pre´stamos, (3) los detalles de la toma de decisiones, (4) sus
expectativas en cuanto a las decisiones sobre pre´stamos que su pa´ıs hara´ en el futuro, y (5)
una evaluacio´n de la estrategia de endeudamiento de otros pa´ıses.
Si esta´ de acuerdo con la entrevista, le voy a pedir permiso para usar una grabadora una
vez empecemos. Usted decide si prefiere que use la grabadora o no.
Riesgos y beneficios de estar en el estudio El estudio no tiene riesgos.
No hay beneficios directos para participar en este estudio.
Confidencialidad Los registros de este estudio son privados. Cualquier tipo de informe
que salga publicado no incluira´ ninguna informacio´n que permita identificarlo a usted
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como individuo. Los archivos de la investigacio´n se almacenara´n de forma segura y so´lo
el investigador tendra´ acceso a los registros. Si usted acepta quedar grabado en audio, la
grabacio´n sera´ almacenada en carpetas cifradas y sera´ eliminada despue´s de cinco aos.
Cara´cter voluntario del Estudio La participacio´n en este estudio es voluntaria. Su
decisio´n de participar o no no afectara´ sus relaciones presentes o futuras con la Universidad
de Minnesota. Si decide participar, usted es libre de no responder a cualquier pregunta o
de retirarse en cualquier momento, sin perjuicio de las relaciones.
Contactos y preguntas El investigador de este estudio es Jonas Bunte. Usted puede
hacer cualquier pregunta que tenga ahora. Si tiene preguntas mas adelante, lo animo a
contactar al investigador directamente en la siguiente direccio´n:
Universidad de Minnesota (University of Minnesota)
Ciencia Pol´ıtica (Department of Political Science)
1414 Social Sciences Building
267 19th Ave S
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Nmero de tele´fono: +(001) 612 709 4242
bunte002@umn.edu
Si tiene alguna pregunta o inquietud con respecto a este estudio y le gustar´ıa hablar con
alguien que no sea el investigador, contacte directamente a la L´ınea del Defensor de los
Sujetos de Investigacio´n, D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware St. SE, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455,
(612) 625 1650.
Se le dara´ una copia de esta informacio´n para mantener en sus archivos.
